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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Depression is one of the most prevalent of all psychiatric disorders (Kessler et 
al., 2005). Epidemiological surveys have shown that approximately one out of five 
individuals in the general population have at least one episode of depression during 
their life (Gotlib & Hamilton, 2008). Depression has also been found to commonly co-
occur with other mental diseases. For example, it appears frequently to show 
comorbidity with anxiety disorders (Gorman, 1996; Swendsen, 1997), PTSD (Bleich, 
Kosllowsky, Dolev, & Lerer, 1997; Stein & Kennedy, 2001) and personality disorders 
(Fava et al., 1996; Robert & Hirschfeld, 1999). A substantial number of surveys and 
studies have shown that depression is related to poor work performance (Kessler et al., 
2006; Wang et al., 2004), impaired social skills (Segrin, 2000; Tse & Bond, 2004), 
reduced social interaction and social support (Cruwys et al., 2013; Fukukawa et al., 
2004; Rauktis, Koeske, & Tereshko, 1995), and increased suicidal ideation and attempts 
(Carpenter, Hasin, Allison, & Faith, 2000; Evans, Hawton, & Rodham, 2004; Harrington, 
2001). The overwhelming personal suffering and huge economic cost of depression in 
society has raised public concern regarding depression and its treatment (Andrews, 
Poulton, & Skoog, 2005; Kessler et al., 2010). 
Despite the availability of a wide variety of treatment options, such as 
pharmacotherapy, psychotherapy, and neurobiological interventions, the relapse and 
recurrence rate remains high in depression (Beshai, Dobson, Bockting, & Quigley, 2011; 
Demyttenaere et al., 2004; Steinert, Hofmann, Kruse, & Leichsenring, 2014). In people 
who have remitted from depression, the risk of relapse is about 50% after a first 
episode, 70% after two episodes, and 90% after a third episode (for a review, see 
Burcusa & Iacono, 2007; Gili, Vicens, Roca, Andersen, & McMillan, 2015; Kessler et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, approximately 10%-20% of depressed patients show no response 
to any treatment (Burrows, Norman, & Judd, 1994; Holtzheimer & Mayberg, 2011). 
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These findings suggest that latent risk factors may still exist when depressive patients 
are in a remission period which may then exert a disruptive influence on wellbeing 
when triggered by stressful life events (for a review, see Joormann & Tanovic, 2015). 
Therefore, discovering the factors that make people vulnerable to depression should be 
considered highly important in the study of depression and its treatment. 
Rumination is of particular interest to researchers focusing on vulnerability to 
depression. Decades of research have shown that rumination is one of the most 
important risk factors for the onset and maintenance of depressive symptoms (Mor & 
Winquist, 2002; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Two main issues have 
received considerable attention over the past two decades. First, what kind of people 
tend to ruminate more often than others, and second, how people who ruminate get 
trapped in the vicious circle of rumination. Several theoretical frameworks have been 
proposed and a large body of research has accumulated concerning these two 
questions. In this chapter, we first introduce a definition of depressive rumination, 
which is the definition used throughout the whole dissertation. To provide background 
to the first question, we briefly summarize the measures and manipulations of 
rumination in laboratory studies. Subsequently, we describe several vital cognitive 
frameworks on information processing in rumination and related empirical studies 
testing the predictions of these models. A comprehensive answer to the second 
question requires not only laboratory studies but also daily life experience. To obtain 
real-life data, experience sampling method has been applied in previous studies. Thus, 
the basic procedure of experience sampling method is provided and the findings 
concerning daily ruminative thinking are reviewed. Next, dynamic system theory is 
introduced as a powerful framework to analyse and interpret experience sampling data. 
Basic concepts of dynamic system theory used in the following chapters are elaborated. 
Finally, the main research questions and corresponding research lines of this thesis are 
presented. 
DEPRESSIVE RUMINATION 
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In general, rumination is characterized as repetitive self-focused thinking 
(Watkins, 2004, 2008). Most conceptual work on rumination has emerged in the 
context of depression. Based on the response styles theory, rumination is conceived as 
a form of responding to negative mood that focuses in a perseverative and repetitive 
manner on the implications, causes, and meanings of one’s feelings and problems 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). It has been repeatedly 
observed that depressive rumination has detrimental effects on mood, problem-
solving, and cognitive processes (Watkins, 2008). Depressive rumination has been 
demonstrated to prospectively predict the onset and maintenance of depression (Just & 
Alloy, 1997; Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). It has also 
been found to be a mediator between other risk factors and depressive symptoms 
(Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001). Hence, understanding the underlying mechanism of 
rumination and its relation with depression may provide insight to prevention, 
intervention, and treatment of depression.  
Most laboratory studies in rumination assess rumination with self-report 
questionnaires. Corresponding to the definition of depressive rumination, Ruminative 
Response Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) has been developed as a 
common measure of the tendency to ruminate in response to depressed mood (Davis & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Generally, individuals are asked 
to rate items on a 4-point scale of the 22-item RRS while thinking about how they 
typically respond when they are in negative or depressed mood. Previous studies using 
the RRS have shown that trait rumination is a relatively stable construct across different 
contexts (e.g., across different mood states and levels of depression) (Bagby, Rector, 
Bacchiochi, & McBride, 2003; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Davis, 1999). There are also other questionnaires that target different 
features of rumination, such as the Global Rumination Scale (McIntosh & Martin, 1992), 
and the Anger Rumination Scale (ARS; Sukhodolsky, Golub, & Cromwell, 2001) amongst 
others (for a review, see Watkins, 2008; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). 
Importantly, several researchers proposed a distinction between two subtypes 
of rumination, which are constructed and termed as brooding and reflection in the RRS 
subscales (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). Reflection involves thoughts 
that are more oriented towards reappraisal that leads to engagement in problem 
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solving (Gibb, Grassia, Stone, Uhrlass, & McGeary, 2012; Schoofs, Hermans, & Raes, 
2010). While reflection has been related to a relatively less detrimental aspect of 
rumination, brooding has been considered as a more maladaptive form of rumination 
(Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Treynor et 
al., 2003). Brooding refers to a passive, abstract self-focus on one’s mood by comparing 
one’s current situation with unattained goals. It has been shown to be associated with 
the onset and maintenance of depressive episodes (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-
Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993), emotional inertia (Koval, Kuppens, Allen, & 
Sheeber, 2012), and attentional bias to negative information (Owens & Gibb, 2016; 
Vanderhasselt et al., 2013).  
In addition to assessment of trait rumination with self-report questionnaires, 
many laboratory studies also tried to activate state rumination using induction 
procedures in order to investigate its influence on cognitive functioning (Whitmer & 
Gotlib, 2013). For example, some researchers asked participants to read a series 
statements (e.g., “Think about why you react the way you do”) which required them to 
focus on themselves and vividly think about how they feel (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). Other 
researchers also created some scenarios and asked participants to think about the 
situation in a ruminative manner (e.g., “think about what consequences this has for 
how you see yourself”) (Grol, Hertel, Koster, & De Raedt, 2015). Before and after the 
induction procedure, participants’ state rumination was measured and then compared 
to assess the effect of the induction. Previous studies have shown that state rumination 
may be associated with cognitive deficits, such as increased levels of cognitive 
distortions (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001) and decreased inhibition ability  in dysphoric 
participants (Philippot & Brutoux, 2008), as well as enhanced processing of negative 
information (Lewis, Taubitz, Duke, Steuer, & Larson, 2015) and lower mood (Huffziger 
et al., 2013) in non-selected undergraduate samples. Importantly, several researchers 
found that rumination induction did not influence switch costs in healthy controls 
(Whitmer & Gotlib, 2012). It is still not clear whether these results were because that 
healthy individual may be less reactive to rumination induction or that state rumination 
does not deteriorate the corresponding cognitive functioning. 
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In sum, great effort has been made in describing, measuring, differentiating, and 
inducing different types or aspects of rumination. Despite the large body of research 
concerning levels of rumination and its impact on depression, research interest has 
shifted to the question why rumination persists (Watkins, 2008). Especially in the last 
ten years, researchers tried to identify cognitive factors that contribute to the 
persistence of ruminative thinking. Below, we review the most recently developed 
theoretical frameworks that reveal the underlying cognitive mechanism of rumination. 
INFORMATION PROCESSING OF RUMINATION: COGNITIVE ACCOUNTS FOR THE MECHANISM 
OF RUMINATION  
 
In a large number of studies with regard to the information processing in 
rumination ranging from cross-sectional to longitudinal designs, the function of 
cognitive control has received wide attention (Vergara-Lopez, Lopez-Vergara, & 
Roberts, 2016). This has led to the development of a number of theoretical models. 
Early suggestions that inhibition is important in the persistence of depressive 
rumination derived from propositions of Joormann (2010). From the account of the 
impaired disengagement hypothesis (Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakhshan, & De Raedt, 
2011), rumination may be accounted for by difficulty in disengagement of attention 
from the activated thoughts in working memory. Further, attentional scope has been 
argued to be one of the most important cognitive factors that influence the repetitive 
feature of rumination (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). Finally, researchers also have also 
developed a goal habit framework of rumination (Koster et al., 2011; Watkins & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2014). These models are discussed in the next section. 
Cognitive inhibition and rumination 
The propositions provided by Joormann (2010) have emphasized the role of 
cognitive inhibition in emotion regulation. Joormann suggests that deficits in inhibition 
of negative information in working memory may cause increases in rumination. In 
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specific, when individuals experience negative feelings, mood-congruent negative 
schema, which refers to internal representations of concepts about oneself and the 
world (Beck, 1967, 1995), tends to be easily activated.  Normally, individuals would 
make an effort to replace the dominant negative thoughts from working memory with 
some other thoughts that are more positive to reappraise the current situation. 
However, individuals with impaired cognitive control, especially in inhibition, would 
have trouble removing the activated negative thoughts and keeping new negative 
information from entering working memory. This would lead to detrimental 
consequences in emotion regulation, such as increased usage of rumination and 
decreased usage of reappraisal. 
Quite substantial empirical evidence supports the notion of a relation between 
rumination and inhibition (for a review, see Cohen, Daches, Mor, & Henik, 2014; 
Monnart, Kornreich, Verbanck, & Campanella, 2016). Notably, by comparing dysphoric 
individuals and healthy controls, some researchers have suggested that inhibition 
difficulties were associated specifically with rumination but not with depression in 
general (De Lissnyder, Koster, Deraksha, & De Raedt, 2010). Other researchers found 
that impaired inhibition of negative words was associated with rumination and 
depression only in currently depressed patients but not in remitted depressed patients 
and healthy controls (Joormann & Gotlib, 2010). Furthermore, most of the previous 
studies only examined the association between cognitive inhibition and rumination in 
cross-sectional designs while scant attention has been paid to their causal direction 
(Cohen et al., 2014; Roberts, Watkins, & Wills, in press). Few studies examined whether 
inducing participants to ruminate has an impact on inhibition (Philippot & Brutoux, 
2008) and in turn, whether training the ability to inhibit negative information in trait 
ruminators could decrease their rumination level (Daches & Mor, 2014). More research 
is needed to extend and elaborate this hypothesis. 
The impaired disengagement hypothesis 
In 2011, Koster and colleagues have put forward the impaired disengagement 
hypothesis to unravel the underlying mechanism of rumination. They stated that 
rumination at the beginning is one of the forms of emotion regulation elicited by 
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negative mood or stressors in life, and therefore, is not necessarily a maladaptive 
regulation strategy. It is the persistent use of rumination that is associated with 
impaired problem solving, negative emotions and the development of depression. With 
regard to how individuals get stuck in sustained rumination, the main assumption of 
this hypothesis points out that difficulties in disengaging attention from negative self-
related thoughts may be the underpinning mechanism. They delineated the possible 
processes that could be involved in attentional disengagement. Specifically, when 
individuals are in negative mood, this is usually accompanied by increased self-critical 
thinking. Such thoughts can elicit cognitive conflict between self-critical thinking and 
typical positive self-evaluation. The awareness of this conflict may elicit an effort to 
move attention away from the current negative thinking which would help re-evaluate 
the current situation or engage in a different new task. Difficulties to disengage 
attention could happen at any of the abovementioned processes in the whole 
attentional disengagement procedure. If there is problem in the conflict detecting, such 
as people have low or negative self- schema, then less arising conflict would lead to less 
motivation to change their current attentional focus. General attentional control, such 
as updating, inhibition and set shifting, may cause the impairment when individuals 
attempt to remove the current negative thoughts and process new information.   
The impaired disengagement hypothesis could be used to explain findings of 
various studies concerning the relation between rumination and cognitive control 
especially in individuals with heightened levels of depressive symptoms. It has also 
received empirical support. For example, a recent study conducted an attentional 
assessment task in undergraduates, which contains attentional engagement bias 
assessment trials and attentional disengagement bias assessment trials to detect which 
process is involved in relation to heightened trait rumination (Grafton, Southworth, 
Watkins, & MacLeod, 2016). Their findings provided evidence for the impaired 
disengagement hypothesis in that high trait rumination was associated with deficits in 
attentional disengagement from negative information but not with facilitated 
attentional engagement to negative information. Additionally, they also found that 
relative to anxiety-related words, attentional bias to depression-related words was 
positively correlated with trait rumination scores, which was consistent with the 
proposition of the impaired disengagement hypothesis that depressive rumination is 
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characterized by specific attentional bias for negative/ depressogenic information. 
Similar results were found in a related study which revealed that higher levels of 
brooding were related to greater difficulties to disengage attention from negative 
relative to positive words (Southworth, Grafton, MacLeod, & Watkins, 2017). Using the 
same attentional assessment task, in a study on undergraduate psychological students 
preparing for mid-term exams, researchers found that rumination was associated with 
impaired disengagement of attention from negative words, and that this bias mediated 
the predictive effect of rumination on stress reactivity (Vålenas et al., 2017). In addition, 
previous studies also showed association between rumination and impaired cognitive 
control for negative stimuli (Chen, Feng, Wang, Su, & Zhang, 2016; De Lissnyder et al., 
2012a, 2012b; Demeyer, De Lissnyder, Koster, & De Raedt, 2012; Hilt, Leitzke, & Pollak, 
2016; Koster, De Lissnyder, & De Raedt, 2013; Yoon, LeMoult, Hamedani, & McCabe, 
2017). 
Despite having been supported by a wealth of well-replicated findings, some of 
the propositions of the impaired disengagement hypothesis still need to be considered 
cautiously. For example, several studies examined associations between rumination and 
cognitive control using both positive and negative stimuli. They found that, contrary to 
the valence-specific prediction of the impaired disengagement hypothesis, cognitive 
control difficulties were not only connected with negative information, but also 
appeared when positive materials were presented (Joormann, 2006; Joormann & Tran, 
2009; LeMoult, Arditte, D’Avanzato, & Joormann, 2013). These findings suggest that the 
cognitive control deficit may not be valence-specific. It is also possible that there are 
other underlying cognitive factors that could influence the perseverance of rumination 
across a broad range of information. 
The attentional scope model of rumination 
Whitmer and Gotlib (2013) have developed a model called the attentional scope 
model of rumination which posits that attentional scope could be a critical factor that 
affects the repetitive nature of thinking in rumination. It states that the effect of mood 
on rumination may actually be mediated by attentional scope.  Moreover, it tries to 
explain the primary source of individual differences that makes some individuals 
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ruminate more than others when encountering sad situations. It assumes that 
individuals with a narrow attentional scope would engage in rumination more often 
than do individuals with broad attentional scope when they are in a negative mood. 
Specifically, it argues that, when in a neutral mood, individuals who have a narrow 
attentional scope will show a greater tendency to constrain most of their attentional 
resources to a limited set of focal thoughts. Then when they feel distress, negative 
mood will further narrow attentional scope and, as a result, magnify focusing on a 
single set of thoughts concerning negative mood or problems. In contrast, individuals 
with a broad attentional scope would allocate their attentional resources to a relatively 
large range of information. When they feel sad, although the negative emotions narrow 
their attentional scope as well, their broader attentional scope would make them less 
susceptible to the narrowing effect of negative emotion.  
According to the basic assumption of this model, it could be postulated that trait 
ruminators have a narrower attentional scope than non-ruminators, even in a neutral 
mood state. Indeed, previous studies have shown that higher levels of trait rumination 
were associated with problems in inhibiting prior relevant information (Whitmer & 
Banich, 2007; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2012), decreased intentional forgetting both positive 
and negative information  (Joormann & Tran, 2009), and better performance on a 
flanker task (Zetsche & Joormann, 2011). Whitmer and Gotlib (2013) argued that 
difficulties in inhibiting no-longer relevant information and less influence by distractors 
are typical features of having a narrow attentional scope. When performing tasks with a 
narrow attentional scope, individuals invest the majority of their attentional resources 
towards task relevant information. This way of allocating attention may result in other 
task irrelevant information gaining less access into working memory which would 
improve the ability to thoroughly process relevant material and ignore distraction. The 
high intensity and amount of attentional resources on the current task relevant 
information, however, may reduce the chance that new information gains access or 
becomes prevailing in working memory. 
Although the attentional scope model of rumination provides an alternative 
explanation for a large number of previous findings in perception, working memory and 
long term memory (for a review, see Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013), until now relatively little 
research has directly examined this model. In a recent study trying to investigate the 
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influence of rumination on attentional scope (Grol et al., 2015), healthy undergraduates 
were first assessed on their trait rumination score and then randomly assigned either to 
a rumination or a problem-solving induction. After the 10 minute induction procedure, 
participants’ visuospatial attentional scope towards self- or other-related information 
was examined. The findings showed that participants with a higher level of trait 
rumination who underwent the state rumination induction showed a more narrow 
attentional scope for self-related information relative to other-related information. In 
their second experiment (Grol et al., 2015), they explored the relationship between trait 
rumination and attentional scope without manipulation of state rumination. They found 
that higher levels of brooding, which is the more depression related sub-component of 
trait rumination, was associated to a more narrow attentional scope for self-related 
information relative to other-related information. These findings suggest that 
rumination is associated with a narrowed attentional scope in visual attention, 
especially when confronted with self-related information. In addition, in a study 
exploring the relation between cognitive inhibition and emotion regulation, researchers 
found that the positive correlation between reappraisal and the ability of inhibiting 
negative words was only present in people with low levels of brooding but not in those 
with high levels of brooding (Daches & Mor, 2015). 
Rumination as a mental habit 
Some models not only concentrate on the individual differences in cognitive 
factors that contribute to rumination (e.g., the ability of disengagement or attentional 
scope), but also try to explain how rumination becomes a maladaptive emotion 
regulation habit upon the interaction between (state) rumination and environment. For 
example, the impaired disengagement hypothesis (Koster et al., 2011) contended that 
sustained rumination can lead to impaired problem solving and prolonged negative 
emotions which in turn increase the usage of rumination. The repetitive occurrence of 
this reciprocal interaction between rumination and its consequences initiates a vicious 
cycle through which rumination turns into a habit.   
Recently, a habit goal framework of depressive rumination, provided by Watkins 
and Nolen-Hoeksema (2014), conceives of rumination as a mental habit and tries to 
   GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
11 
characterize how state ruminative thinking develops into a habitual thinking style. In 
combination of response styles theory (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) and control theory 
(Martin & Tesser, 1996), this framework proposes that some people start to ruminate 
when they realize there is discrepancy, which always appears together with negative 
feelings, between their current status and their major goals. If state rumination occurs 
frequently enough as response to the same negative discrepancy context, it will 
become a habitual response that could be cued automatically by the context. After a 
certain period of time, habitual rumination can be activated by a negative context 
without the involvement of goals. As long as rumination becomes a habitual response 
to negative context independent of goals, it is hard to change it, even when the current 
goal has been achieved or altered.  
Summary 
The above mentioned theoretical accounts of rumination share a common 
concern in explaining the repetitive nature of rumination.  They all assume that it is the 
difficulty of removing previous task-related thoughts from working memory that leads 
to the persistence of rumination. However, they propose different mechanisms that 
determine the difficulty of updating working memory in rumination. Whereas cognitive 
inhibition is considered as the main reason why individuals have difficulties to get rid of 
negative thoughts (Joormann, 2010), it might only be one of the components in general 
cognitive control that influence one of the steps of the disengagement of attention in 
working memory (Koster et al., 2011). The attentional scope model of rumination, on 
the other hand, does not stress the role of impaired cognitive control in negative or 
depressed information, but argues that rumination is related to individual differences in 
general (i.e., attentional scope), and thus is not necessarily an impaired way of 
information processing. Therefore, it can provide an explanation for findings showing 
that levels of rumination influence the processing of not only negative materials but a 
broad range of information (Joormann, 2006; Joormann & Tran, 2009; LeMoult et al., 
2013).  
Interestingly, while previous views highlight the disadvantages of impaired 
cognitive control in rumination, the attentional scope model of rumination describes 
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the problematic as well as beneficial effect of the way how high ruminators allocate 
their attention on different tasks. For example, people with a narrow attentional scope 
would constrain their attention onto current task-relevant information so that they can 
deeply encode task-related information. This may reduce the chance of new 
information gaining access into working memory which would then lead to 
perseverance of a limited amount of information.  But this focused attention can also 
facilitate prevention of the interference caused by irrelevant distractors. Indeed, 
previous studies have shown that trait ruminators had better performance in tasks that 
need people to maintain their attentional focus in task-relevant information 
(Altamirano, Miyake, & Whitmer, 2010; Zetsche & Joormann, 2011).  Taken together, 
the attentional scope model of rumination seems to have a potential to explain 
previous contradicting findings by providing a more complex way to understanding the 
attentional control mechanism of rumination. However, until now, few empirical 
studies have directly tested the assumptions of this model (e.g., Grol et al., 2015). In 
Chapter 2-4 of this dissertation, a series of studies were conducted to examine the main 
predictions of this model. Specifically, the relation between attentional scope and 
rumination was inspected at perceptual level.   
Moreover, in line with the propositions that narrow attentional scope of high 
ruminators may help improve performance in certain tasks, occasional rumination as an 
emotion regulation strategy is not necessarily maladaptive as well. It is habitual 
rumination, which people often passively use when they feel depressed without taking 
into account specific requirements of the current context, which makes them 
vulnerable to depression. Notably, it takes a long time for state ruminative thinking to 
become a relative stable and automatic habit. Once the habit emerges, it may be 
resistant to change. Corresponding treatment and intervention are expected to be 
more effective if they could be carried out before the formation of habitual rumination. 
For this reason, it is crucial to investigate how state-like ruminative thinking changes 
and interacts with its cognitive and affective consequences in daily life. To do this, 
studying real-life experiences may be necessary. Of further interest is whether daily 
patterns of rumination, i.e. reciprocal interactions between rumination and affect in 
daily life, predict future depressive symptoms.  
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EXPERIENCE SAMPLING METHOD 
Given the dynamic nature of thoughts and emotions, it is necessary to probe 
and record their changes with multiple measurements (Myin-Germeys et al., 2009). The 
changes over time can be measured accordingly through experience sampling methods 
(Kircanski, Thompson, Sorenson, Sherdell, & Gotlib, 2015). Experience sampling method 
(ESM) is a structured self-report measurement in which individuals are typically 
required to answer a certain number of questions several times a day across several 
days (Myin-Germeys et al., 2009). Decades of research have demonstrated that ESM is a 
valid and reliable technique that is assumed to be sensitive to behavioural and 
emotional changes in daily life (Myin-Germeys et al., 2009; Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 
1987). For instance, ESM has been found being able to catch subtle temporal changes 
that can hardly be detected when using trait measurement (Palmier-Claus et al., 2010).  
In the domain of emotion regulation, participants have always been asked to 
evaluate their momentary affect/emotion, emotion regulation strategy, and related 
context such as stressful events either at the time when they receive signals from 
researchers or during the period between the last and the current signal. Unlike trait-
like rumination, such as the one measured by RRS (Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999), 
ruminative thought in daily life is an ongoing dynamic process (Kasch, Klein, & Lara, 
2001) and thus can be measured accordingly through the ESM (Kircanski et al., 2015; 
Moberly & Watkins, 2008). In the first study concerning the relation between 
momentary rumination and affect (Moberly & Watkins, 2008), an unselected sample of 
individuals was instructed to assess their momentary rumination and affect 8 times a 
day for 7 days. Two items were created to measure momentary ruminative thinking 
(“focused on feelings” and “focused on problems”) which have been widely adopted in 
later ESM studies. They also used three items to measure negative affect (“sadness”, 
“anxiety”, and “irritation”). This study was the first to show that momentary ruminative 
thinking reciprocally interacts with negative affect. Following this study, a large number 
of studies have been concentrating on momentary rumination and affect, trying to 
observe and describe their daily patterns, their interaction and their association with 
future depressive symptoms.  
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Previous ESM research has shown that momentary rumination is often followed 
by exacerbation of negative affect (Hoorelbeke, Koster, Demeyer, Loeys, & 
Vanderhasselt, 2016; Kircanski, Thompson, Sorenson, Sherdell, & Gotlib, 2017; Moberly 
& Watkins, 2008; Takano & Tanno, 2011) and/or decreases in positive affect (Brans, 
Koval, Verduyn, Lim, & Kuppens, 2013; Hoorelbeke et al., 2016; Huffziger et al., 2013; 
Kircanski et al., 2017). In turn, affect also influences rumination. For example, negative 
affect has been found to predict subsequent rumination, which suggests a reciprocal 
relation between momentary rumination and affect (Hoorelbeke et al., 2016; Moberly 
& Watkins, 2008). Particular interest has arisen in differentiating contributions of 
momentary emotion regulation, momentary affect, and their link to the development 
of depressive symptoms. Previous findings revealed that future depressive symptoms 
could be prospectively predicted by momentary rumination in the evening relative to in 
the morning (Takano & Tanno, 2011), momentary rumination and emotional inertia 
(Koval et al., 2012), the average levels of momentary rumination but not its impact on 
emotions (Pasyugina, Koval, De Leersnyder, Mesquita, & Kuppens, 2015), and the 
beliefs about worry and rumination (Hartley, Haddock, Vasconselos e Sa, Emsley, & 
Barrowclough, 2014). Interestingly, a study also found that depressive symptoms can 
moderate the relation between daily activities and momentary rumination where 
people with higher levels of depression use less ruminative thinking when they engage 
in pleasant activities (Takano, Sakamoto, & Tanno, 2013). 
Recently, some studies combined measurements of cognitive control in lab and 
measurements of momentary rumination in daily life.  For example, in a study 
conducted in first-year undergraduates that sought to examine whether individual 
differences in cognitive control could moderate the influence of emotion regulation on 
affective experiences (Pe et al., 2013), the impairment of cognitive control was assessed 
by an affective interference resolution task at baseline. After that, momentary 
assessment was conducted for 10 times a day within 7 consecutive days in which 
positive and negative affect were assessed with 6 items whereas rumination and 
appraisal were measured by one item each. There were also 4 items targeting 
additional emotion regulation strategy. The results showed a moderation effect of 
negative interference level on the impact of emotion regulation on affect in daily life.  
Specifically, greater increase of negative affect was found when using rumination in 
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individuals with high impairment in removing no-longer-relevant negative information 
from working memory. Another study measured momentary brooding in high trait 
ruminators after 10 days of intensive cognitive control training (Hoorelbeke, Koster, 
Vanderhasselt, Callewaert, & Demeyer, 2015). They found, in a four-week follow-up, 
that individuals in the cognitive control training group showed decreased levels of 
brooding when facing naturalistic stressor in daily life. 
In sum, the ESM has provided us a chance to closely inspect the fluctuations of 
our emotions and emotion regulation on a daily basis. However, to better understand 
ESM data and, indirectly, the underlying emotion regulation processes, researchers 
need to find appropriate tools. The knowledge of how momentary ruminative thinking 
and emotion influence each other and what underlying mechanism might generate and 
affect the changing data sequence can be improved if the underlying dynamic process is 
understood. 
DYNAMIC SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR INVESTIGATING RUMINATION IN DAILY LIFE 
There are multiple ways in which fluctuations of rumination in daily life can be 
conceptualized and investigated. What is lacking, however, is a well-established and 
systematic conceptual framework that may precisely capture and describe the temporal 
and probably non-linear features of this fluctuation (Smith & Alloy, 2009). Regarding 
the continuous changing nature of daily ruminative thinking, dynamic system theory 
may be a powerful and appropriate method (Koster, Fang, & Marchetti, 2015). Dynamic 
system theory has been used in various disciplines, such as physics, biology, psychology 
and geography and so on. In the following paragraphs, basic concepts in dynamic 
system theory are briefly introduced.   
Dynamic systems 
Dynamic systems theory (DST) provides principles and a useful framework to 
examine how systems containing multiple variables change over time (Hollenstein, 
2013). A system can be conceived as a set with different components. A dynamic 
system is a system with different components that change over time (Lewis & Granic, 
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2000; Thelen & Smith, 1998). If we consider human beings as a dynamic system, then 
behaviour, thoughts, and emotion are key components of this dynamic system. 
According to DST, a dynamic system is posited to unfold over time in a non-linear way, 
in which each component interacts with the others and forms the behaviour of the 
whole system (Sulis & Trofimova, 2001). Further, it proposes that unique features 
emerge during reciprocal interaction among different components, which suggests that 
the whole system itself shows features that are absent or non-detectable at the level of 
components that make up the system (Guastello, Koopmans, & Pincus, 2008). Given 
these features, DST might be useful to model in real time the complex interaction 
between emotion and emotion regulation, such as momentary affect and ruminative 
thinking. The questions about how ruminative thinking and affect interact with each 
other and how their interactions or co-occurrence play different roles in the 
development of depressive symptoms may be elucidated by applying a dynamic 
systems approach.  
It has been proposed that a dynamic system is hierarchical with different levels 
of components, such as micro-level and macro-level, interacting with each other 
(Hollenstien, Lichtwarck-Aschoff, & Potworowski, 2013; Wichers, 2013). Components at 
micro-level can build or form a new component at macro-level after a certain amount 
of time whereas this new higher level component can then influence or constrain the 
change of those ones at micro-level (Wichers, 2013). As mentioned before, there is an 
increasing interest in investigating micro-level daily changes, such as momentary 
ruminative thinking. Consistent with DST, it would be interesting to look at the 
development of rumination in this hierarchical dynamic system. Thus, the habit shaping 
process can be conceptualised as follows: ruminative thinking at micro-level interacts 
with a certain context in the beginning. After a certain amount of time, habitual 
rumination (i.e., trait rumination) emerges at the macro-level. Habitual rumination at 
the macro-level then constrains the usage of ruminative thinking at the micro-level, 
such as increasing the co-occurrence of ruminative thinking with negative affect. 
Accordingly, it would be informative to examine whether momentary rumination and 
affect at the micro-level have a predictive impact on depressive symptoms and 
rumination at the macro-level. In turn, it would also be interesting to investigate 
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whether rumination at the macro-level has an impact on momentary rumination at the 
micro-level. 
State space, attractor, and entropy 
To illustrate the abstract changes of behaviour and emotion in real time, state 
space has been developed in the DST domain. State space is a conceptual space where 
all possible states of a system are represented (Shelhamer, 2007). A system can only be 
in one state at one time and mostly some predominant states will be revisited more 
often than others under certain circumstances (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Lunkenheimer, 
Hollenstein, Wang, & Shields, 2012). These recurring states are called attractors in DST 
(Thelen & Smith, 1998). When one or few states have relatively strong strength, a 
system may stay in a relative stable mode. Even if there is a disturbance in the system, 
strong attractor states may constrain the duration and range of the fluctuation of the 
system. It also attempts to pull the system back from the deviated state to the original 
equilibrium state (Carver & Scheier, 1998). However, when the perturbation is too 
strong or the attractor is too weak, the system will turn into a chaotic condition waiting 
for a new order to be created. This frame has been adapted in observing the progress of 
treatment in depression (Hayes & Yasinski, 2015) and also in interpreting the individual 
differences in affective change (Kuppens, Oravecz, & Tuerlinckx, 2010). 
Among various ways of visualizing state space, a system called State Space Grid 
(SSG; Hollenstein, 2007) has recently been used frequently in the field of developmental 
psychology (Granic & Hollenstein, 2003; Hollenstein, 2007). In SSG, the momentary 
state of each variable can be displayed on an axis of the state space grid with each point 
on the grid representing a single data point where individuals provided temporal 
information about the corresponding variables. Each state can be seen as the content 
of the system, e.g., such as the valence of the current emotion or level of momentary 
rumination. Constructs that describe how the whole system changes over time is 
conceived as the structure of a system. Various parameters can be extracted from SSG 
to describe the structure of a system. For example, duration represents to the duration 
of time a system stays in one state and visit refers to the number of time points a state 
appears in a system’s on-going time series. Both content and structure of a system have 
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been considered to serve important roles in reflecting individual differences in daily 
dynamic affect and emotion regulation (Kuppens et al., 2010). Moreover, previous 
research has shown that the structure of dynamic emotional states in parent-children 
dyadic interactions plays a specific role in predicting psychopathology above and 
beyond the content of these emotional interactions (for a review, see Hollenstein et al., 
2013).  
One of the structural features of a nonlinear system that is of key interest here 
is the degree of instability, oftentimes referred to as entropy. In general, entropy is a 
measure of information that is generated as a system changes (Mitchell, 2009; Shannon 
& Weaver, 1949; Young, 2003). As information is generated over time, entropy also 
changes (Heath, 2000). The first statistical definition of entropy was proposed by 
Boltzmann as one of the main thermodynamic parameters, which changes as the whole 
system transform towards the equilibrium state and remains stable thereafter 
(Klimontovich, 2001). Perhaps the most widely known definition of entropy comes from 
information theory (Shannon & Weaver, 1949), in which entropy refers to the amount 
of information a signal can generate. Derived from Shannon’s formula, SSG provides 
visit entropy of a system which is the sum of the relative frequencies with which every 
state is visited during the evolution of the dynamic process. When a system contains 
one attractor that has strong strength, the time series of the system may go back to this 
state more often which then generates less new information. This could be reflected by 
lower level of entropy. Alternatively, when a system contains a very weak attractor or 
several attractors, the states that would occur in the trajectory of the system may be 
more unpredictable. Thus, this kind of system would have relatively high level of 
entropy.  
In sum, dynamic system theory has proven valuable in describing and analysing 
detailed temporal data sets in physiology, biology, and psychology. To successfully 
apply DST in momentary affect and emotion regulation in terms of their dynamics 
patterns requires intensive momentary measurement procedures that are sensitive to 
minor and transient changes. The combination of experience sampling methodology 
and dynamic system framework may serve as a more reliable and informative way to 
investigating daily dynamic patterns of rumination and emotion.  
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THESIS OUTLINE 
The main aim of the current thesis is to investigate the underlying cognitive 
mechanisms of rumination and its impact on the onset, development and recurrence of 
depression. Given the importance of the attentional scope model of rumination in 
integrating mixed findings of previous studies, and in complementing contemporary 
theories, systematic research is needed to examine the predictions of this model. 
Moreover, it indicates a more complex way to understanding the attentional control 
mechanism of rumination. For example, the hypothesis of the model that narrow 
attentional scope can affect individuals’ performance in processing all kinds of 
information when they do not feel depressed provides insight into a new way for the 
interference and prevention of rumination and depression, such as training attentional 
scope in individuals that are vulnerable to rumination when they have not become 
stuck in a cycle of negative emotions. Therefore, a series of studies presented in the 
following chapters sought to test the main ideas of this model.  
In the first research line, we tried to find the attentional factors that contribute 
to the susceptibility to ruminate by focusing primarily on the association between 
rumination and attentional scope. We directly examine the predictions based on the 
attentional scope model of rumination that individual differences in attentional scope 
may impact the tendency to ruminate, and that changes in attentional scope should 
influence people’s engagement in rumination. Therefore, we investigated whether 
there is a close relationship between attentional scope and rumination by conducting 
two eye-movement experiments in which attentional scope was measured while 
participants were reading sentences (Chapter 2 and 3). To explore whether 
characteristics of the sentences have impact on the relation between attentional scope 
and rumination, different types of sentences were employed in these two experiments. 
While the feature of self-relevance was examined in Chapter 2 by using neutral 
sentences that involve self- and other-related content, the feature of valence was 
inspected in Chapter 3 by including both neutral and emotional sentences as reading 
material. Based on the findings from Chapter 2 and 3, a multiple-session training in 
which the direction of causality between attentional scope and rumination was 
examined (Chapter 4). 
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In the second research line, we investigated the dynamic mechanisms of 
rumination in daily life by analysing the dynamic patterns in ruminative thinking and 
affect which may help us to understand how rumination develops into a maladaptive 
habit in daily life that has a detrimental influence on the onset and maintenance of 
depression. In the first study, we sought to examine individual fluctuations of negative 
mood and the occurrence of rumination in remitted depressed patients based on 
electronic daily dairy assessment of their momentary mood and rumination (Chapter 5). 
Specifically, we used a dynamic systems framework: state space, to explore their 
dynamic patterns. In line with the findings of Chapter 5 that the dynamic systems 
framework could be considered as a useful way to detect and measure the subtle 
alterations of the co-occurrence between two momentary measured constructs, the 
second study (Chapter 6) conducted in a broad range of population and sought to test 
whether the structure attribute (i.e., entropy) of the dynamics in rumination and affect 
in daily life has a specific contribution in predicting future trait rumination and 
depressive symptoms at six-week follow-up.  
Below we describe the details of each chapter. 
In Chapter 2, we investigated the association between attentional scope and 
rumination in processing neutral information that involves self- and other-related 
content. In order to study attention in a more direct manner, we used a moving window 
task (McConkie & Rayner, 1975) in the current study, which is a well-validated eye 
movement paradigm to measure attentional scope in perceptual level (Pollatsek, 
Rayner, Fischer, & Reichle, 1999; Rayner, 2014). Typically in the task, participants are 
asked to read a sentence and then provide a response to see the next sentence. There 
is a window on the screen moving with participants’ eye movement only through which 
one could see the letters of the sentence while the text outside the window is masked. 
The width of the window is manipulated in each block so that when the window is 
narrower than individuals’ attentional scope they would read the sentence with more 
difficulties than when the window is as large as or larger than their attentional scope. 
Based on the predictions of attentional scope model of rumination, we assumed that 
individuals with high levels of rumination relative to those with low levels of rumination 
may show a narrower perceptual scope in processing neutral information. 
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In Chapter 3, we tried to extend the findings of Chapter 2 about relation 
between attentional scope and rumination from neutral stimuli to emotional stimuli. 
Based on the findings of Chapter 2, we used the same moving window paradigm and 
included not only neutral sentences but also positive and negative sentences. 
Therefore, the aim of this study was to investigate whether people with different levels 
of trait rumination have different perceptual attentional breadth when processing both 
neutral and emotional material. Further, we also tried to explore whether the relation 
between attentional scope and trait rumination would be influenced by different 
valence of information. According to the attentional scope model of rumination 
(Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013) and our previous findings, we predicted that high ruminators 
relative to low ruminators would show narrowed attentional scope when processing 
both neutral and emotional faces. We also assumed that high ruminators would 
perform differently when processing negative information relative to other kinds of 
information. 
In Chapter 4, we further explored the causal link between attentional scope and 
rumination. Based on the attentional scope model of rumination (Whitmer & Gotlib, 
2013), people’s attentional scope might influence the extent to which they engage in 
rumination, even after controlling for the mood state. Therefore, the aim of this 
experiment was to investigate the influence of different attentional scope on 
rumination. Specifically, we examined whether attentional breadth can be changed 
through such intended training manipulation and, if so, whether the attentional effect 
of these manipulations would be evident on state rumination induced in lab.  
In Chapter 5, we explored the predictive effect of the relation between mood 
and rumination on depressive symptoms in remitted depressed (RMD) patients. In their 
initial study (Huffziger et al., 2013), both RMD patients and healthy controls were given, 
ten times a day within two days, an assessment of momentary mood and ruminative 
self-focus (Moberly & Watkins, 2008). We reanalysed the data by using dynamic system 
methodology: state space grid analysis (Hollenstein, 2013; Lamey, Hollenstein, Lewis, & 
Granic, 2004). The latter methodology elucidates the dynamic relation between 
different constructs in function of time.  
Chapter 6 examined whether dynamic patterns in rumination and affect, 
expressed using entropy, could predict trait rumination and depressive symptoms. In 
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the previous study (Chapter 5), given that daily assessments were conducted during a 
relatively short time period where participants were mostly in a neutral or positive 
mood state, it could be assumed that the amount of variability observed in mood and 
rumination might be larger in a more prolonged assessment. Thus, the current 
experience sampling study extended the daily measurement into eight times a day over 
seven days. Moreover, our previous study (Chapter 5) found that a heightened level of 
entropy has detrimental effects specifically in the remitted depressed patients relative 
to healthy controls. This suggests that there might be different predictive effects of 
entropy depending on the extent to which people are vulnerable to depression. 
However, the healthy controls in this study (Huffziger et al., 2013; Koster et al., 2015) 
were selected strictly as a comparative group to remitted depressive group which thus 
had a relatively low depression scores at baseline. It remains unclear whether the 
dynamics of rumination and affect, in a more general population, influence future 
depressive symptoms. Therefore, the current experience sampling study recruited 
unselected sample which contains a wide range of trait rumination. In addition, in order 
to investigate whether the structure of dynamic patterns (i.e., entropy) of momentary 
rumination and affect in daily life plays specific role in predicting future trait rumination 
and depressive symptoms, content of dynamic patterns and relative weight of their 
contribution were explored as well. 
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TESTING THE ATTENTIONAL SCOPE MODEL 
OF RUMINATION: AN EYE-TRACKING 
STUDY USING THE MOVING WINDOW 
PARADIGM
1 
ABSTRACT 
Attentional processes are considered to play an important role in information 
processing in rumination. The attentional scope model of rumination predicts that 
rumination is associated with a narrowed attentional scope which magnifies emotional 
responding and reduces problem-solving. This study examined key predictions of the 
model by using a moving window paradigm, allowing for a more direct measurement of 
attentional scope at a perceptual level. High and low trait ruminators were asked to 
read self-related and other-related sentences under small, medium, large, and no 
moving window conditions while their visual fixations during reading were recorded. 
Results showed significant group differences in the small window size condition, with 
the high rumination group processing faster and making fewer fixations when reading 
the sentences. Further analyses confirmed that differences remained after controlling 
for mood state and the level of depression. These findings support the key predictions 
of the attentional scope model of rumination, indicating that people with high levels of 
trait rumination are characterized by a narrower attentional scope when processing 
information. Theoretical and clinical implications in relation to rumination are 
discussed. 
                                                 
1Based on Fang, L., Sanchez, A., & Koster, E.H.W. (2017). Testing the attentional scope model of 
rumination: An eye-tracking study using the moving window paradigm. Biological Psychology, 
123, 278-285. DOI: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2016.10.011. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Rumination is considered a form of responding to negative mood that focuses in 
a perseverative and repetitive manner on the implications, causes and meanings of 
one’s feelings and problems (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). It is one of the most important 
cognitive risk factors for development and maintenance of depressive symptoms (Mor 
& Winquist, 2002; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Previous studies 
mostly focused on the negative content of rumination (Watkins, 2008), whereas more 
recent research has begun to investigate the mechanisms involved in the persistent use 
of rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Cognitive control, which involves top 
down control in processing, updating, and inhibiting of information has been shown to 
play a critical role in depression (Disner, Beevers, Haigh, & Beck, 2011) and specifically 
in rumination (Joormann, 2010; Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakhshan, & De Raedt, 2011). 
Therefore, investigation of the influence of rumination on information processing may 
help to gain a better understanding on the underlying mechanism of rumination and 
provide insights into prevention and treatment of depression. 
Several theoretical frameworks have been developed to conceptualize the 
information-processing mechanisms that contribute to the persistence in the use of 
ruminative response styles (i.e., trait rumination). For example, some cognitive views 
propose that persistent rumination is associated with deficient inhibition (Joormann, 
2010) and impaired disengagement from negative self-related information (Koster et 
al., 2011). Recently, a complementary framework has been proposed by Whitmer and 
Gotlib (2013), which posits that attentional scope is an important factor that affects the 
repetitive nature of thinking in trait ruminators. Attentional scope here has a broad 
definition and can refer both to the amount of information that is directly perceived 
from the environment as well as to the amount of information that is activated in 
working memory, where the perceived information is temporarily stored and 
manipulated. Overall, the attentional scope model of rumination (Whitmer & Gotlib, 
2013) proposes that a limited attentional scope accounts for various characteristics 
observed in high trait rumination: in a neutral mood, high trait rumination is frequently 
associated with a narrower attentional scope which sometimes benefits to task-related 
information processing (Altarmirano, Miyake, & Whitmer, 2010). However, under 
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negative mood states, high trait rumination would be associated with a stronger focus 
on the causes and problems related to distress, at the expense of processing other 
information relevant for problem solving. Accordingly, the attentional scope model of 
rumination predicts that people with high levels of rumination would be characterized 
by a narrow attention scope even when they are in a neutral mood and are processing 
neutral information. Then, as their negative mood increases or positive mood 
decreases, high trait ruminators’ attentional scope will become increasingly narrow by 
only focusing on negative self-related themes. This model also posits that people with 
low rumination levels are characterized by a broader attentional scope, which reduces 
their level of ruminative thinking by increasing their chance to reallocate attention to 
other sources of information or distracting stimuli.  
Although the attentional scope model provides an explanation for a large 
number of previous findings in relation to rumination and information-processing 
(Altamirano, Miyake, & Whitmer, 2010; Joormann & Tran, 2009), only few empirical 
studies directly examined the model’s predictions on attentional scope at a perceptual 
level. In a recent study (Grol, Hertel, Koster, & De Raedt, 2015), healthy undergraduates 
were induced to either engage in a state of rumination or in a state of problem-solving 
after which their visuospatial attentional scope towards self- or other-related 
information was examined. This study found that participants with a higher level of trait 
rumination who underwent the state rumination induction showed a more narrow 
attentional scope for self-related information relative to other-related information. 
Moreover, in a second experiment, Grol et al. (2015) also demonstrated that even in 
absence of a manipulation of rumination state, higher levels of trait rumination (i.e., 
brooding) were related to a more narrow scope of attention for self-related information 
relative to other-related information. This suggests that ruminative thinking is 
associated with a narrowed attentional scope in visual attention, especially when 
confronted with self-related information.  
Although results from Grol et al. (2015) are promising in clarifying the 
association between rumination and attentional scope, a drawback is that the 
manipulation of self-relevant information was rather limited as this entailed presenting 
the word “me” versus another two letters. Moreover, the task was a rather complicated 
dual-task where inferences on attention were purely based on accuracy rates. Further 
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research is required to clarify whether rumination is specifically associated with 
narrowed attentional scope for self-relevant information or whether this impairment 
emerges for other information. Moreover, the approach used in Grol et al. (2015) and 
other frequently employed methodologies (e.g., Global-Local Navon Letter task, Navon, 
1977) rely on indirect indices to estimate perceptual processes of attentional scope 
(e.g., participants’ detection accuracy, reaction times). Hence, it seems crucial to 
investigate the relation between rumination and attentional scope using more direct 
measures of individuals’ natural attentional scope for different types of information 
(i.e., self-related vs. other-related neutral information). 
The current study 
The current study was designed to explore the association between trait 
rumination and attentional scope in a more direct manner. We used a moving window 
task (McConkie & Rayner, 1975), which is a well-validated eye movement paradigm to 
measure attentional scope at the perceptual level (Pollatsek, Rayner, Fischer, & Reichle, 
1999; Rayner, 2014). During this task, there is a window frame on the screen moving 
with participants’ eye movements through which one can only see a limited amount of 
letters belonging to a sentence while the text outside the window is masked. To control 
how much information is available to participants, the width of the window is 
manipulated in different conditions (i.e., different sizes). The rationale of this task is 
that when the window size is smaller than a reader’s attentional scope, the reading 
process will be different from the natural (i.e., no window and no mask) reading 
condition (Rayner, 1998). In contrast, the reading process will not differ from the 
natural reading condition when the window size is as large as or larger than a reader’s 
attentional scope. Specifically, previous research using this paradigm has taken eye 
movements as a measure of reading process, showing that increased processing 
difficulty is correlated with slower reading rate, longer fixation duration and larger 
number of fixations (Pomplun, Reingold, & Shen, 2001; Rayner, Chace, Slattery, & 
Ashby, 2006). Therefore, in the present study, we used these eye movement indices 
(i.e., total sentence reading time, average fixation duration, number of fixations, and 
reading rate) as indicators of the degree of processing difficulty in reading during the 
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moving window task (Brzezicka, Krejtz, von Hecker, & Laubrock, 2012; Choi, Lowder, 
Ferreira, & Henderson, 2015 Häikiö, Bertram, Hyönä, & Niemi, 2009). 
The first aim of the current study was to examine whether individual differences 
in the general tendency to ruminate (trait rumination) are associated with the 
magnitude of attentional scope at a perceptual level, as measured by eye movement 
indices at different window sizes during reading. Based on the prediction of the 
attentional scope model of rumination (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013), we hypothesized that 
individuals with high levels of trait rumination would show a more narrow perceptual 
scope in comparison with individuals with low levels of trait rumination. This should be 
reflected by faster reading time (shorter total reading time, shorter average fixation 
duration, and faster reading rate) and less number of fixations when the window size is 
more compatible with the size of attentional scope of individuals with high rumination 
than the ones with low rumination (i.e., at small window size conditions). Furthermore, 
the attentional scope model of rumination states that the association between 
individual differences in rumination and attentional scope emerges not only in negative 
but also in neutral mood states. Therefore, participants’ current mood state levels and 
depression levels were measured and included as covariates when significant effects 
that related to rumination group were observed.  
Our second aim was to clarify under which conditions attentional narrowing 
effects can be observed. In the present study we used neutral sentences to examine the 
prediction of the attentional scope model of rumination that the association between 
trait rumination and attentional scope would emerge. In order to test whether the 
attentional narrowing effect would be dependent on the activation of self-
representations, we manipulated the self-relevance of sentences. As suggested by Grol 
et al. (2015), trait rumination might be more strongly associated with narrowed 
attentional scope when confronted with self-related information rather than other-
related information. Therefore, in the present study, we used both self- and other-
related sentences as reading material to explore whether the presence of self-related 
information influences the association between trait rumination and attentional scope. 
In line with the evidence suggesting that ruminative thinking might be specifically 
related to narrowed attention towards self-related content (Grol et al., 2015), we 
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expected that there would be specific differences between individuals with high and 
low trait rumination when processing self-related sentences. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Participants were prescreened on the basis of their scores on the Ruminative 
Response Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Raes, Hermans, & Eelen, 2003) 
from a database of 305 students of Ghent University. Only individuals scoring in the 
highest 25% (high ruminators) and the lowest 25% (low ruminators) of the RRS were 
invited to participate in the current study. Based on the medium effect size (partial ղ2 = 
.07) provided in the recent study of Brzezicka et al. (2012) using the similar moving 
window task on dysphoric and healthy control groups, we calculated the sample size 
needed to establish a similar effect using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007). The analysis showed a total sample size of 52 for finding a significant 
within-between interaction is required with α = .05 and power = .80. In the current 
study, a final sample of 64 participants (32 low ruminators and 32 high ruminators) 
completed the experimental session. All participants were native Dutch speakers with 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They provided informed consent and received 
course credit for their participation.  
Self-report measures 
Depression. Depressive symptoms were measured using the 42-item Depression 
Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). The DASS contains a set of 
three subscales (i.e., depression, anxiety and stress), among which the depression 
subscale is of particular interest in the present study. Participants were asked to rate on 
a 4-point scale according to their experience over the past week. Internal consistency of 
the depression subscale in this study was high, Cronbach’s α = .92.  
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Rumination. We administered the 22-item Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Raes et al., 2003) to assess individual differences in 
the general tendency to ruminate (i.e., trait rumination).  Participants were asked to 
rate on a 4-point scale how they typically respond when they are in negative or 
depressed mood. Internal consistency of the RRS in this study was high, Cronbach’s α = 
.92. Additionally, in order to control the influence of state rumination, we also used the 
Momentary Ruminative Self-focus Inventory (MRSI; Mor, Marchetti, & Koster, 2013) 
before and after the moving window task.  Participants were instructed to rate six items 
measuring their current degree of ruminative self-focused thinking on a 7-point scale 
ranging from “totally not agree” to “totally agree”. Internal consistency of the MRSI was 
high, Cronbach’s α = .87. 
Mood. Since attentional scope has been shown to be influenced by mood (Baas, 
De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008), we also assessed mood state along with the measure of state 
rumination so as to control its potential influence. Participants were asked to rate their 
mood (i.e., happy, sad and agitated) “at the moment” on three 100 mm Visual Analogue 
Scales (VAS) ranging from “neutral” to “as much as I could imagine”.  
Moving window task 
In the current study, we used short (mean length of sentences = 58.3 characters, 
range: 55-66 characters), syntactically simple Dutch sentences with an average word 
frequency of 4.32 (SD = .38; range: 3.22-5.11), 60 of which are self-related (e.g., “I 
looked around and saw that the others were out of earshot.”) and 60 of which are 
other-related (e.g., “John Cavendish frowned and changed the subject.”).  The 
sentences presented on the screen were selected from a pool of validated sentences 
obtaining from an Agatha Christie novel (Cop, Drieghe, & Duyck, 2015) and were 
randomly assigned to four blocks.  The length of sentences and word frequency were 
matched among four window size conditions and only the length of sentences but not 
word frequency was matched between self- and other-related sentences as well2. Each 
                                                 
2 Concerning the length of sentences (unit: character), there was no significant difference among 
different window size conditions, F (3, 116) = .01, p =.998. The average length of sentences (unit: 
character) for each window size condition was (1) small window size condition: M = 58.37, SD = 2.97; (2) 
medium window size condition: M = 58.33, SD = 2.96; (3) large window size condition: M = 58.23, SD = 
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block contained only one window size condition with 30 sentences (i.e., trials): (1) small 
window condition (5-8 characters visible; 12.5 mm of size; 1.19 degrees of visual angle); 
(2) medium window condition (10-13 characters; 25 mm; 2.39 deg.); (3) large window 
condition (22-25 characters; 50 mm; 4.77 deg.); and (4) no window condition (without 
restricted frame). The order of conditions was counterbalanced between participants 
and the trial presentation was randomized for each participant as well. In each trial, 
participants were instructed to first focus on a fixation cross presented on the left area 
of the screen. Once the eye-tracker detected a visual fixation of 200 ms on the fixation 
cross, the sentence appeared on the screen. Participants were instructed to read the 
sentence by moving their eyes naturally from left to right once the sentence was 
presented. They can see a limited amount of the text through the invisible window 
frame whereas the text outside the window was masked with a blank so that no extra 
information outside the window can be perceived. As soon as they finished reading, 
they were asked to press the space bar to continue with the following trial. In order to 
assure that participants read the sentence carefully and understood its meaning, five 
easy questions regarding the content of the sentence were randomly presented in each 
condition after participants finished reading some of the sentences. Participants were 
asked to select the correct answer to the questions from two options. 
Participants’ eye movements were recorded using a Tobii TX300 eye-tracker 
system. This system employs a dual-Purkinje eye-tracking method (Crane & Steele, 
1985) and samples eye-gaze coordinates at 300 Hz (i.e., a coordinates’ estimation every 
3.3 ms). Both stimulus presentation and eye movements’ recording were controlled by 
E-prime Professional software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2012). The eye-
tracking system synchronized automatically with the program at the start of each trial. 
                                                                                                                                                
2.84; (4) no window size condition: M = 58.27, SD = 2.52. In addition, there was also no significant 
difference between self- and other-related sentences with regard to length of sentences, t (110) = 1.51, p 
= .133. The average length of characters for each content was (1) self-related sentences: M = 58.68, SD = 
3.12; (2) other-related sentences: M = 57.92, SD = 2.38. Word frequency was obtained from Cop et al. 
(2015). There was no significant difference of word frequency among different window size condition, F 
(3, 116) = .15, p =.929. The average word frequency for each window size condition was (1) small window 
size condition: M = 4.32, SD = .39; (2) medium window size condition: M = 4.33, SD = .32; (3) large 
window size condition: M = 4.28, SD = .42; (4) no window size condition: M = 4.34, SD = .41. However, 
there was a significant difference of word frequency among different content, t (118) = 5.06, p < .001. 
The word frequency for each content was (1) self-related sentences: M = 4.48, SD = .32; (2) other-related 
sentences: M = 4.16, SD = .38. 
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Participants were seated approximately 60 cm from the eye tracker capture. Eye 
movement signals were converted to visual fixation data by using E-prime extensions 
for Tobii (i.e., Clearview PackageCalls). The area of interest comprised the area where 
the sentence was presented. 
Procedure 
After signing informed consent, participants were administered all the 
questionnaires including trait and state measures. Then they completed the eye-
tracking calibration procedure and a practice block with the reading task (five trials). 
Following the practice block, the four blocks of the main experiment were presented 
with a short break in between. At the end of the experiment, participants were asked to 
fill in the state measures again and received course credits for their participation. 
Data preparation and analytical strategy 
A series of indices were derived from visual fixations recorded within the area of 
interest (Brzezicka et al., 2012; Inhoff & Radach, 1998; Rayner, 1998): (1) Total sentence 
reading time (the sum of all visual fixation durations within each sentence); (2) average 
fixation duration (the average of all visual fixation durations within each sentence); (3) 
the total number of fixations made during reading each sentence; and (4) reading rate 
(the number of words divided by total sentence reading time and then was transformed 
to words/min). All these indexes indicate the processing difficulty while reading the 
sentence (Brzezicka et al., 2012; Häikiö et al., 2009; Rayner, 2009; Whitford, O’Driscoll, 
Pack, Joober, Malla, & Titone, 2013). Visual fixations were considered when they were 
equal to and longer than 100 ms. Therefore, trials where the average fixation duration 
was less than 100 ms (range: 0-99 ms) were excluded (0.45 % trials in total). In addition, 
trials where the reading rate was equal and larger than 3 SD of each window size 
condition (range: 640.78-4333.33 words/min) were excluded (0.93% trials in total). The 
remaining of 7219 trials was included in the final data analysis. 
We performed a series of linear mixed effect (LME) models separately for each 
of the four attention indices (i.e., total sentence reading time, average fixation 
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duration, number of fixations, and reading rate) in SPSS 19 (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 
2008). Fixed effects included group (high rumination vs. low rumination), window size 
(small, medium, large, no window), content (self-related, other-related), and the 
interactions among these variables. Random effects included intercepts for subjects 
and items. In addition, to control for the influence of depression level and mood states 
on group-related interactions, depression (depression subscale in the DASS), and 
positive and negative mood state levels (VAS Positive and VAS Negative before 
completing the task) were included as covariates in the LME models when further 
analysed the interaction effects. Cohen’s d was used to calculate the effect size of the 
difference between two groups. 
RESULTS 
Group characteristics 
One participant was excluded because of relatively high levels of depression (> 3 
SD in DASS depression subscale). Another two participants were excluded based on 
poor task performance (both sentence reading time and number of fixations were ≥ 3 
SD). Demographic and psychological characteristics of the remaining 61 participants are 
presented in Table 1. No differences between the two groups were found concerning 
their age, t (44) = 1.59, p = .12. The high rumination group (27 female: 3 male) had a 
significantly higher ratio of females relative to males than the low rumination group (19 
female: 12 male), χ2 (1, N= 61) = 6.78, p < .01. As expected, there was a significant 
difference between groups (see Table 1 for details) in trait rumination, t (59) = 7.64, p < 
.001 and we also found a significant difference between groups in the level of 
depressive symptoms, t (37) = 4.48, p < .001.  With regard to the state measures at 
baseline (before the experimental task), there was a significant difference between 
groups in positive mood state, t (52) = 2.94, p < .01, as well as in negative mood state, t 
(47) = 2.54, p < .05, but no significant difference between groups in arousal state, t (59) 
= 1.76, p = .08, as well as in state rumination, t (59) = 1.71, p = .09. 
 
TESTING THE ATTENTIONAL SCOPE MODEL OF RUMINATION 
 
 
47 
Table 1. Characteristics of participants. 
 
                    Group   
 High trait rumination ( N = 30) Low trait rumination ( N = 31) 
 M 
 
SD M 
 
SD 
Age 19.43 
 
2.50 18.61 
 
1.36 
Gender 
(female:male) 
27:3  19:12  
DASS_Depression 9.83 
 
7.66 3.16 
 
2.84 
RRS 50.97 
 
9.57 34.10 
 
7.60 
MRSI_T1 27.27 
 
7.58 24.16 
 
6.60 
MRSI_T2 19.33 8.66 19.45 
 
6.59 
VAS_positive_T1 42.33 
 
30.69 62.45 
 
21.77 
VAS_positive_T2 35.67 
 
28.45 54.00 
 
26.30 
VAS_negative_T1 28.63 
 
29.49 12.84 
 
17.28 
VAS_negative_T2 25.27 
 
29.53 11.74 
 
15.72 
VAS_agitated_T1 42.60 
 
25.17 32.23 
 
20.64 
VAS_agitated_T2 29.03 
 
24.40 23.74 
 
21.49 
Note: DASS, Depression Anxiety Stress Scales; RRS, Ruminative Response Scale; MRSI, 
Momentary Ruminative Self-focus Inventory; T1, Time 1 (before the experimental task); T2, 
Time 2 (after the experimental task); VAS, Visual Analogue Scale. 
Total Sentence Reading Time 
Results showed that window size, F (3, 7116.41) = 1425.18, p < .001, but not 
content, F (1, 28.01) = 0.43, p = .52, significantly predicted total sentence reading time. 
More importantly, analyses also showed that group, F (1, 58.95) = 5.91, p < .05, the 
interaction between group and window size, F (3, 7116.42) = 30.76, p < .001, and the 
interaction between group and content, F (1, 7116.05) = 8.19, p < .01, all significantly 
predicted total sentence reading time. No other significant interaction effects were 
found (all Fs < 1.43, ps > .23). The interactions were further analysed by conducting 
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separate LME models on each window size or on each content. The setting of models 
were similar as the main model (except we removed window size and content from the 
fixed effects), but we also added either mood states or depression as covariates to 
control for the influences of mood states or depression. 
For the small window size condition, group significantly predicted total sentence 
time both when controlling for the influence of mood states, b = 1.21, SE = .46, t (56.92) 
= 2.64, p < .05, 95% CI = [0.29, 2.13], and when controlling for the influence of 
depression, b = 1.04, SE = .48, t (58.00) = 2.16, p < .05, 95% CI = [0.08, 2.00]. Consistent 
with our first hypothesis, the high rumination group required less time to read the 
sentences in this window size condition (i.e., lower total fixation duration during 
sentence reading) in comparison to the low rumination group (see Table 2 for details), 
indicating a more narrow attentional scope in the high rumination group relative to the 
low rumination group. In contrast, no significant main group effects were found for the 
other window size conditions (medium, large, no window), all ts < 1.59, all ps >.12. 
Overall, although the high rumination group showed less total sentence reading time 
than the low rumination group in general, the further LME models indicated that this 
difference was limited to the small window size conditions (small window condition: d = 
.48; other conditions: all ds < .25), with high ruminators reading faster than low 
ruminators in that specific condition (see Fig. 1a).  
Additionally, the high rumination group generally used less time to read both 
the self- (d = .20) and other-related (d = .28) sentences relative to the low rumination 
group (see Table 2 for details). Specifically, for self-related sentences, group was found 
to significantly predict total sentence time when controlling for mood states, b = .50, SE 
= .24, t (56.95) = 2.04, p < .05, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.98], but not significant when controlling 
for depression, b = .40, SE = .26, t (58.03) = 1.53, p = .13, 95% CI = [-0.12, 0.93]. For 
other-related sentences, group also significantly predicted total sentence time when 
controlling for mood states, b = .72, SE = .28, t (56.86) = 2.61, p < .05, 95% CI = [0.17, 
1.27], but not significant when controlling for depression, b = .56, SE = .29, t (57.90) = 
1.91, p = .06, 95% CI = [-0.03, 1.15].  
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Fig.1. Eye movement measures in each window size condition for high and low 
rumination groups: (a) Total sentence reading time, (b) Number of fixations, and (c) 
Reading rate. Error bars represent the standard errors of the means.  
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Average Fixation Duration 
The results revealed that window size, F (3, 7116.56) = 807.14, p < .001, and the 
interaction between group and window size, F (3, 7116.58) = 7.48, p < .001, both 
significantly predicted average fixation duration. The other main or interaction effects 
were not significant (all Fs < 2.60, ps > .12). However, when we examined the 
interaction by conducting separate LME models for each window size, no significant 
effects were found neither when controlling for mood states, nor when controlling for 
depression, all ts < 1.57, ps > .12. 
Number of Fixations 
The results showed that window size, F (3, 7116.34) = 951.32, p < .001, but not 
content, F (1, 28.01) = 0.13, p = .72, significantly predicted number of fixations. The 
results also revealed that group, F (1, 58.95) = 4.39, p < .05, the interaction between 
group and window size, F (3, 7116.35) = 17.83, p < .001, and the interaction between 
group and content, F (1, 7116.04) = 7.41, p < .01, all significantly predicted number of 
fixations. No other significant interaction effects were found (all Fs < 2.15, ps > .09). The 
interactions were further analyzed by conducting separate LME models on each 
window size or each content. The models specified were similar as the main model 
(except we removed window size and content from the fixed effects), but we also 
added either mood states or depression as covariates. 
For the small window size condition, group significantly predicted number of 
fixations when controlling for the influence of mood states, b = 3.28, SE = 1.41, t (56.86) 
= 2.34, p < .05, 95% CI = [0.47, 6.10], but not when controlling for the influence of 
depression, b = 2.31, SE = 1.45, t (57.97) = 1.59, p = .12, 95% CI = [-0.59, 5.21]. The 
results indicated that when the influence of mood states was considered, the high 
rumination group was still found to use less number of fixations than the low 
rumination group when reading the sentences in the small window condition (see Table 
2 for details). In contrast, no significant main group effects were found for the other 
window size conditions (medium, large, no window), all ts < 1.60, ps >.11. Overall, we 
found that the high rumination group used less number of fixations than the low 
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rumination group in general, but the results of separate LME models showed that this 
difference in function of trait rumination level was only significant in the small window 
size condition (small window condition: d = .45; other conditions: all ds < .28), with high 
ruminators displaying fewer fixations than low ruminators (see Fig. 1b).  
In addition, the high rumination group mostly used less number of fixations for 
the other- (d = .27) but not the self-related (d = .20) sentences than the low rumination 
group (see Table 2 for details). Specifically, for self-related sentences, no significant 
effects of group were found neither when controlling for mood states nor when 
controlling for depression, all ts < 1.61, ps > .11. For other-related sentences, group was 
found to significantly predict the number of fixation when controlling for mood states, b 
= 2.21, SE = 1.04, t (56.84) = 2.12, p < .05, 95% CI = [0.13, 4.30], but not significant when 
controlling for depression, b = 1.46, SE = 1.08, t (57.86) = 1.36, p = .18, 95% CI = [-0.70, 
3.61].  
Reading Rate 
The results showed that window size, F (3, 7116.20) = 1302.02, p < .001, 
content, F (1, 28.00) = 10.57, p < .01, and the interaction between window size and 
content, F (3, 7115.95) = 5.09, p < .01, all significantly predicted reading rate. Analyses 
also revealed that the interaction between group and window size, F (3, 7116.20) = 
6.20, p < .001 significantly predicted reading rate. No other significant main or 
interaction effects were found (all Fs < 3.08, ps > .09). According to our main 
hypotheses, only group-related interactions were further analyzed by conducting 
separate LME models on each window size. The models specified were similar as the 
main model (except we removed window size and content from the fixed effects), but 
we also added either mood states or depression as covariates. 
For the small window size condition, group significantly predicted reading rate 
when controlling for the influence of mood states, b = -24.62, SE = 11.59, t (56.55) = 
2.12, p < .05, 95% CI = [-47.83, -1.40], and nearly significantly when controlling for the 
influence of depression, b = -24.36, SE = 12.24, t (57.59) = 1.99, p = .05, 95% CI = [-
48.85, 0.14]. The results indicated that relative to the low rumination group, the high 
rumination group read faster in the small window size condition (see Table 2 for 
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details). In contrast, no significant main group effects were found for the other window 
size conditions (medium, large, no window), all ts < 1.86, all ps >.07. Overall, the results 
revealed that reading rate was significantly faster in the high rumination group than in 
the low rumination group only in the small window size condition (small window 
condition: d = .40; other conditions: all ds < .30; see Fig. 1c). 
DISCUSSION 
In the current study we examined key predictions of the attentional scope 
model of rumination (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). This model proposes that individuals 
with high levels of trait rumination are characterized by a narrower scope of attention. 
We investigated this claim using a moving window task where reading sentences in 
different types of window sizes provided an indication of the individual’s attentional 
scope. The main results were (1) significant differences between high and low trait 
rumination groups in the small window size condition even after controlling for 
participants’ current mood states and depressive levels, and (2) the association 
between individual differences in trait rumination and attentional scope was observed 
across all types of sentences.  Below we discuss these results in more detail. 
Regarding our first aim – clarifying whether individual differences in trait 
rumination are associated with differences in the magnitude of attentional scope – the 
differences between high and low trait rumination groups in the small window size 
condition suggest that individuals with different levels of trait rumination may have 
different sizes of attentional scope at the perceptual level. Based on the underlying 
rationale of the moving window paradigm (Rayner, 1998), individuals with a narrow 
attentional scope relative to individuals with a broader attentional scope are less 
affected when reading in reduced window size conditions (Brzezika et al., 2012; Häikiö 
et al., 2009; Whitford et al., 2013). In our study, participants in the high rumination 
group showed faster total reading time (i.e., shorter total fixation time), a fewer 
number of fixations and faster reading rate than participants in the low rumination 
group in the small window size condition when differences in current mood levels and 
depression levels were controlled. This suggests that relative to people with low level of 
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trait rumination, people with high levels of trait rumination were less sensitive to the 
small window manipulation and therefore may have a narrower attentional scope at 
the perceptual level. Interestingly, this association was not observed in the average 
fixation duration. These differential results indicate that overall shorter reading times 
observed in the high trait rumination group in the small window condition were not 
accounted by making fixations with a shorter duration but by using a lower number of 
fixations to read the sentence (i.e., requiring less time to complete the full reading 
pattern). Overall, these findings support the hypothesis of the attentional scope model 
of rumination (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013) postulating that individuals characterized by a 
persistent use of rumination have a narrow attentional scope even in the processing of 
neutral information.  
Our second aim was to clarify whether trait rumination differences in 
attentional scope specifically emerge under conditions of self-related information 
processing. A recent study (Grol et al., 2015) showed that trait rumination level was 
related with a more narrowed attentional scope for self-related compared with other-
related information. In our current study, we found that in the small window condition, 
the high rumination group showed a more narrow attentional scope across all types of 
sentences after controlling for the current mood and depressive levels, suggesting that 
the association between trait rumination and attentional scope may not influence by 
the presence of self-related information. Notably, although the high rumination group, 
relative to the low rumination group, generally used faster total reading time and less 
number of fixations for both types of sentences, these effects were not significant when 
introducing depression levels as covariate, indicating that after controlling individual’s 
depression level, the high rumination group was not significantly different from the low 
rumination group in processing both types of sentences.  
Furthermore, since we used neutral sentences as reading material in our study, 
the current results provide supportive evidence for the prediction of the attentional 
scope model of rumination that individual differences in attentional scope will not only 
affect the processing of negative information but extend to other types of information 
(Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). Nevertheless, the fact that we only employed neutral 
sentences in our study prevents us from driving strong conclusions on whether 
attentional scope differences as a function of trait rumination level occur in the same 
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way for different sources of emotional information. Further studies will require testing 
attentional scope during reading of sentences with different valences (positive, 
negative and neutral) in order to fully test these theoretical predictions.  
The current findings may have clinical implications for the prevention and 
treatment of depression, specifically when attempting to reduce maladaptive processes 
of persistent rumination. A wealth of empirical research has been trying to reduce 
rumination by using procedures to target attentional processes using computerized 
training. Interestingly, the effects of such training procedures have been mixed (Mor & 
Daches, 2015). Notably, these procedures have mainly targeted attentional orienting. In 
light of the attentional scope model of rumination’s proposals and based on our current 
findings, individual differences in attentional scope may play a critical role in the 
persistent use of rumination. Therefore, training procedures aimed to target cognitive 
control processes of attentional scope (e.g., improving the ability to enlarge the 
perceptual scope or working memory representation repertoire and to disengage from 
focused information) may be a promising avenue to reduce persistent use of 
rumination. Moreover, we observed an association of attentional scope and trait 
rumination when processing neutral information, not accounted by differences in their 
mood states and depression levels. Thus, contrasting with current interventions that 
specifically focus on modifying negative information processing (e.g., Daches, Mor, & 
Hertel, 2015), attentional scope training might also be implemented as a general 
cognitive control training approach in order to reduce trait rumination (Cohen, Mor, & 
Henik, 2015; Hoorelbeke, Koster, Vanderhasselt, Callewaert, & Demeyer, 2015). 
The present study has some limitations. First, due to the cross-sectional nature 
of our study, we cannot make causal inferences about the direction of causality 
between trait rumination and attentional scope. However, previous research has found 
that individuals characterized by a high trait rumination level showed narrowed 
attentional scope when they were induced to elevate their rumination state (Grol et al., 
2015), which might afford a potential causal direction. Further research should also 
develop manipulations of the attentional scope in order to investigate its impact on 
changes in rumination levels at short duration (i.e., state rumination) as well as at 
longer periods (i.e., trait rumination). Second, our design did not allow to fully testing 
the predictions derived from the attentional scope model of rumination. This model 
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also attempts to explain the development of rumination when individual’s mood 
changes from neutral to depressed. Specifically, it predicts that when people with a 
tendency to ruminate feel depressed, negative mood would bias ruminators’ 
attentional scope to only focus on negative personal relevant information. However, in 
the present study, we only used neutral sentences and did not manipulate individual’s 
negative mood state. Therefore, we were not able to extend our findings to the 
examination of depressed mood effects in the association between trait rumination and 
attentional scope for negative self-related information. Further research is warranted to 
test this issue. Third, word frequency was not controlled for different content, as the 
word frequency of self-related sentences was higher than other-related sentences. 
However, among all the reading indexes, we only found a significant main effect of 
content in reading rate which showed a faster reading rate for self-related sentences 
(M = 213.75, SD = 107.08) than other-related sentences (M = 195.20, SD = 99.80). Also, 
no significant three-way interaction effects among group, window size and content 
were found for all four indexes. These may suggest that the differences of word 
frequency between self- and other-related sentences did not influence the main results 
of the current study. 
In summary, the current research is the first eye movement study exploring the 
association between trait rumination and attentional scope at the perceptual level. Our 
findings provide supportive evidence for the key prediction of the attentional scope 
model of rumination that people with persistent use of rumination have a more narrow 
attentional scope in the processing of neutral information. This effect was observed 
during reading of sentences including both self-related and other-related neutral 
information in the most difficult reading condition (i.e., the small window size 
condition), and was not accounted by mood state and depressive levels. 
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RELATION BETWEEN ATTENTIONAL SCOPE 
AND RUMINATION: EXAMINATION OF 
VALENCE-SPECIFICITY USING A GAZE-
CONTINGENT MOVING WINDOW 
PARADIGM
1 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Rumination has been considered as a relatively maladaptive form of repetitive 
thinking with a marked impact on mood. Individual differences in attentional scope 
have been proposed as an important mechanism making some individuals more prone 
to ruminate than others. The attentional scope model of rumination posits that 
rumination is related to a narrowed attentional scope, which may affect the processing 
of neutral and emotional information. This study aimed to extend research on the 
relation between rumination and attentional scope while processing neutral, positive 
and negative information. To assess individual’s attentional scope, a moving window 
task was applied which involved reading both neutral and emotional sentences. The 
result of reading rate indicated that individuals with higher levels of trait rumination 
showed a narrower attentional scope across all types of sentences. In addition, the total 
reading time of individuals with higher levels of trait rumination was shorter when 
processing neutral and positive sentences through a constrained window frame, but 
this was not the case when processing negative sentences. These findings suggest that 
even though high trait ruminators use an overall constrained manner of processing all 
types of information, they may still process negative information differently compared 
with other types of information. 
                                                 
1Based on Fang, L., Sanchez, A., & Koster, E.H.W. (2017). Attentional scope, rumination, and 
processing of emotional information: An eye-tracking study. Manuscript submitted to 
publication. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For decades, great efforts have been made to investigate rumination and its 
impact on depression. According to the response styles theory, rumination is 
characterized by repetitive self-focused thinking about the implications, causes, and 
meanings of one’s negative feelings (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Accumulating evidence 
has shown that rumination has a deleterious impact on mood, problem solving, and 
cognitive functioning (Watkins, 2008). It has also been found that habitual use of 
rumination prospectively predicts the onset and maintenance of depression (Just & 
Alloy, 1997; Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). Therefore, 
identifying factors that make individuals more vulnerable to engage in persistent 
rumination is essential to understand and potentially treat this key cognitive risk factor 
for depression.  
A number of information-processing factors have been associated with the 
repetitive nature of rumination. For instance, cognitive inhibition impairments (i.e., 
problems in the ability to inhibit the processing of irrelevant information) have been 
considered one of the main mechanisms contributing to difficulties interrupting 
persistent negative thoughts in high trait rumination (Joormann, 2010). Furthermore, 
impaired disengagement of attention from negative information has also been 
proposed to account for limited control over negative thinking in high ruminators 
(Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakhshan, & De Raedt, 2011). Inspired by research revealing 
that sustained self-focus of high ruminators may not be limited to negative information 
(Joormann & Tran, 2009) and that high ruminators tend to show better performance on 
tasks requiring focused attention (Altamirano, Miyake, & Whitmer, 2010; Zetsche & 
Joormann, 2011), recently a novel theoretical model, the attentional scope model of 
rumination, has been proposed (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). In this framework, 
attentional scope is considered the primary source of individual differences that 
determines the susceptibility to rumination in response to negative affect. Specifically, 
this model assumes that high ruminators may process all types of information in a more 
focused manner when they are in neutral mood (having beneficial effects in relation to 
certain tasks), compared to low ruminators. Yet, when they feel sad or depressed, their 
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attentional scopes may become even more narrow towards negative mood-relevant 
information, leading to an unproductive narrow focus on self-related themes.  
The most distinctive characteristic of the attentional scope model of rumination 
is that it argues that the attentional scope of individuals can affect their processing of 
all types of information, when they are in a neutral mood. Hence, it can provide an 
explanation for findings showing that levels of rumination influence the processing of 
not only negative material but a broad range of information (Hilt, Leitzke, & Pollak, 
2016; LeMoult, Arditte, D’Avanzato, & Joormann, 2013). In a recent study trying to 
investigate the relation between rumination and attentional scope (Fang, Sanchez, & 
Koster, 2017), undergraduates were preselected on high versus low levels of trait 
rumination. Participants were asked to perform a moving window task during which 
neutral sentences were presented and their eye movements while reading were 
recorded. In this task, participants read sentences that were either presented without 
or with varying window sizes that restricted participants’ reading scope. The content of 
a sentence that can be seen depends on the size of an invisible window frame which 
was moved contingent with gaze position. Individual’s attentional scope is inferred by 
comparing performance on different window size conditions and baseline condition (no 
window condition). We found that, when reading neutral sentences, individuals in the 
high trait rumination group were better able to read sentences presented in a small 
window size than individuals low in trait rumination. This study provided direct 
evidence of a narrower attentional scope (at the perceptual level) in habitual 
ruminators, as predicted by the attentional scope model of rumination. Nevertheless, 
due to the fact that only neutral sentences were used in this study, it is unclear whether 
the results could be generalized to other types of information, particularly emotional 
positive and negative information. 
Concerning processing of negative information, the attentional scope model of 
rumination predicts more focused attention on negative information for individuals 
with higher levels rumination when they feel depressed, due to the negative mood 
congruent effect. However, already in a neutral mood, this narrow focus would be 
present for processing information in general. Nevertheless, the model has not 
precisely delineated whether individuals with high levels of rumination still process 
negative material differently from other types of information, in a neutral mood. 
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Previous studies have shown that high levels of trait rumination are associated with 
attentional bias towards negative information relative to positive or/and neutral stimuli 
(De Lissnyder, Koster, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2010; Donaldson, Lam, & Mathews, 
2007; Duque, Sanchez & Vazquez, 2014). Noteworthy, in these studies, valence-specific 
attentional bias in relation to rumination remained significant, even after statistically 
controlling for the influence of depressive symptoms. Thus, it would be interesting to 
explore whether specific patterns of attentional narrowing can be observed during 
reading emotional information after controlling for mood state.  
The present study 
The present study sought to extend the research in relation between rumination 
and attentional scope using the moving window paradigm (Fang et al., 2017). Based on 
the assumptions of the attentional scope model of rumination, according to which 
individual differences in attentional scope would affect performance during the 
processing of neutral and emotional information (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013), our first 
hypothesis was that trait rumination is associated with performance benefits when 
processing neutral and emotional sentences in a restricted attentional window. In line 
with previous research using this paradigm (Fang et al., 2017), we adapted the moving 
window task to evaluate attentional scope (McConkie & Rayner, 1975). Typically, this 
task requires participants to read a sentence through an invisible window frame. The 
text within the window frame can be seen whereas the text outside of it is masked. The 
rationale of this paradigm is that, if the attentional scope of an individual is larger than 
the window frame, then the limited window would make it more difficult to process the 
sentence than natural reading. People with a narrower attentional scope may be less 
influenced by the reduced window size than people with a broader attentional scope. 
Second, to test whether attentional scope is influenced by the valence of the sentence, 
we presented different types of emotional stimuli. According to previous studies 
indicating rumination-related differential processing of negative information (e.g., De 
Lissnyder et al., 2010; Donaldson et al., 2007), we predicted that high ruminators show 
a narrower attentional scope while processing negative sentences. 
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METHOD 
Participants 
In the current study, a total of 64 participants (36 females, 28 males) completed 
the experimental session. They were native Dutch speakers with normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. All participants provided informed consent and received 
reimbursement for their participation.  
Self-report measures 
Symptom and trait measurements. Depressive symptoms were assessed with 
the 21-item Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; Van der 
Does, 2002). The occurrence and severity of depressive symptoms over the past two 
weeks were rated by participants on a 4-point scale (Cronbach’s α = .84). Trait 
rumination was assessed with the 22-item Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Raes, Hermans, & Eelen, 2003; Treynor, Gonzalez, & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003).  Participants were asked to rate items on a 4-point scale while 
thinking about how they usually respond when they are in a negative or depressed 
mood (Cronbach’s α = .93).  
State measurements. Provided that the aim of our study was to examine the 
relation between attentional scope and rumination in a neutral mood condition, mood 
state should be assessed and controlled. In this regard, mood (i.e., happy, sad and 
agitated) was assessed on three 100 mm Visual Analogue Scales (VAS) ranging from 
“neutral” to “as much as I could imagine” (see Rossi & Pourtois, 2012).  Additionally, in 
order to control the influence of state rumination, the 6-item Momentary Ruminative 
Self-focus Inventory (MRSI; Mor, Marchetti, & Koster, 2013) was employed before and 
after the moving window task. Participants were asked to rate the extent of ruminative 
self-focused thinking at the moment on a 7-point scale ranging from “totally not agree” 
to “totally agree” (Cronbach’s α = .82). 
Moving window task 
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A series of short (mean length of sentences = 30.10 characters, range: 22-47 
characters) and syntactically simple Dutch sentences were used in the current study. 
The reading material comprised three types of valence, which were 60 positive (e.g., “I 
am a cherish person.”), 60 negative (e.g., “I am a born loser.”), and 60 neutral sentences 
(e.g., “I relax during holidays.”).  The positive and negative sentences were selected 
from a pool of validated self-referent sentences obtaining from a previous study 
(Everaert, Duyck, & Koster, 2014). In line with previous studies (Everaert et al., 2014; 
Sanchez, Everaert, De Putter, Mueller, & Koster, 2015), neutral sentences were 
generated using WordGen (Duyck, Desmet, Verbeke, & Brysbaert, 2004) and matched 
with emotional sentences on word length and frequency. All the sentences were 
randomly assigned to four blocks.  The length of sentences was matched among the 
four window size conditions and the three types of valence. Four different window size 
conditions were used: (1) small window condition (2-4 characters visible; 12.5 mm of 
size); (2) medium window condition (6-8 characters; 25 mm.); (3) large window 
condition (12-14 characters; 50 mm); and (4) no window condition (without restricted 
frame). Each window size condition consisted of 3 blocks (i.e., positive, negative, and 
neutral block), each of which contained 15 sentences (trials). The order of the window 
size conditions was counterbalanced among participants. The presentation of blocks 
within each window size condition was also randomized for every participant.  
At the beginning of each trial, a fixation cross was presented on the left side of 
the screen. Participants were required to look at the cross for at least 200 ms until the 
target sentence was displayed on the screen. They were then asked to read the whole 
sentence and to press the space bar as soon as they understood the meaning of the 
sentence. In those three moving window conditions, only limited numbers of characters 
could be seen through the invisible window frame (larger, or smaller, depending on the 
condition) and the window frame was moving contingent to the individual’s gaze. Thus, 
participants were instructed to move their eyes naturally from left to right so that they 
can read the full sentence. The rest of the sentence outside the window frame was 
blanked. After several sentences, participants were randomly asked to answer a simple 
question concerning the content of the preceding sentence by choosing the correct 
answer from two options. This encouraged participants to process the meaning of the 
sentences, as instructed. 
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In line with our previous study (Fang et al., 2017), attention indices comprise 
total sentence reading time, number of fixations, and reading rate. Specifically, the total 
sentence reading time was the summation of all fixations duration within a sentence. 
The number of fixations was the total number of fixations that were recorded within a 
sentence. Reading rate was the average number of words processed per minute.   
Eye tracking 
Eye movements during the moving window task were recorded with a Tobii 
TX300 eye-tracker system, which utilizes a dual-Purkinje eye-tracking method (Crane & 
Steele, 1985) and samples eye-gaze coordinates at 300 Hz (i.e., a coordinates’ 
estimation every 3.3 ms). E-prime Professional software (Schneider, Eschman, & 
Zuccolotto, 2012) was used to run the presentation of experimental stimuli and control 
the recording of eye movements. The eye-tracking system synchronized automatically 
with E-prime at the start of each trial. The distance between participants and the eye 
tracker was approximately 60 cm. Eye movement signals were converted to visual 
fixation data by using E-prime extensions for Tobii (i.e., Clearview PackageCalls).  
Procedure 
Participants were first asked to complete a written informed consent and to 
complete self-report questionnaires with regard to depressive symptoms, trait 
rumination, and state measurements at baseline. Then, they were instructed to 
perform the moving window task, which included one practice block and four main 
experiment blocks (one for each window condition, randomly presented). State 
measurements were measured again immediately following the moving window task 
performance. At the end of the experiment, participants were debriefed and received 
reimbursement for their participation. 
Data preparation and analytical strategy 
The criteria for data exclusion were the same as in the previous study using this 
paradigm (Fang et al., 2017). Thus, all trials with average fixation duration < 100 ms 
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were excluded (0.36% trials in total), and trials in which reading time was equal or 
larger than 3 SD of each window size condition were excluded as well (1.11% trials in 
total). Final data analyses were conducted on the remaining 9933 observations (98.53% 
trails in total).  
A series of linear mixed effect (LME) models were performed (Baayen, Davidson, 
& Bates, 2008), for each of the four attentional scope indices (i.e., total sentence 
reading time, number of fixations, and reading rate) in R version 3.3.2 using lme4 
package (Bates, Maechler, Boler, & Walker, 2015). In each LME model, the variables 
included in fixed effects were adjusted based on different purposes whereas intercepts 
for participants and items were always comprised in the random effects. We first tested 
the full model in which the centered RRS score (continuous covariate), window size 
(small, medium, large, and no window), valence of sentence (negative, neutral, and 
positive), and corresponding interactions among these variables were entered as fixed 
effects.  
To test our hypothesis, a two-way interaction between window size and the RRS 
score was expected for the first hypothesis, and a three-way interaction between 
window size, the RRS score, and valence was expected for testing the second 
hypothesis. In the further analyses of the expected interactions, separate mixed models 
were conducted in each window size condition (or for each valence of sentence), with 
RRS included in fixed effects as continuous covariate, and participant and item included 
as random effects while controlling for baseline positive and negative mood2. In order 
to avoid collinearity, all continuous variables were centered before the LME analysis. 
 
 
                                                 
2 We also entered the state rumination score as covariance in all models and found similar 
results as when they were not involved in the models. Given that the attentional scope model 
of rumination mainly stresses the influence of mood state on attentional scope, we did not put 
the related results in the main text. 
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RESULTS 
Group characteristics 
One participant was excluded because of a highly elevated depression score 
(BDI-score of 37; > 3 SD in BDI-II). Two participants were excluded for not completing 
the questionnaires. Five participants were ruled out due to poor task performance 
(standard deviation score of total reading time and number of fixation ≥ 3). The 
characteristics of the remaining 56 participants (age: M = 20.32, SD = 2.82; 31 female) 
are shown in Table 1. Our sample showed sufficient variation in trait rumination (range: 
22-70). 
 
Table1. Characteristics of participants (N = 56). 
 Mean SD Range 
Age 20.32 2.82 17-31 
Gender 
(female:male) 
31:25   
BDI-II  9.80 6.47 0-24 
RRS  39.77 12.41 22-70 
MRSI T1 25.36 7.25 7-40 
MRSI T2 24.54 6.58 11-40 
VAS_positive T1 50.09 28.44 0-93 
VAS_positive T2 52.50 28.14 0-97 
VAS_negative T1 15.84 20.32 0-94 
VAS_negative T2 12.48 15.22 0-55 
VAS_agitated T1 30.30 25.58 0-95 
VAS_agitated T2 31.12 24.43 0-84 
Note: BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventroy-II; RRS, Ruminative Response Scale; MRSI, Momentary 
Ruminative Self-focus Inventory; T1, Time 1 (before the experimental task); T2, Time 2 (after 
the experimental task); VAS, Visual Analogue Scale. 
Total Sentence Reading Time 
The results of the full model showed a significant effect of the RRS, F (1, 54.00) = 
6.07, p < .05, window size, F (3, 168.00) = 114.21, p < .001, and a significant two-way 
interaction between window size and RRS, F (3, 9835.10) = 15.82, p < .001. Moreover, 
the three-way interaction among window size, RRS, and valence was also significant, F 
(6, 9834.80) = 2.76, p < .05 (other Fs < 1.76, ps > .17) (see Fig. 1). To clarify the three-
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
72 
way interaction, separate mixed models for different valences showed that the 
interaction between window size and RRS was significant for neutral sentences, F (3, 
3124.88) = 3.12, p < .05, and for positive sentences, F (3, 2986.09) = 17.05, p < .001, but 
not for negative sentences, F (3, 2979.73) = 1.88, p = .13. Therefore, we conducted 
separate mixed model only for neutral and positive sentences in each different window 
size condition while controlling for baseline mood. 
For neutral sentences, there was a tendency that RRS predicted performance in 
the small window condition, b = -25.97, SE = 14.16, t (51.14) = 1.83, p = .07, 95% CI = [-
53.37, 1.43], in the medium window condition, b = -13.25, SE = 7.06, t (50.86) = 1.88, p 
= .07, 95% CI = [-26.90, 0.41], and in the large window condition, b = -10.77, SE = 5.03, t 
(52.03) = 2.14, p < .05, 95% CI = [-20.50, -1.05], but not in no window condition, b = -
4.61, SE = 6.40, t (52.07) = 0.72, p = .48, 95% CI = [-16.93, 7.72]. Results indicated that, 
although trait rumination does not influence total reading time in natural reading, 
individuals with different trait rumination levels were influenced by the constrained 
window frames. Specifically, individuals with higher RRS scores had shorter total 
reading time in all conditions in which text could only be perceived through a limited 
window. 
For positive sentences, separate mixed models in different window size 
conditions revealed that the RRS significantly predicted performance in the small 
window condition, b = -36.13, SE = 16.43, t (51.98) = 2.20, p < .05, 95% CI = [-67.85, -
4.41] and marginally significant in the medium window condition, b = -12.54, SE = 6.91, 
t (51.71) = 1.81, p = .08, 95% CI = [-25.92, 0.84], but not significantly in the large window 
and no window condition (ps > .24). The results of positive sentences was quite similar 
to what was shown in neutral sentences, in that individuals with higher RRS scores had 
shorter total reading time in the most restricted conditions.  
Number of Fixations 
Results of the full model showed a significant effect of window size, F (3, 168.00) 
= 70.06, p < .001, and a significant two-way interaction between window size and RRS, F 
(3, 9687.50) = 9.19, p < .001 (other Fs < 2.44, ps > .12). To further analyze the two-way 
interaction between window size and RRS, a separate mixed model was conducted in 
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each window size condition. However, after controlling for current positive and 
negative mood, no significant effects were found in any of the window size conditions 
(ts < .001, ps > .99). 
Reading Rate 
Results of the full model showed significant effects of RRS, F (1, 54.00) = 8.66, p 
< .01, window size, F (3, 167.70) = 325.20, p < .001. Moreover, we found a significant 
two-way interaction between window size and RRS in reading rate, F (3, 9663.60) = 
24.44, p < .001 (other Fs < 1.07, ps > .38). 
To further analyze the two-way interaction between window size and RRS, a 
separate mixed model was conducted in each window size condition while controlling 
for positive and negative mood levels at baseline. No significant effect was found in the 
no window condition, b = 4.00, SE = 5.26, t (51.94) = 0.76, p = .45, 95% CI = [-6.11, 
14.12], reflecting that trait rumination does not influence total reading time in natural 
reading. As expected, RRS significantly predicted performance in the small window 
condition, b = 5.47, SE = 2.64, t (51.89) = 2.08, p < .05, 95% CI = [0.40, 10.54], and also 
marginally significantly predicted performance in the medium window condition, b = 
7.00, SE = 3.87, t (51.56) = 1.81, p = .08, 95% CI = [-0.46, 14.45], and in the large window 
condition, b = 9.31, SE = 4.70, t (51.88) = 1.98, p = .05, 95% CI = [0.25, 18.36]. In sum, 
results show that reading rate was influenced by trait rumination only when reading 
through various restricted windows but not in natural reading. Specifically, individuals 
with higher RRS scores had a faster reading rate whereas individuals with lower RRS 
scores had slower reading rate in the restricted window conditions. 
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DISCUSSION 
In the present study we aimed to extend the research on the relation between 
rumination and attentional scope while processing neutral and emotional information. 
To assess attentional scope, we applied a gaze-contingent moving window task which 
involved reading both neutral and emotional sentences. The main results indicated (1) 
that individuals with higher levels of trait rumination were less influenced by the 
constrained window frame (i.e., faster reading rate) when processing neutral, positive, 
and negative sentences, and (2) the total reading time of individuals with different 
levels of trait rumination was found to be different for neutral and positive sentences, 
but not for negative sentences. We discuss these effects in more detail below. 
First, we found that trait rumination predicted individuals’ performance when 
reading both neutral and emotional sentences with reduced window sizes, which was 
reflected by faster reading rate in individuals with higher levels of rumination. These 
findings are in accordance with previous research. For example, Grol et al. (2015) found 
that individuals with higher levels of brooding (i.e., a maladaptive subtype of 
rumination) presented a narrower attentional scope for neutral self-related information 
relative to other-related information. Recently, Fang et al. (2017) reported that, after 
controlling for the positive and negative mood states, individuals with high levels of 
trait rumination showed a faster reading rate than the ones with low levels of trait 
rumination when reading neutral sentences. Our findings are in line with the idea that 
higher levels of trait rumination are associated with a more narrow attentional scope 
when processing neutral information. Moreover, with the inclusion of emotional 
sentences, the current study showed an associated between attentional scope and trait 
rumination regardless of the valence of the sentences, as evidenced in the reading rate. 
Taken together, these findings provided supportive evidence for the prediction of the 
attentional scope model of rumination, which proposed that high levels of rumination 
would show narrow attentional scope in overall processing of information when they 
are in a neutral mood (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013).  
Second, we examined whether the relation between attentional scope and trait 
rumination would be influenced by different types of emotional sentences. The 
expected three-way interaction among window size, valence, and the RRS score was 
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only found to be significant for total sentence reading time. Further analyses revealed 
that high levels of trait rumination predicted faster total reading time when processing 
neutral and positive sentences, but this was not the case when they were reading 
negative sentences. These findings seem to suggest that the better performance of 
individuals with high levels of trait rumination when processing neutral and positive 
sentences through constrained window frame may be compromised or masked when 
processing negative sentences. However, which feature of the negative sentence 
influences the processing remains to be explored. In addition, it is important to note 
that the expected three-way interaction was only significant for total sentence reading 
time but not for other indexes. It has been suggested that inhibition impairments for 
negative information emerge when information is attended (so on an index of sustained 
attention: total fixation time), but not on other attention indices related to selection 
(number of fixations) (Everaert & Koster, 2015). Accordingly, the difference in 
processing of negative information may only occur during sustained attention and 
encoding the meaning of the information but not during the early attentional selection. 
However, we realize that this is a tentative conclusion based on a null result, thus future 
research should further examine these findings. 
Our findings provide supportive evidence for the attentional scope model of 
rumination, but also raise some theoretical issues. On the one hand, if there is not a 
negative mood state, the narrower attentional scope of high ruminators would 
influence their overall performance on multiple types of information. On the other 
hand, they might still process negative information differently even if they process all 
types of information in a constrained manner. Future studies are needed to provide 
more details about these different processes in high trait ruminators. Moreover, it is 
also important to elucidate precisely whether high and low ruminators react differently 
to emotional and neutral information when they are in a neutral mood, in comparison 
to when they are in a negative mood state.  
There are some limitations in the current study. First, we used an unselected 
sample in our study which may limit the generalization of the observed findings to 
depressed or remitted depressed patients. Nevertheless, the variability in rumination 
scores in the current study is comparable to the previous studies testing cognitive 
impairments/ processes as a function of habitual use of rumination. Second, despite our 
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best efforts to match the different types of sentences, there may still have been lower 
level differences between the different sentences types. Future research should 
consider constructing a well-validated sentence pool including all different types of 
sentence that are matched to facilitate the consistency of related studies.  
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the current study aimed to investigate and extend the research on 
the relation between rumination and attentional scope. This is the first study 
demonstrating that higher levels of trait rumination are associated with faster speed of 
reading when processing both neutral and emotional information after controlling for 
baseline mood. This suggests that individuals with high levels of rumination exhibit 
narrower attentional scope during reading. In addition, the results of total reading time 
showed that individuals with higher levels of trait rumination performed better when 
processing neutral and positive sentences under constrained window frame conditions, 
but this benefit was not significant anymore when processing negative sentences. 
These findings suggest that even though high trait ruminators use a constrained 
manner in processing all types of information, they may still process negative 
information differently compared with other types of information. 
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CAN MULTIPLE-SESSION ATTENTIONAL 
BREADTH TRAINING CHANGE 
ATTENTIONAL BREADTH AND 
RUMINATION?1 
ABSTRACT 
Recently, theoretical frameworks have been proposed to explain the question 
about what kind of people tend to use rumination more often than others. The 
attentional scope model of rumination suggests that individual differences in 
attentional breadth make them react differently to negative mood. The aim of the 
current research was to establish the causal direction between attentional breadth and 
rumination by exploring whether attentional breadth could be manipulated through 
these training procedures, and whether the manipulation of attentional breadth can 
influence rumination. This study contained one multiple-session manipulations using a 
combined training approach over a five day period, pre- and post-training assessment 
to test the direct transfer effects of training on attentional breadth construed in 
different measures, and a stress induction to test the effect of attentional breadth 
training on rumination. Our findings do not support the hypothesis that training 
variants of the Global-Local attentional breadth task or of the visuospatial attentional 
breadth task can broaden attentional breadth. Therefore, we cannot make any firm 
statements about the causal link between attentional breadth and rumination. 
 
 
                                                 
1Partly based on Fang, L., Hoorelbeke, K., Bruyneel, L., Notebaert, L., MacLeod, C., De Raedt, R., 
& Koster, E.H.W. (in press). Can training change attentional breadth? Failure to find transfer 
effects. Psychological Research. DOI: 10.1007/s00426-017-0845-y. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Decades of research have shown that rumination, a repetitive thinking on 
negative mood related thoughts, is one of the most important risk factors for the onset 
and maintenance of depressive symptoms (Mor & Winquist, 2002; Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Several theoretical frameworks 
have been proposed concerning the question that what kind of people tend to use 
rumination more often than others (Joormann, 2010; Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakhshan, 
& De Raedt, 2011; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). According a recent attentional scope 
model of rumination, attentional breadth has been proposed to play an important role 
in explaining the repetitive nature of rumination (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). This model 
suggests that individual differences in attentional scope (or attentional breadth) make 
them react differently to negative mood. It argues that, when in neutral mood, 
individuals with narrow attentional breadth may tend to allocate their attentional 
resources in a more constrained manner to all kinds of information. When they feel 
depressed, this restricted focus would be biased by the negative mood to negative 
information only. In contrast, individuals with broad attentional breadth would tend to 
spread their attentional resources more widely in the neutral mood. This broad 
attentional breadth may prevent them from being stuck in the same negative thoughts 
repetitively. Previous studies have shown the assumed relationship between 
attentional breadth and rumination (Daches & Mor, 2015; Fang, Sanchez, & Koster, 
2017; Grol, Hertel, Koster, & De Raedt, 2015).  Given the theorized connection between 
attentional breadth and rumination (e.g., Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013), it is important to 
establish the causal nature of any observed relationship between them. 
Researchers have already tried to explore the causal direction from rumination 
to attentional breadth. Recently, engagement in rumination has been reported to 
influence attentional breadth. For example, Grol et al. (2015) induced either a 
ruminative or problem-solving thinking style and then measured attentional breadth in 
an attentional breadth task including self- or other-related stimuli. They found that, 
relative to the problem-solving induction, people with higher levels of trait rumination 
who were led to ruminate showed a narrowing attentional breadth when processing 
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self-related stimuli, as compared to other-related stimuli. Therefore, this emotional 
regulation of rumination appears to causally influence attentional breadth.  
In contrast, until now no research has been carried out on investigating whether 
the manipulation of attentional breadth can influence rumination, despite the fact that 
attentional breadth has been proposed to be an important cognitive factor that 
influences the repetitive characteristic of rumination (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). To test 
the assertion that attentional breadth causally affects rumination, it is necessary to 
experimentally manipulate attentional breadth and then observe its influence on 
rumination. In fact, several studies in the field of emotion regulation have sought to 
modify attentional breadth using amended variants of the Global-Local task and then to 
examine its impact on emotion regulation. For example, in an ERP study, Gable and 
Harmon-Jones (2012) used the Global-Local task to induce a global or local processing 
preference, on a trial-by-trial basis, before exposing participants to disgust-evoking and 
neutral pictures. Specifically, they asked participants first to identify either the global or 
the local letter presented in a visual display, and then measured the relative degree to 
which attention was captured by disgusting and neutral images. The results showed 
that when participants were induced to process global letters, rather than induced to 
process local letters, they showed reduced N1 amplitude towards disgust pictures, 
suggesting that inducing greater attentional breadth reduced processing of this 
negative information. Other studies have aimed to induce a more sustained change in 
attentional breadth using training variants of the Global-Local task. For example, Hanif 
et al. (2012) sought to induce differences in attentional breadth using such a modified 
Global-Local task. During this task, a set of hierarchical shaped stimuli were presented 
and participants were required to always identify either the global shape (broad 
training) or the local shape (narrow training). These two groups showed differences in 
self-regulation after exposure to this intended attentional breadth manipulation, as 
measured by the time spent squeezing a handgrip exerciser, which reflects individuals’ 
efforts to regulate the negative feelings they experienced during the task. These results 
are consistent with the possibility that the manipulation of attentional breadth can 
causally influence self-regulation.  
However, an important limitation of these earlier studies is that, because no 
measures of attentional breadth were taken after the manipulation of attentional 
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breadth, it remains unknown whether or not the candidate training procedures served 
to modify attentional breadth as intended. Unless it is first confirmed that the 
manipulation exerted the required impact on attentional breadth, these studies permit 
no strong conclusion concerning the causal influence of attentional breadth on emotion 
regulation. Indeed this prior literature provides no strong basis for assuming that 
attentional breadth can be modified using such candidate training procedures. It also is 
relevant to note that these previous studies only construed attentional scope in terms 
of global-local processing and it would be appropriate to also consider whether 
intended training procedure can modify attentional breadth, when this is construed in 
terms of visuospatial attentional scope (cf. Vanlessen, De Raedt, Koster, & Pourtois, 
2016).   
Current Studies 
The main aim of the present research was to establish whether the 
manipulation of attentional breadth can influence rumination. Specifically, we 
examined whether attentional breadth can be changed through such intended training 
manipulation and, if so, whether the attentional effect of these manipulations would be 
evident on state rumination induced in lab. To address limitations of previous research, 
we used more stringent pre- and post-training assessment design, in which we directly 
tested whether intended attentional breadth training exerted a significant impact on 
attentional breadth. Moreover, we used a multiple-session, multiple training task 
approach in order to maximize the potential to modify attentional breadth and also to 
provide insight into sustained effects of attentional breadth training. Our first 
hypothesis was that if the attentional breadth training works, the attentional effect of 
these manipulations would then be evident on assessment tasks that construe 
attentional breadth in different ways. The second hypothesis was that the successful 
attentional breadth training would have impact on state rumination so that after 
rumination induction in lab, individuals in the broad training group would show less 
increase in state rumination, less decrease in positive affect and less increase in 
negative affect than those in the narrow training group. 
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METHOD 
Participants 
Seventy-three individuals participated in the current experiment and were 
randomly assigned to two training groups. The sample size was based on the 
consideration that one would expect at least a moderate effect size (f = .25) for such an 
extensive training on close transfer (on a highly similar task). This would require a total 
sample size at least of n = 54 (based on G-power with α = .05 and (1-β) = .95). Here we 
oversampled because we expected some drop out of participants during multiple-
session training procedure. Attentional breadth was assessed both before and after a 5 
day procedure intended to induce differential change in attentional breadth.  
Participants were excluded either because their mean RT deviated more than 2.5 SDs 
from the sample mean during the pre-assessment (n = 2), or because their depressive 
symptoms met or exceeded a moderate level of depression, indicated by a BDI-II score 
greater than or equal to 20 (n = 6; for criteria, see Beck et al., 1996). An additional nine 
participants completed only the pre-training assessment, and consequently were 
excluded from the study. The remaining 56 participants completed the whole 
procedure. 
Questionnaires 
Depressive symptoms were assessed with the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-
II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), to ensure training groups did not differ in depression 
levels before training commenced. The BDI-II contains 21 items, scored on a four-point 
scale (0-3), and measures the occurrence and severity of depressive symptoms over the 
past two weeks. To ensure that training groups did not differ in either positive or 
negative affect, they completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), which is a brief measure containing 20 items that 
assess both positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA). Participants completed the 
state version in which they had to rate the extent to which they were currently 
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experiencing a certain affective state on a 5-point scale. The Dutch translation of the 
PANAS has shown good psychometric properties (Peeters, Ponds, & Vermeeren, 1996). 
In addition, state of rumination and affect were measured during post-training 
assessment session. State rumination was assessed with the 6-item Momentary 
Ruminative Self-focus Inventory (MRSI; Mor, Marchetti, & Koster, 2013), by asking 
participants to evaluate the degree of ruminative self-focused thinking at the moment 
on a 7-point scale ranging from “totally not agree” to “totally agree”. In line with 
previous study using similar stress induction (Hoorelbeke et al., 2015; Rossi & Pourtois, 
2012), participants were also asked to rate their current mood on seven 100 mm Visual 
Analogue Scales (VAS) ranging from “neutral” to “as much as I could imagine”, including 
the measurement of their positive affect (i.e., “energetic”, “satisfied” , and “happy”), 
negative affect (i.e., “angry”, “tense”, and “depressed”), and fatigue (McNair, Lorr, & 
Dropplemann, 1992). 
Attentional breadth assessment and training 
Both of the attentional breadth training tasks and the Global-Local assessment 
task were programmed using the E-PRIME 2 software package (Psychology Software 
Tools Inc, 2007). The visuospatial attentional breadth assessment task was programmed 
using Inquisit software package (Millisecond Software LLC., Seattle, WA, USA).  
Assessment tasks.  
Before and after the candidate attentional breadth training procedure 
participants’ attentional breadth was assessed using the standard Global-Local Navon 
Letter task (Navon, 1977). There were 64 trials in total. On each trial, a black fixation 
cross was presented in the center of the screen for 500 ms. Then, 1 of 8 global-local 
Navon figures was presented. The target letter in each figure was either T or H. On each 
trial, only one of these two letters was presented, either as a local shape (e.g., the 
global letter L made up of little T’s) or as a global shape (e.g., the global letter H made 
up of little F’s). Participants had to indicate whether the presented target letter was a T 
or an H, as quickly and accurately as possible, by pressing one of two keys on a standard 
AZERTY keyboard. Thus, a local trial was the one in which the target letter was the local 
feature, whereas a global trial was the one in which the target letter was the global 
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feature. All Global-Local figures were written in upper-case letters (Times New Roman). 
Global letters were either global T’s composed of local F’s or L’s, or global H’s composed 
of local F’s or L’s, whereas Local letters were either local T’s forming global F’s or L’s, 
local H’s forming global F’s or L’s. In line with Hanif et al. (2012), each global letter 
encompassed a horizontal visual angle of 6.2° and a vertical angle of 14.3°, whereas 
each local letter encompassed a horizontal visual angle of 1.1° and a vertical angle of 
1.4°. 50% of the trials were figures with a global target, 50% with a local target. The 
target remained on the screen until response. The inter-trial interval was 2000 ms.  
Additionally, in order to test whether the effect of attentional breadth training 
would transfer to another task which measures attentional breadth in a different 
manner, we also delivered an established visuospatial attentional breadth assessment 
task (Bosmans, Braet, Koster, & De Raedt, 2009). This task was recently used for 
measurement of attentional breadth on self-related information in people with 
different levels of rumination, since rumination has been considered to be associated 
with self-focus attention (Grol et al., 2015). During this assessment, a self- (“ME”) or 
other-related (“LR”) word was presented 68 ms in the central area of the screen 
surrounded by 16 gray dots arranged in two concentric circles in one of which a black 
smaller circle target appeared simultaneously with the word and gray dots. Participants 
were required to identify the central word (ME vs. LR) as well as to localize the position 
of the small black target. In close trials the positions of the target were in the smaller 
one of the two concentric circles whereas in far trials the positions of the target were in 
the larger (outer) one of the two concentric circles.  
Participants performed 16 practice trials and 182 test trials, during which the 
stimulus displays were presented for 250 ms in the first eight practice trials and then 
were presented 68 ms in the following eight practice trials and during all the test trials. 
In previous studies, as Attentional Narrowing index (ANI = accuracy of the close trials – 
accuracy of the far trials) has been calculated to assess the attentional breadth, and this 
has been shown to be an effective index that reveals variation in attentional breadth 
(Bosmans et al., 2009; Grol et al., 2015). Accordingly, we too used this method by 
computing attentional breadth using the Attentional Narrowing Index, where higher 
ANI scores indicate a more narrow attentional breadth and lower ANI scores indicate 
more broad attentional breadth.  
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Training tasks.  
Global-Local training. In the current study, we tried to manipulate attentional 
breadth using a modified version of the abovementioned Global-Local task (Navon, 
1977). Specifically, we exposed participants to one of the two training variants of this 
task, each delivering 160 trials. For the Global-Local training, people in the attentional 
broadening training group were instructed to only focus on and respond to the letter in 
the global form whereas people in the attentional narrowing training group were asked 
to only focus on and respond to the letter in the local form.  
Visuospatial training. In addition, we developed and tested a new candidate 
procedure to manipulate attentional breadth. This procedure was delivered in either of 
two conditions designed to differentially modify attentional breadth: one intended to 
train broadened attention by improving attentional acuity across a wide visual angle, 
and the other intended to train narrowing of attention by employing the reverse 
contingency. Because previous research has shown that narrowed attentional breadth 
is related to decreasing mental well-being, here in the narrow training group, 
participants were only trained by improving the attentional acuity in a fixed visual angle 
instead of narrowing their initial attentional breadth. Participants were instructed to 
maintain their gaze on the center of the screen throughout the experiment. On every 
trial, a black fixation cross was presented in the middle of the screen. After 500 ms, 
while the fixation cross stayed on the screen, six letters (randomly chosen T’s and H’s; 
all uppercase, Calibri, 18) were briefly and simultaneously shown on screen for 100 ms. 
These six letters were positioned at different distances from the center of the screen, 
located on six of the 24 positions arranged on eight points around the circumference of 
three invisible circles. More specifically, one of the six letters was presented randomly 
at one of the eight positions on the circle the closest to fixation (radius circle = 50 
pixels), four of the six letters were presented at the circle on medium distance from 
fixation (radius circle = 150 pixels) and one of the six letters was presented randomly at 
one of the eight positions on the circle the furthest from fixation (radius circle = 250 
pixels).  
Depending on the training condition, participants were required to identify 
either the letter closest (narrow attention group) or furthest (broad attention group) 
from the center of the screen. This way, participants in each of the two training groups 
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were required to adopt either a narrow or broad attentional focus, respectively, to 
optimally perform the task. In the broad attention group, whenever accuracy level on a 
block of trials was above 80%, the radius of the imperceptible circles increased by 20 
pixels to encourage the further broadening of attention. Otherwise, the maximal 
eccentricities stayed at the last level, when participants’ performances were below 
80%. In the narrow attention group, the radius remained constant across all blocks.  
The trials were presented in eight blocks of 32 training trials and four 
manipulation check trials, each block separated by a short break. In the manipulation 
check trials, a set of six different letters were presented with the same random 
configurations and presentation time as the training trials. However, on these trials, 
individuals were instructed to identify as many letters as possible. This allowed us to 
examine whether the letters that were best identified were those presented closest, 
middle distant or furthest from the center of the screen. Narrower attention will be 
indicated by a heightened tendency to identify the letters close to the screen center, 
whereas broader attention will be indicated by a more even probability of identifying 
letters distributed across the full breadth of the display.     
On each trial of both training tasks, if the participants’ response was incorrect, 
an error message was then presented for 500 ms. Participants were required to 
perform both tasks each day, and were instructed to switch the order of the two tasks 
across successive days. There were 160 trials in the Global-Local training and 288 trials 
in the visuospatial training, and each training session could be completed in around 20-
30 minutes. 
Stress induction 
After post-training attentional breadth assessment tasks, participants received a 
stress induction based on the variant of a validated procedure (Hoorelbeke, Koster, 
Vanderhasselt, Callewaert, & Demeyer, 2015; Rossi & Pourtois, 2012). They obtained a 
fictive feedback about their post-training assessment performance compared to their 
baseline scores. To standardize the induction procedure, these scores were presented 
through an E-prime program and they were told that their post-training performance 
was much worse than their baseline levels, which was unexpected since they have 
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conducted such an intensive training procedure. After being told that the experimenter 
needed some time to figure out whether they should perform the assessment tasks 
again, participants were then left alone in the lab for three minutes, which was 
assumed to increase the chance for them to ruminate about what they have done 
during the experiment, and the consequences of this stressful situation. Before and 
after the stress induction, participants’ state rumination and affect were measured. 
Procedure 
After signing informed consent, participants completed the visuospatial 
attentional breadth task and the Global-Local task as pre-training assessment of their 
attentional breadth. In line with the specific requirements of the visuospatial 
attentional breadth assessment task (Bosmans et al., 2009; Grol et al., 2015), 
participants were seated at 27 cm from a 19 inch CRT screen during pre- and post-
assessment. Participants then filled out the questionnaires (BDI-II, PANAS). 
Subsequently, participants were randomly assigned to one of the two training groups 
(broad or narrow) which were scheduled to include five training sessions at home 
within a period of one week. During each session, participants were required to 
complete both the visuospatial training and the Global-Local training in random order. 
Every participant was given an instruction manual which included all the information 
and requirements regarding the home training. In the manual, they were asked to 
concentrate on the training tasks and to read the instruction of each task carefully. They 
were also asked to record the date and order in which they performed the training 
tasks at home. After home-training, they returned to the lab where the experimenter 
collected the data of the training tasks and checked the accuracy rate of each day to see 
whether they performed the training tasks as instructed. At the same time, participants 
completed the post-training assessment (i.e., cognitive transfer tasks). Following the 
computer tasks, they were asked to complete trait measurement and to assess their 
state of rumination and affect as well. Then, they received a stress induction, after 
which their state of rumination and affect were measured again. This experiment was 
approved by the local ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology at Ghent 
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University, and participants were fully debriefed and reimbursed at the end of the 
study. 
RESULTS 
Participant characteristics 
Participant characteristics are shown in Table 1. There were no significant 
differences between the two training groups on any of the self-report measures (all ts < 
0.82) or pre-assessment task performance (all ts and Fs < 1).  
 
Table 1. Characteristics of participants at pre-training assessment. 
 
 Training Group 
 Broad Narrow 
N 29 27 
Age 22.38 22.48 
Gender (F/M) 23/6 21/6 
Questionnaires M  
(SD) 
M  
(SD) 
BDI-II 6.90  (3.80) 8.26  (5.34) 
PA state 34.55 (4.69) 33.81 (5.65) 
NA state 17.28 (8.21) 17.85 (5.82) 
Note: BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996); PA and NA state, positive 
and negative affect (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988). 
Progress on training tasks 
We used Repeated Measures ANOVAs to examine the effect of time (5 sessions) 
on the training tasks, for each group separately. For the global-local training task we 
based our analyses on RTs (see Table 2 for details) since accuracy was at ceiling levels. 
As expected, we found a significant main effect of time for both broad training group, 
F(4, 112) = 42.57, p < .001, η2 = .60 and narrow training group as well, F(4, 104) = 41.39, 
p < .001, η2 = .61, which indicated that both training groups improved via training 
sessions. In the broad training group, the RT decreased from session 1 (M = 506, SD = 
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167) to session 5 (M = 353, SD = 83), and in the narrow training group the RT also 
decreased from session 1 (M = 562, SD = 148) to session 5 (M = 401, SD = 78). 
For the attentional breadth training task, with accuracy as DV (see Table 2 for 
details), there was a significant main effect of time in the broad training group, F(4, 112) 
= 17.44, p < .001, η2 = .38, whereas no significant main effect of time was found in the 
narrow training group, F(4, 104) = 0.80, p = .53, η2 = .03. In the broad training group, 
participants’ accuracy increased from session 1 (M = 79.47, SD = 5.32) to session 5 (M = 
85.43, SD = 6.56). Note that there was no attentional breadth training in the narrow 
group and they had a consistently high accuracy rate across the five-days training.  
 
Table 2. Training progress as a function of training condition 
 
 Broad training group  
        (n = 29) 
Narrow training group  
         (n = 27) 
 M SD M SD 
Global-Local Training Task (RT: ms)     
Time1 506 167 562 148 
Time2 408 99 471 101 
Time3 396 112 433 91 
Time4 370 94 397 76 
Time5 353 83 401 78 
Attentional Breadth Training Task (ACC)     
Time1 79.47 5.32 94.88 5.74 
Time2 82.22 6.25 96.20 3.28 
Time3 82.81 5.93 96.48 2.66 
Time4 83.53 5.83 97.06 2.12 
Time5 85.43 6.56 94.07 14.97 
 
We then assessed performance on the manipulation check trials as an index of 
attentional breadth training, by conducting a mixed ANOVA with time (5 sessions) and 
distance (inner vs. middle vs. outer) as within-subject factors and training group as 
between-subjects factor. We found a significant main effect of time, F(4, 216) = 9.12, p 
< .001, η2 = .14, as well as distance, F(2, 108) = 868.67, p < .001, η2 = .94. Importantly, 
we found a significant distance x group interaction, F(2, 108) = 358.06, p < .001, η2 = .87. 
Further analyses showed that the broad group identified less letters in the inner circle 
(M = .49, SD = .15) than the narrow group (M = .96, SD = .04), F(1, 54) = 252.24, p < .001, 
η2 = .82. In contrast, the broad group identified more letters in the middle circle (M = 
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.13, SD = .03) than the narrow group (M = .10, SD = .04), F(1, 54) = 14.58, p < .001, η2 = 
.21. The broad group also detected more letters in the outer circle (M = .51, SD = .13) 
than the narrow group (M = .21, SD = .11), F(1, 54) = 93.92, p < .001, η2 = .64. These 
results confirm that there was a differential attentional strategy required in both 
conditions.  
Furthermore, we also tried to examine the effect of time on the attentional 
breadth training by using repeated measures ANOVAs with the manipulation check 
trials as dependent variable, for each group separately. For the inner circle, both groups 
did not show any significant improvement (all Fs < 1, ps > .52). For the middle circle, we 
found a significant increase of the accuracy both in the broad training group in which 
the performance improved from session 1 (M = .125, SD = .03) to session 5 (M = .134, 
SD = .03), F(4, 112) = 5.32, p < .001, η2 = .16, and in the narrow group in which the 
performance improved from session 1 (M = .08, SD = .04) to session 5 (M = .11, SD = 
.04), F(4, 104) = 23.57, p < .001, η2 = .48. Similarly, there was a significant improvement 
for both groups in the outer circle as well. In the broad training group, participants’ 
accuracy increased from session 1 (M = .46, SD = .15) to session 5 (M = .53, SD = .17), 
F(4, 112) = 5.33, p = .001, η2 = .16,and in the narrow training group, participants’ 
performance improved from session 1 (M = .15, SD = .10) to session 5 (M = .24, SD = 
.15), F(4, 104) = 7.58, p < .001, η2 = .23. The results of manipulation trials indicated that 
although there was no requirement for attentional broadening in the narrow training 
group, they still involved in the task actively and showed increasing improvement in 
their performance on middle and outer circle. 
Impact of training on attentional breadth assessment 
Training-related changes on the Global-Local assessment task.  During data 
preparation, trials on which participants responded incorrectly were discarded (< 4.9%). 
Furthermore, trials with RTs 2.5 SDs or more above a participants’ own mean RT were 
also excluded (< 2.8%). To determine whether the training influenced performance on 
the Global-Local assessment task, we conducted a mixed ANOVA with assessment time 
(pre- vs. post-training) and trial type (global vs. local) as within-subject factor and 
training group (broad vs. narrow) as a between-subjects factor on RT (see Table 2 for 
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details) as dependent variable. This revealed a significant main effect of assessment 
time, F(1, 54) = 46.33, p < .001, partial η2 = .46, a marginally significant main effect of 
trial type, F(1, 54) = 3.70, p = .06, partial η2 = .06, and a significant interaction effect 
between assessment time and trial type, F(1, 54) = 8.35, p < .01, partial η2 = .13. 
Importantly, we found a significant interaction effect between trial type and training 
group, F(1, 54) = 8.26, p < .01, partial η2 = .13, and a significant three-way interaction 
involving assessment time, trial type and training group, F(1, 54) = 9.20, p < .01, partial 
η2 = .15 (other Fs < 0.99, ps > .32, partial η2s < .02). Further investigation of this three-
way interaction revealed that its nature was as follows. Whereas the two-way 
interaction of trial type and time was not significant in the broad training group, F(1, 28) 
= 0.01, p = .91, partial η2 < .001, this interaction was significant in the narrow training 
group, F(1, 26) = 14.64, p < .01, partial η2 = .36. Specifically, in the narrow training 
group, there was no significant difference between the response times at pre-training 
assessment on the global trials (M = 697, SD = 138) and the local trials (M = 719, SD = 
157), t(26) = 1.34, p = .19, d = 0.26. However, at post-training assessment, response 
times on local trials (M = 568, SD = 84) were faster than on global trials (M = 610, SD = 
111), t(26) = 3.18, p < .01, d = 0.67, suggesting a narrowing effect of attentional breadth 
in the narrow training condition. 
 
Table 3. Reaction time (ms) as a function of training group in Global-Local assessment 
task. 
 
 
Time 
 
Group 
 
N 
 
Global Trial 
  
      Local Trial 
  M SD  M SD 
Narrow 27 624 120  635 117 
1 Broad 29 678 155  726 185 
Narrow 27 697 138  719 157 
2 Broad 29 589 104  638 130 
Narrow 27 610 111  568 84 
 
Training-related changes on the visuospatial attentional breadth assessment 
task. An average of 3.41% of the trials was discarded from further analysis due to 
incorrect reporting of the center word. We performed a mixed ANOVA with Time (pre- 
vs. post- training) and word (ME vs. LR) as within-subject factors and training group 
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(broad vs. narrow) as a between-subjects factor on Attentional Narrowing Index as 
dependent variable. We found a significant main effect of time, F(1, 54) = 4.46, p < .05, 
partial η2 = .08, indicating a decrease of visuospatial attentional breadth from pre-
assessment (M = .40, SD = .17) to post-assessment (M = .45, SD = .17). However, there 
was no group related main effect or interaction effect, Fs < 2.30, ps > .14, partial η2 < 
.04. Therefore, the two training conditions did not exert a differential impact on 
visuospatial attentional breadth.  
Impact of training on state rumination and mood  
To examine the impact of training on state rumination and mood, we performed 
mixed ANOVAs with Time (pre vs. post induction) as within-subject factors and training 
group (broad vs. narrow) as between-subjects factor and the scores on the MRSI and 
VAS scales (separately) as dependent variable.  
No significant results were found for state rumination, reflecting that there was 
no significant difference between the two training groups nor before and after 
rumination induction (all Fs < 3.22, ps > .08). For the VAS scale of negative affect, we 
only found a significant main effect of group, F(1, 54) = 4.84, p < .05, η2 = .08, indicating 
that the level of negative affect across the induction was generally lower in the broad 
training group (M = 16.74, SD = 11.57) than in the narrow training group (M = 24.16, SD 
= 13.65) (all other Fs < 1.50, ps > .23).  
For the VAS scale of positive affect, a significant main effect of time was found, 
F(1, 54) = 22.81, p < .001, partial η2 = .30. The level of positive affect decreased after the 
rumination induction (pre: M = 59.02, SD = 12.81; post: M = 51.08, SD = 16.74). We also 
found a significant main effect of group, F(1, 54) = 4.91, p < .05, partial η2 = .08, 
revealing that the level of positive affect across the rumination induction was generally 
higher in the broad training group (M = 58.76, SD = 13.37) than the narrow training 
group (M = 51.06, SD = 12.57). There was a marginally significant time x group 
interaction, F(1, 54) = 3.25, p = .08, η2 = .06. To explore this interaction, separate paired 
samples t-test within each group yielded a significant decrease in the broad group from 
pre-induction (M = 61.26, SD = 12.26) to post-induction (M = 56.25, SD = 15.91), t(28) = 
2.83, p < .01, d = .56, and also a significant decrease in the narrow group from pre-
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induction (M = 56.60, SD = 13.17) to post-induction (M = 45.52, SD = 16.07), t(26) = 
3.79, p = .001, d = .74. Furthermore, we conducted two independent sample t-tests to 
explore group difference before and after the induction. The result showed that there 
was no significant difference between the two groups before the induction, t(54) = 
1.37, p = .18, d = .37, but a significant difference after the induction, t(54) = 2.51, p < 
.05, d = .67. The result of interaction effect and the follow-up analyses jointly indicated 
that, although in both groups positive affect decreased after the induction, the 
amplitude of decreasing was smaller in the broad group than in the narrow group. 
DISCUSSION 
In the current study, we conducted one multiple-session attentional breadth 
training with the aim of determining whether attentional breadth could be manipulated 
through these training procedures and whether the manipulation of attentional 
breadth can influence rumination. For the Global-Local assessment task, we only found 
a training-congruent effect for the narrow training group, whereas we failed to observe 
any evidence that the broad training condition served to broaden attentional breadth. 
For the visuospatial attentional breadth assessment task, neither the narrowing nor the 
broadening transfer effect was observed. In addition, after stress induction, positive 
affect was decreased more in the narrow training group than in the broad training 
group but this was not the case neither for state rumination nor for negative affect. 
Taken together, the current study provides no evidence that training variants of the 
Global-Local task and/or the visuospatial task can lead to significant increases in 
attentional breadth in broad training group, assessed using the Global-Local assessment 
task or the visuospatial assessment task. This was true regardless of an intensive 
multiple-session (five days) training approach that was employed. Consequently, we 
cannot make any firm statements about the causal link between attentional breadth 
and rumination. Rather, our findings indicate limited success of attentional breadth 
manipulations.  
When reflecting on the possible explanations for the present results, we first 
need to consider the validity and reliability of the measures and research approach in 
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our study. It seems unlikely that our assessment measures were inadequate. We used 
the Global-Local task and a well-established visuospatial attentional breadth 
assessment task. The Global-Local task is the most frequently used task to assess 
attentional breadth (e.g., Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005) and the visuospatial attentional 
breadth assessment task has been used in previous research as well (e.g., Bosmans et 
al., 2009; Grol et al., 2015). Might it be the case that we employed inappropriate 
attentional breadth training procedures? We used the Global-Local training task 
combining with a new visuospatial training task. Importantly, the Global-Local training 
task has been used in previous studies that have sought to manipulate attentional 
breadth. This manipulation has previously shown to influence attentional bias to 
negative information (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2012) and emotion regulation (Hanif et 
al., 2012; vanDellen et al., 2012). However, these studies typically lack manipulation 
check procedures, which do not allow drawing conclusions on the causal influence of 
attentional breadth on these far transfer measures. With regard to our novel 
visuospatial training task, the manipulation check trials suggest successful online 
manipulation of attentional breadth during training. 
It is important to consider whether our failure to detect any impact of training 
procedures on attentional breadth could be due to insufficient power. Again this seems 
unlikely to be the case, if we assume a medium effect size of f = .25 (Cohen, 1988), as 
post-hoc power calculations confirm that our experiment showed sufficient power to 
detect a potential impact of the training manipulation on attentional breadth, using the 
G*Power 3.1.9.2 software package (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). The power 
(1 - β) to detect the training condition x assessment time two-way interaction effect on 
the assessment tasks was .96. However, if we conservatively assume a small effect size 
of f = .10 (Cohen, 1988), the power (1 - β) to detect the interaction effect on the 
assessment tasks was .31. These results suggest that both assessment tasks in the 
current study were sufficiently powered to detect medium effects but not small effects 
on the measures assessing attentional breadth. Thus, power considerations add weight 
to our conclusion that visual attentional breadth cannot be manipulated using the 
modified Global-Local task or visuospatial training task.  
One important characteristic that differentiates our current study from previous 
ones is that we measured individuals’ attentional breadth pre- and post-training, which 
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in principle could provide stronger evidence that attentional breadth can be changed 
through training. However, even though the manipulation check showed that 
participants complied with the requirements of the training procedure, we did not find 
any subsequent broadening impact of these procedures on alternative measures of 
attentional breadth. Furthermore, after performing multiple training sessions, we only 
observed a decrease on the Global preference measure of attentional breadth following 
the narrow training condition. However, this effect was not found on the visuospatial 
measure of attentional breadth.  
Perhaps there may not have been sufficient overlap between our training and 
assessment tasks. The definition of attentional breadth is often rather broad, so it is 
unclear which tasks provide an optimal assessment. In our study we included two 
different operationalizations of attentional breadth, the Global-Local and visuospatial 
training task, which may represent different kinds of attentional breadth. Global (or 
local) processing may reflect a high (or low) level of processing (Fujita, Trope, Liberman 
& Levin-Sagi, 2006; Hanif et al., 2012; van Dellen et al., 2012), whereas the target of the 
visuospatial attentional breadth training task pertains to the size of spatial perceptual 
attentional breadth. Though the narrowing effect in the Global-Local assessment task 
found may suggest a possibility that manipulation of visuospatial attention can be 
transferred to the global-local processing measurement, this was not the case for the 
broad training condition in these two experiments. Also, no transfer effect of multiple-
session training was found in visuospatial assessment task. Hence, whether the effect of 
manipulation of one kind of attentional breadth can transfer to tasks that measure 
other kinds of attentional breadth should be further considered in future research.  
As has been noted, some previous studies that found improvement of self-
regulation after Global-Local training intended to modify attentional breadth, but failed 
to include any post-training assessment of attentional breadth (Hanif et al., 2012). 
Given the present findings, it seems unlikely that attentional breadth was actually 
modified in these previous studies. How then did these training procedures exert their 
influence on emotion regulation? One interesting possibility is that Global-Local training 
may instead have influenced cognitive flexibility, as greater cognitive flexibility is 
associated with enhanced self-regulation (Olivers & Nieuwenhuis, 2005). This was 
especially evident for the narrow training group, which started with global preference 
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and was trained to switch to local preference. Thus, the effect of Global-Local training 
procedures on self-regulation observed in previous research (Hanif et al., 2012) could 
be due to increased cognitive flexibility instead of increased attentional breadth. Future 
research should consider combining both pre-and post-assessment tasks that measure 
attentional scope and cognitive flexibility. 
An alternative, but related, possibility is that the training procedures employed 
in these studies may have increased the flexibility of attentional breadth. According to 
theoretical models and empirical evidence in the visual attention domain, the field of 
focal attention could be seen as a single unitary focus that varies its size depending on 
task requirements (e.g., zoom lens model, Eriksen & St. James, 1986; Barriopedro & 
Botella, 1998; Muller, Bartele, Donner, Villringer, & Brandt, 2003), or as multiple foci 
attending to different places in a display simultaneously (e.g., Awh & Pashler, 2000; 
Cave, Bush, & Taylor, 2010). Notably, the mode of attentional deployment (as a 
changeable zoom lens or multiple foci) could even be altered within a task due to a 
simple change in the goals of the participants (Jefferies, Enns, & Di Lollo, 2014). 
Therefore, it may be that attentional breadth is highly malleable based on goals and 
context, such that individuals can easily modify their attentional breadth to meet task 
demands. In our experiments, participants were asked to keep using one dominant 
attentional deployment approach (i.e., using broad attentional breadth in the broad 
training group and narrow attentional breadth in the narrow training group), whereas 
in the assessment tasks no specific attentional deployment approach was required. 
Thus, participants may have adjusted their strategy between the training and 
assessment task in order to reach the optimal performance in the assessment tasks. 
Future research should consider using assessment tasks that do not require altering the 
size of attentional breadth in order to improve performance, such as the moving 
window task (McConkie & Rayner, 1975) which is proposed to measure perceptual 
attentional breadth in a natural reading context and the attention-demanding 
conjunction task (Hüttermann, Memmert, & Simons, 2014; Hüttermann, Memmert, 
Simons, & Bock, 2013) which is an interesting paradigm that could give precise 
information concerning the shape and size of changes in attentional breadth. 
This current study is the first to our knowledge that has systematically examined 
whether attentional breadth can be manipulated through the application of these 
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candidate training procedures and whether the manipulation of attentional breadth can 
influence rumination. Though we did not find any broadening effect of the training, the 
findings of our studies have important implications for future research designed to 
investigate the potential causal impact of variability in attentional breadth by observing 
the consequences of systematically manipulating attentional breadth. The vague 
definition of attentional breadth, possibly overlapping with cognitive flexibility, and its 
flexible nature, suggests that we need to further specify whether and how attentional 
breadth may be involved in emotion regulation. However, the present demonstration 
that attentional breadth may be resistant to direct manipulation compromises the 
prospect of evaluating these refined theories by testing the predictions they generate 
concerning how induced change in attentional breadth will affect emotion regulation. 
Given the increasing interest in changing attentional breadth in psychopathology 
(Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013), instead of training people to exhibit differences in their 
average breadth of  attention, future research could aim to increase individuals’ 
capacity to flexibly change their attentional breadth based on the requirements of 
different tasks. In addition, the results of the stress induction also suggest some issues 
to be considered in the future rumination induction. Previous research using rumination 
induction procedures, participants were instructed to read a series statements which 
required them focus on themselves and vividly think about how they feel (Lyubomirsky 
& Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Watkins & Teasdale, 
2001). However, the nature of this induction procedure may also induce individuals to 
constrain their attentional breadth on purpose, which would interfere with the effect of 
attentional breadth training. Thus, we chose a more naturalistic induction procedure. 
Using similar procedure, state rumination was found to be increased using breathing 
focus task, and negative and positive affect was shown to be changed using VAS 
(Hoorelbeke et al., 2015). We used the same VAS to assess state of mood but MRSI to 
measure state rumination, and only the positive affect was found to be decreased after 
the induction. Considering the context of the stress induction in the current study was 
more relevant to individual’s performance in the task so that the ruminative thinking 
may concern their bad performance and the consequences of this performance, 
whereas the items in the MRSI are more related to individuals’ thinking about their own 
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life. This suggests that various assessments of state rumination are needed in order to 
capture different aspect of state rumination.  
Several limitations in the current study should be considered. First, training 
effects were assessed by comparing two training groups. A no-training control group 
could have revealed additional information about different effects of attentional 
breadth training. Second, in the multiple-session training, participants conducted the 
training tasks at home using their own computer. This may have reduced the 
consistency of the training environment in ways that reduced training efficacy. 
Nevertheless, recent meta-analytical findings regarding cognitive training effects in the 
field of working memory training suggest that such training effects can be obtained 
regardless of whether training is administered in the lab or at home (Au, Sheehan, Tsai, 
Duncan, Buschkuehl, & Jaeggi, 2014). Third, although we instructed participants to 
always focus on the central fixation point, it is possible that they may have directed 
attention to other regions. However, given that the target letter was presented 
randomly at the eight positions on the outer circle, the best strategy for participants to 
adopt would be to focus on the central fixation point instead of moving eyes to some 
“expected” position before the appearance of the target, since the chance of the target 
appearing at one attended outer location is rather small (12.5%). Moreover, the target 
letter was presented for only 100 ms. The latency to execute a saccade exceeds this 
time, typically taking at least 150-175 ms (Rayner, 1998), and so our use of 100 ms 
target presentations precludes the possibility that participants shifted their attention to 
the target after its appearance. 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, we investigated whether attentional breadth could be changed 
through experimental procedures designed to directly modify attentional breadth. We 
also sought to examine whether the changing attentional breadth has impact on state 
rumination. Our findings do not support the hypothesis that training variants of the 
Global-Local attentional breadth task or of the visuospatial attentional breadth task can 
broaden attentional breadth, as indicated by subsequent tasks that assess attentional 
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breadth in terms of either global-local processing preference (Global-Local assessment 
task) or in terms of scope of visual perception (visuospatial assessment task). This was 
the case after the multiple-session manipulations using a combined training approach 
over a five day period. Although there were some indications that training a narrowing 
of attentional breadth may be possible, but there was no evidence that, even with this 
extensive and intensive training, it was possible to induce an increase in attentional 
breadth. Due to the fact that visual attentional breadth was not manipulated as 
intended, not any firm statements about the causal link between attentional breadth 
and rumination can be made in the current study. 
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EXAMINING THE RELATION BETWEEN 
MOOD AND RUMINATION IN REMITTED 
DEPRESSED INDIVIDUALS: A DYNAMIC 
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
1 
ABSTRACT 
Cognitive theories of recurrent depression suggest that the relationship 
between mood and cognition is altered by previous depressive episodes. In individuals 
remitted from depression (RMD), this would be linked to a larger susceptibility for new 
depressive symptoms. This study explored whether the association between mood and 
rumination indeed is different between RMD and non-depressed controls relying on 
dynamic systems theory (DST). From DST we selected entropy, defined here as the level 
of instability in the dynamic patterns of mood and rumination, as main variable of 
interest. Daily electronic dairy measures of mood and rumination were administered in 
31 RMD patients and 32 healthy controls. The results showed that mean levels of 
rumination and negative mood, but not entropy, were elevated in RMD individuals 
compared with controls. Moreover, entropy significantly predicted depressive 
symptoms at six months follow-up only in RMD group. These findings indicate that a 
higher level of instability in the dynamic patterns of momentary rumination and mood 
is associated with more depressive symptoms at follow-up in individuals that are more 
vulnerable to depression. 
  
                                                 
1Based on Koster, E.H.W., Fang, L., Marchetti, I., Ebner-Priemer, U., Kirsch, P., Huffziger, S., & 
Kuehner, C. (2015). Examining the relation between mood and rumination in remitted 
depressed individuals: A dynamic systems analysis. Clinical Psychological Science, 3, 619-627. 
DOI: 10.1177/2167702615578129. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Negative mood and self-reflective thought are tightly coupled (Moberly & 
Watkins, 2010). Provided that negative mood is thought to signal a discrepancy 
between actual state and desired state (Carver & Scheier, 1998), negative mood elicits 
self-reflection to understand the causes of such discrepancy (Watkins, 2008). In 
addition, there is extensive evidence that excessive levels of self-reflection in the form 
of rumination, which is oftentimes defined as attending to “the causes, meanings, and 
consequences of depressive symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, p. 569), can lead to 
heightened levels of negative affect (Mor & Winquist, 2002). The reciprocal relation 
between negative mood and rumination can explain why rumination is one of the key 
cognitive vulnerability factors in the onset and maintenance of depression (Nolen-
Hoeksema, Lyobomrisky, & Wisco, 2008).   
For many patients, depression is a recurrent disorder with data indicating high 
chances of new depressive episodes, even after initial remission from a first depressive 
episode (Kessing, Hansen, Andersen & Angst, 2004; Monroe & Harkness, 2005). In this 
context, it is important to understand the mechanisms that are associated with 
elevated risk of recurrent episodes. Despite the key role assigned to rumination in the 
first episode of depression, much less is known about the phenomenology of 
rumination in remission from depression, and its relation to recurrence of depression. 
Theories of recurrent depression have argued that the experience of depressive 
episodes can influence the link between mood and depressogenic cognition (Teasdale & 
Barnard, 1993). For instance, in the differential activation hypothesis (Teasdale & 
Barnard, 1993), it is argued that the link between negative mood and negative cognition 
(in the form of dysfunctional attitudes) is strengthened by having experienced one or 
more depressive episodes. Specifically, in individuals who have remitted from 
depression (RMD), negative mood reactivates negative cognition much more strongly 
compared with never depressed individuals. This concept is referred to as cognitive 
reactivity and there indeed is some empirical support for this notion (Segal et al., 2006) 
although there are also notable failures to observe this effect (Van Rijsbergen et al., 
2013). 
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Interestingly, there is a paucity of research examining whether the relation 
between mood and rumination is altered according to individuals’ vulnerabilities to 
depression. Such alteration would be conceivable as oftentimes RMD patients suffer 
from negative consequences of the previous depressive episode (at the social or socio-
economic levels; e.g., job loss) that could give rise to rumination. Moreover, it could be 
that rumination is more maladaptive and is more easily triggered by negative mood in 
RMD patients compared with individuals with no prior history of depression. However, 
in conceptualizing this relationship, previous depressive episodes are not necessarily 
linked to linear increases in the association between rumination and negative mood. It 
may also be that the relationship between negative mood and rumination becomes 
characterized by more variability in both constructs and lower levels of stability. This 
could for instance be observed because of active attempts to suppress depressive 
thoughts which can be successful under low cognitive load but can backfire under more 
demanding and stressful conditions (Rude et al., 2002). Based on cognitive reactivity 
theory of depression one would hypothesize that the link between rumination and 
mood becomes tighter in RMD patients. Alternatively, it could be that the link between 
rumination and mood is more disrupted and less organized in RMD patients.   
In order to understand the changes of rumination and negative mood we 
applied a dynamic systems framework to specifically examine their dynamic patterns. 
Dynamic systems theory (DST) posits that a dynamic system shows features that are 
absent or non-detectable at the level of components that make up the system 
(Guastello, Koopmans, & Pincus, 2008). Moreover, a dynamic system is supposed to 
unfold over time in a non-linear fashion, whereby each part interacts with the other(s) 
determining the behavior of the whole system (Sulis & Trofimova, 2001).  Given its 
features, DST is useful to model and analyze in real time the complex interaction 
between mood and rumination.  
In the DST framework, many possible indexes2 can be examined. We selected 
entropy as main index. Entropy, originated from thermodynamics (Rudolf, 1865) and 
information theory (Shannon & Weaver, 1949), has been widely used in informatics, 
                                                 
2 For example, entropy, dispersion, transition and average mean duration. In general, these 
indexes could describe the variability of a system from different aspects (Hollenstein, 2013). 
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biology and recently in psychology to describe the instability of a system (Carhart-Harris 
et al., 2014; Hollenstein, 2013; Hirsh, Mar, & Peterson, 2012). The level of entropy 
represents the level of randomness or (in)stability about the state of a dynamic system, 
with higher levels of entropy indicating a more unstable system. In psychopathology 
theories, this concept is increasingly used to allow understanding of uncertainty 
associated with the outcome of conflicting perception and behavior, for example, in the 
context of the experience of anxiety (Hirsh et al., 2012). In the present study, we use a 
specific type of entropy, visit entropy, which refers to the instability of transition 
between different states that an individual reports with regard to dimension of mood 
and rumination. Here higher levels of visit entropy reflect frequent and unstable 
changes in the dynamic patterns of momentary rumination and mood, whereas lower 
levels of visit entropy suggest that their fluctuations are more certain. 
In our study, we investigated the dynamic patterns of rumination and negative 
mood in RMD vs. never-depressed individuals based on electronic daily dairy 
assessment of both constructs. Individuals were asked to assess their momentary mood 
and ruminative thinking ten times a day during two consecutive days. These two daily 
measurements were then used as constitutive dimensions of the dynamic system 
where all possible joint states were presented (otherwise known as “state space”; 
Lamey et al., 2004; Lewis, Lamey, & Douglas, 1999) and visit entropy was extracted to 
indicate the instability of the transitions between different states. In addition to 
characterizing the nature of the dynamic patterns of rumination and mood as a 
predictive factor of future depressive symptoms which may depend on different 
vulnerabilities to depression, we also examined whether the instabilities of dynamic 
patterns have predictive effect on future depressive symptoms and trait rumination, 
and whether this predictive effect is different between RMD and CTL groups. For this 
purpose, participants in the study were examined at a first time point and reassessed 
on depressive symptoms six months later. 
METHOD 
Participants 
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Data for the present study were derived from the study by Huffziger et al. 
(2013), in which participants were 31 individuals (age: M = 45.42, SD = 7.98; 22 female) 
with remitted major depressive episodes ranging from 1 to 10 (RMD group) and 32 
healthy controls (age: M = 44.50, SD = 7.86; 22 female) with no present or past 
depressive disorder (CTL group). The RMD group and controls were matched on age, 
gender and education levels (see Table 1 for details). 
 
Table 1. Demographic and baseline characteristics for remitted depressed patients and 
healthy controls. 
 
 Group   
 RMD (n= 31) CTL (n=32)   
 M 
(SD)/% 
Observed 
range 
M 
(SD) 
Observed 
range 
Test 
statistic 
p 
Age 45.42 
(7.98) 
27-54 44.50 
(7.86) 
26-55 t= 0.46 .647 
Gender 
(male:female) 
9:22 - 10:22 - Chi2= 0.04 .848 
Education (% high 
school degree) 
64.5%  62.5%  Chi2= 0.03 .868 
BDI-II T1 9.61  
(8.27) 
0-36 3.41  
(3.93) 
0-14 t= 3.78 < .001 
MADRS T1 5.45 
(4.90) 
0-22 1.31 
(2.33) 
0-11 t= 4.26 < .001 
N of episodes 4.13 
(2.29) 
1-10 - -   
Brooding T1 10.87 
(3.84) 
5-19 8.13  
(2.43) 
5-13 t= 3.38 .001 
Reflection T1 10.97 
(3.67) 
5-19 8.53  
(3.31) 
5-16 t= 2.77 .007 
Note: RMD, remitted depressed group; CTL, control group; BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory-
2nd Edition; MADRS, Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale; T1, baseline measurement. 
 
Symptom and trait measurements 
Study inclusion and exclusion criteria were assessed with the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV axis I disorders (SCID-I, German version Wittchen et al., 1997). 
Interviewer-rated depressive symptoms were assessed with the Montgomery and 
Asberg Depression Rating Scale (MADRS; Montgomery & Asberg, 1979). Self-rated 
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depressive symptoms over the past two weeks were measured with a validated German 
version of the Beck Depression Inventory-2nd Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 
1996; German version: Hautzinger et al., 2006).  The Cronbach’s αs of MADRS and BDI-II 
in the present samples were high (MADRS: α = .80 for RMD group and α = .73 for CTL 
group; BDI-II: α = .91 for RMD group and α = .78 for CTL group). 
To measure trait rumination, participants completed two 5-item subscales of 
Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ; Treynor et al., 2003; German version Huffziger & 
Kuehner, 2012), in which brooding is defined as a maladaptive and symptom-focused 
form of rumination, prospectively associated with negative mood and depression, 
whereas reflection is conceived as a less maladaptive and problem-solving-focused 
form of rumination (Joormann, Dkane, & Gotlib, 2006; Moberly & Watkins, 2008). In the 
current sample, the Cronbach’s αs of brooding scale were .83 for the RMD group and 
.69 for the CTL group, whereas of reflection scale were .84 for the RMD group and .78 
for the CTL group, indicating acceptable internal consistency. 
Ambulatory assessment (AA) 
After the diagnostic screening session and filling in questionnaires, participants 
were asked to report their momentary mood and rumination by performing the AA with 
ten assessments per day on two successive days. Specifically, their momentary mood 
was defined and evaluated with six bipolar items with three scales which have been 
demonstrated previously with good reliability (Wilhelm & Schoebi, 2007): valence, 
calmness, and energetic- arousal.  Here, our interests only focused on the valence scale 
in which the valence of mood was assessed by rating two bipolar items (“content-
discontent”, “unwell-well”) on a scale from 0 to 6. Scores of the “content-discontent” 
item were recoded, so that the total momentary valence of mood was represented 
from 0 to 6, in which higher scores reflect a more positive momentary mood state. 
In addition, participants measured their momentary rumination state by rating 
two items (“At the moment, I am thinking about my problems” and “At the moment, I 
am thinking about my feelings”) on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 7 (very much) by 
Moberly and Watkins (2008). The scores on these two scales were also averaged to 
obtain a single momentary rumination score. 
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State space grid analysis 
The state space consisting of both momentary rumination and mood was 
plotted and analyzed by using GridWare 1.15a (Hollenstein, 2013). In the state space 
grid, we divided the scale of momentary rumination into 15 categories and also the 
scale of momentary mood into 13 categories in order to provide precise detail about 
the rates of changes (due to the reason of using average scores, the rate of changes was 
0.5). Therefore, the momentary state of rumination is represented on the x-axis, 
ranging from 0 (no rumination) to 14 (very much rumination), and the momentary 
valence of mood is represented on the y-axis, ranging from 0 (negative mood) to 12 
(positive mood). Each point on the grid represents a single time point where individuals 
provided joint information about rumination and mood. By examining the data points 
on the grid, we can get a time-series trajectory on different states visited by a 
participant (see Fig.1)3.  
To measure the instability of the system, we used Visit Entropy as main index 
(Hollenstein, 2013). Generally, the level of entropy represents the level of randomness 
or (in)stability about the state of a system. In the present study, computation of the 
entropy was based on the probability (P) of the visit of a single state, which was 
calculated by  
P= 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐴  𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠
                                                                                (1) 
where A denotes one certain joint state and visits represent one or more 
consecutive data points into a single state, beginning from the entry of a trajectory  and 
ending with the exiting of it. Then, the combination of all the probabilities of every joint 
state was used to extract the visit entropy index of the whole system, i.e. 
Entropy = ∑ (Pi ∗ ln (
1
Pi
))𝑛𝑖=1                                                                       (2) 
Here the visit entropy index is formulated in such a way that higher levels of visit 
entropy indicate a more unstable transition among the occurring states of a system.  
                                                 
3 Note that missing data were classified as an “unknown” state and considered in the analysis, 
as suggested by Hollenstein (2013, p. 49-50). 
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Fig.1. State space of momentary rumination and valence of mood representing (in panel 
A and B respectively) two individuals in this study. Panel A is characterized by lower visit 
entropy than Panel B. Missing data was depicted as scores of 15 on momentary 
rumination and of 13 on momentary valence of mood. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were told that they were taking part in a study on “thoughts and 
feelings”, and were administered a telephone screening session. Following the 
prescreening, each participant was evaluated using the Structured Clinical Interview for 
DSM-IV axis I (SCID-I; Wittchen et al., 1997) and MADRS by a qualified clinical 
psychologist in an individual session. After that, participants received the AA 
instructions and completed the BDI-II and the two subscales of the RSQ (T1). Then, the 
AA procedure followed, and was carried out for 2 consecutive workdays during which 
participants had to rate their momentary mood and rumination state on a personal 
digital assistant (PDA, Palm Tungsten E2, Palm Inc.) after a beep. After six months (T2), 
participants were reassessed with the BDI-II, the MADRS, and the two subscales of the 
RSQ. 
Data analytic plan 
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To investigate the dynamics in momentary mood and rumination in RMD versus 
healthy controls, we performed the following analyses. First, descriptive information for 
both groups is provided. Then, independent t-tests are used to test group differences in 
momentary rumination, mood, as well as entropy. Then, we examined the correlation 
between numbers of episodes, and the dynamics in rumination and mood. Finally, to 
investigate prediction of depressive symptoms and trait rumination six months later 
(T2), we conducted hierarchical regression analyses (HRAs) with BDI-II, MADRS, 
brooding, and reflection score at T1 in the first step and entropy in the second step as 
predictors, and BDI-II, MADRS, brooding and reflection score at T2 as dependent 
variables (separately). 
RESULTS 
Group characteristics 
Descriptive information about both groups can be found in Table 1. RMD group 
and controls did not significantly differ on age and gender, but the RMD group had a 
significantly higher score of BDI-II, MADRS, Brooding and Reflection. 
First, differences between the two groups on mean momentary rumination 
levels, mood and entropy were examined. The results revealed that the RMD group (M 
= 1.32; SD = 1.17) had marginally significant higher levels of momentary rumination 
than the CTL group (M = 0.82; SD = 0.87), t (61) = 1.93, p = .06, d = .49. Moreover, the 
mood ratings were significantly less positive in the RMD group (M= 3.97, SD = 1.01) 
compared with the CTL group (M = 4.68, SD = 1.15), t (61) = 2.60, p = .01, d = .66. 
However, groups did not differ significantly on entropy, RMD group (M= 2.26, SD = .44), 
CTL group (M= 2.04, SD= .66), t < 1.7. 
In a next step, the impact of previous episodes on the dynamic pattern of mood 
and rumination was investigated by inspecting correlations between numbers of 
episodes, entropy, momentary state measures in the RMD group. The results showed 
that the number of episodes was not correlated with momentary rumination (rs = .27, p 
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= .15), momentary valence (rs = -.01, p = .97), as well as entropy (rs = .23, p = .23)
4.  In 
addition, we checked for a possible difference in the association between momentary 
rumination and mood in the RMD versus the CTL group. Fisher’s Z test indicated that 
the difference in correlations was not statistically significant (RMD: rs= -.61, CTL: rs = -
.75; z< 1.10, p = .32) (Preacher, 2002). 
Predicting recurrent depressive symptoms 
In order to examine whether alterations in the dynamic pattern of rumination 
and mood is of relevance for the clinical phenomenon of recurrent depression, we 
investigated prediction of depressive symptoms and trait rumination six months later 
(time 2) based on symptom- and trait scores at time1 and entropy. Separate HRAs were 
conducted for predicting depression and rumination scores in the RMD and CTL group 
where in a first step entered relevant baseline questionnaire scores (e.g., time 1 BDI-II) 
and included entropy in the second step to examine whether entropy has incremental 
predictive value. The results of the HRA on BDI-II scores at time 2 are presented in Table 
2. BDI-II scores at time 1 significantly predicted BDI-II scores at time 2 in both RMD and 
control group. Interestingly, after controlling for BDI-II scores at time 1, entropy in the 
RMD group explained an additional 16% of variance of BDI-II scores at time 2. In the CTL 
group, no significant associations were found with entropy. 
To examine whether similar effects are obtained with the interview-based 
clinical assessment, we performed a similar HRA using the MADRS scores. Results of this 
HRA are presented in Table 2. In the RMD group, MADRS scores at time 1 and entropy 
were found to significantly predict MADRS scores at time 2. Importantly we observed a 
tendency that entropy could explained additional variance (5%) of depressive 
symptoms as assessed at time 2, whereas no significant contribution of entropy was 
found in the CLT group. 
                                                 
4 Note that when we used 1 as the unit of change, entropy was significantly correlated with the 
number of episode in RMD group, r = 42, p = .02. It also significantly predicted the BDI-II and 
MADRS at time 2, similarly as what we have present in the article. Here, we reported the 
entropy obtained from the state space grid with 0.5 as the unit of change, since it is supposed 
to provide a more precise detail of average changes. 
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The HRA for brooding scores at time 2 is shown in Table 3. In both groups, 
brooding scores at time 1 included in the first step of the HRA significantly predicted 
brooding scores at time 2. When entropy was added in the second step, there’s a 
tendency that it added to the prediction of brooding in both the RMD group (i.e., 5%) 
and the CTL group (i.e., 7%). In line with previous results, higher levels of brooding at 
time 1 and higher levels of entropy are related to higher levels of brooding at time 2.  
The results of the HRA on reflection at time 2 are presented in Table 3. In both 
RMD and control groups, reflection scores at time 1 were found to be significantly 
predictive of reflection scores at time 2. However, after entering entropy in the second 
step, it significantly explained additional variance (9%) of reflection scores at time 2 
only in the CTL group. 
Note that we also conducted HRAs examining whether mean levels of daily 
reported rumination and negative mood had a similar predictive effect in RMD 
individuals and, as shown in Supplementary material (Table S2 and S3), this was not the 
case. 
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Table 2. Hierarchical regression analysis predicting BDI-II T2 and MADRS T2 (separately) 
in two groups. 
 
Steps Predictors ∆R2 df Β 
BDI-II    
RMD group    
Step 1 .16* (1,29)  
 BDI-II T1   .40* 
Step 2  .16* (1,28)  
 BDI-II T1   .23 
 Entropy   .43* 
CTL group    
Step 1 .33** (1,28)  
 BDI-II T1   .57** 
Step 2  .03 (1,27)  
 BDI-II T1   .50** 
 Entropy   .19 
     
MADRS     
RMD group    
Step 1 .45*** (1,29)  
 MADRS T1   .67*** 
Step 2  .05† (1,28)  
 MADRS T1   .56** 
 Entropy   .25† 
CTL group    
Step 1 .23** (1,28)  
 MADRS T1   .48** 
Step 2  .02 (1,27)  
 MADRS T1   .44* 
 Entropy   .15 
Note: †p< .1; *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. RMD, remitted depressed group; CTL, control 
group; BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory-2nd Edition; MADRS, Montgomery-Asberg Depression 
Rating Scale; T1, baseline measurement; T2, six months follow-up. 
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Table 3. Hierarchical regression analysis predicting brooding T2 and reflection T2 
(separately) in two groups. 
 
Steps Predictors ∆R2 df   β 
Brooding    
RMD group    
Step 1 .49*** (1,29)  
 Brooding T1    
.70*** 
Step 2  .05† (1,28)  
 Brooding T1    
.67*** 
 Entropy    .22† 
CTL group    
Step 1 .35** (1,28)  
 Brooding T1    .59** 
Step 2  .07† (1,27)  
 Brooding T1    .51** 
 Entropy    .28† 
     
Reflection     
RMD group    
Step 1 .56*** (1,29)  
 Reflection T1    
.75*** 
Step 2  .00 (1,28)  
 Reflection T1    
.72*** 
 Entropy    .08 
CTL group    
Step 1 .34** (1,28)  
 Reflection T1    .58** 
Step 2  .09* (1,27)  
 Reflection T1    .48** 
 Entropy    .32* 
Note: †p< .1; *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. RMD, remitted depressed group; CTL, control 
group; T1, baseline measurement; T2, six months follow-up. 
 
. 
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DISCUSSION 
The aim of the present study was to examine whether the instability of the 
dynamic pattern between mood and rumination differs between individuals with RMD 
and never depressed individuals. We also examined whether the instabilities of 
dynamic patterns have predictive effect on future depressive symptoms and trait 
rumination, and whether this predictive effect changes according to individuals’ 
vulnerability to depression. Based on cognitive theories of depression, one could 
hypothesize that the link between rumination and mood becomes tighter in remitted 
depressed patients (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). Alternatively, it could be that the link 
between rumination and mood is more disrupted and less organized in RMD patients. 
In order to test these opposite views, we applied dynamic systems theory and used a 
specific index to assess instability, which is visit entropy. The main findings of our study 
are that (1) at the group level, RMD and CTL do not have different levels of entropy; and 
(2) entropy adds significantly to the prediction of future depressive symptoms in RMD 
but not in CTL individuals. These findings are discussed below. 
The first issue to be considered is that no significant difference between RMD 
patients and CTL group were found in the correlation between mood and rumination as 
well as in the dynamic relation of these two constructs, i.e., the levels of the entropy. 
These findings are not in line with the idea of cognitive reactivity where one would 
expect a tighter link between mood and negative cognition (see Scher, Ingram, & Segal, 
2005) but are in line with recent studies that failed to detect higher cognitive reactivity 
in RMD (Van Rijsbergen et al., 2013; Wichers, Geschwind, & Peeters, 2010). However, it 
should be noted that cognitive reactivity is mainly focused on dysfunctional attitudes 
and not rumination.  
More importantly, at the group level we found no differences in entropy 
between RMD and CTL. This suggests that the clinical status of previous depression 
does not always lead to a more disorganized relation between mood and rumination. 
However, previous research has suggested that different populations may have 
different optimal levels of entropy (Cunningham, Dunfield, Stillman, 2013). It implies 
that even though the average level of entropy was not significantly different between 
the RMD and CTL groups, it can still play different roles when associated with future 
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depressive symptoms according to individuals’ different vulnerabilities to depression. In 
this respect, the prospective part of the current study is of crucial importance. 
A key finding of our study is that the pattern characteristics of the dynamics of 
mood and rumination play an important role in predicting future depressive symptoms 
and levels of rumination. Entropy significantly predicted depressive symptoms assessed 
by self-report BDI-II in six months later in RMD group, even when controlling for 
depressive symptoms at time 1. Moreover, clinical assessment with the MADRS 
interview confirmed this result. It is noteworthy that we also conducted regression 
analyses examining whether mean levels of daily reported rumination and negative 
mood had a similar predictive effect and, as shown in Supplementary material (Table S2 
and S3), this was not the case. Thus, these results suggest that entropy, the level of 
instability between mood and rumination, plays a specific role as a vulnerability factor. 
Interestingly, this finding is echoed in the prediction of brooding (but not reflection) 
which is considered the more depressogenic type of rumination.  
Our study is among the first to integrate ambulatory assessment and the 
dynamic system theory in relation to psychopathology. Given the specific role of 
entropy in predicting future depressive symptoms, DST framework could be used to 
detect and measure the subtle alterations in RMD patients’ dynamic patterns of mood 
and cognition. This implies that both at the theoretical and clinical level, instead of 
focusing on mean levels of rumination and mood, a more detailed analysis of the 
relation between mood and cognition could be a promising way to improve our 
understanding of cognitive vulnerability in recurrent depression. Here, a key theoretical 
question is why higher levels of entropy were associated with higher levels of 
depressive symptoms at six months follow-up in the RMD group. We can speculate that 
the more instability in RMD individuals may be potentially caused by that they 
sometimes ruminate in a positive mood. Alternatively, thought control strategies that 
only occasionally work (i.e., initial suppression of negative thought leading to 
subsequently increases in negative thought, see Rude et al., 2002) could be another 
reason for maladaptive effect of the heightened entropy in RMD individuals.  
Provided that the current study is among the first to use DST indices in 
predicting depression scores, there are several issues that need further consideration in 
follow-up research. First, given the limited sample size, only two factors could be 
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included as predictors of future depression symptoms and trait rumination. Thus, it is 
possible that with more predictors, more sophisticated hierarchical regression analyses 
could be applied. Second, given that the present daily assessments were conducted 
during a relatively short time period where participants were mostly in a neutral or 
positive mood state, the amount of variability observed in mood and rumination might 
be larger in more prolonged assessment. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, we consider the DST framework as a useful approach for examining the 
dynamic patterns of momentary mood and rumination in daily life. We found that 
entropy predicted future depressive symptoms and maladaptive brooding in remitted 
depressed individuals. Our results indicate that entropy, which maps the ongoing 
dynamic process of mood and rumination, can be considered as one of the vulnerability 
factors that predict future depressive symptoms.  
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Table S2. Hierarchical regression analysis predicting BDI-II T2 and MADRS T2 in remitted 
depressed and controls. 
 
Steps Predictors ∆R2 df Β 
BDI-II    
RMD group    
Step 1 .16* (1,29)  
 BDI-II T1   .40* 
Step 2  .11 (2,27)  
 BDI-II T1   .08 
 Momentary Rumination   .41 
 Momentary Mood   -.07 
CTL group    
Step 1 .33** (1,28)  
 BDI-II T1   .57** 
Step 2  .09 (2,26)  
 BDI-II T1   .41* 
 Momentary Rumination   .45 
 Momentary Mood   .13 
    
MADRS    
RMD group    
Step 1 .45*** (1,29)  
 MADRS T1   .67*** 
Step 2  .03 (2,27)  
 MADRS T1   .53** 
 Momentary Rumination   .20 
 Momentary Mood   - .03 
CTL group    
Step 1 .23** (1,28)  
 MADRS T1   .48** 
Step 2  .05 (2,26)  
 MADRS T1   .47* 
 Momentary Rumination   .47 
 Momentary Mood   .34 
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. RMD, remitted depressed group; CTL, control group; BDI-II, 
Beck Depression Inventory-Revised; MADRS, Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale; T1, 
baseline measurement; T2, six months follow-up. 
 
. 
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Table S3. Hierarchical regression analysis predicting brooding T2 and reflection T2 in 
remitted depressed and controls. 
 
Steps Predictors ∆R2 df Β 
Brooding    
RMD group    
Step 1 .49*** (1,29)  
 Brooding T1   .70*** 
Step 2  .09 (2,27)  
 Brooding T1   .65*** 
 Momentary Rumination   .33* 
 Momentary Mood   .06 
CTL group    
Step 1 .35** (1,28)  
 Brooding T1   .59** 
Step 2  .07 (2,26)     
 Brooding T1   .45* 
 Momentary Rumination   .23 
 Momentary Mood   - .07 
    
Reflection    
RMD group    
Step 1 .56*** (1,29)  
 Reflection T1   .75*** 
Step 2  .10* (2,27)  
 Reflection T1   .55*** 
 Momentary Rumination   .47** 
 Momentary Mood   .28 
CTL group    
Step 1 .34** (1,28)  
 Reflection T1   .58** 
Step 2  .13 (2,26)  
 Reflection T1   .47** 
 Momentary Rumination   .70* 
 Momentary Mood   .42 
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. RMD, remitted depressed group; CTL, control group; T1, 
baseline measurement; T2, six months follow-up. 
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DO DAILY DYNAMICS IN RUMINATION 
AND AFFECT PREDICT DEPRESSIVE 
SYMPTOMS AND TRAIT RUMINATION? AN 
EXPERIENCE SAMPLING STUDY
1 
ABSTRACT 
Rumination has been shown to prospectively predict the onset of depression. 
However, it is unclear whether the dynamic patterns of rumination and affect in daily 
life can also predict future depressive symptoms. The present study examined whether 
the structure of dynamic patterns in rumination and affect, expressed using entropy, 
could prospectively predict depressive symptoms and trait rumination in an unselected 
sample (n = 63). Momentary rumination and affect were assessed eight times per day 
within seven days. Additionally, depressive symptoms and trait rumination were 
measured at the beginning of the experiment and at six weeks follow-up. The results 
showed that trait rumination and depressive symptoms at six weeks follow-up were 
predicted by entropy. Our findings suggest that the structure of dynamic patterns of 
momentary rumination and affect contributes to the development of depression and 
trait rumination. 
  
                                                 
1Based on Fang, L., Marchetti, I., Hoorelbeke, K., & Koster, E.H.W. (2017). Do daily dynamics in 
rumination and affect predict depressive symptoms and trait rumination? An experience 
sampling study. Manuscript submitted to publication. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Decades of research have shown that rumination forms one of the most 
important cognitive vulnerability factors for the onset and maintenance of depressive 
episodes (for reviews, see Mor & Winquist, 2002; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & 
Lyubomirsky, 2008). According to the Response styles theory of depression, rumination 
can be conceived as a thinking style that repetitively focuses on the implications, causes 
and meanings of one’s feelings and problems (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). In fact, previous 
studies have consistently shown that rumination has detrimental influence on affect 
(Watkins, 2008), which can prolong negative mood and may then cause the 
development of depressive episodes (Ciesla & Roberts, 2007). Although these findings 
suggest a prospective effect of ongoing interactions between rumination and affect in 
daily life on depressive symptomatology, few studies have directly examined whether 
the dynamics in momentary rumination and affect could predict development of 
depressive symptoms. Therefore, a better understanding of daily dynamics in 
rumination and affect, and their contributions would be important in the prevention 
and treatment of depression.    
Rumination and affect in daily life 
Although mostly treated as a stable trait-like construct (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Davis, 1999), ruminative thought in daily life is an ongoing dynamic process (Kasch, 
Klein, & Lara, 2001), and can be measured accordingly through experience sampling 
methods (Kircanski, Thompson, Sorenson, Sherdell, & Gotlib, 2015; Moberly & Watkins, 
2008). A large number of experience sampling studies have provided evidence that 
momentary rumination is often followed by exacerbation of negative affect 
(Hoorelbeke, Koster, Demeyer, Loeys, & Vanderhasselt, 2016; Moberly & Watkins, 
2008; Takano & Tanno, 2011) and/or decreases in positive affect (Brans, Koval, 
Verduyn, Lim, & Kuppens, 2013; Hoorelbeke et al., 2016; Huffziger, Ebner-Priemer, 
Zamoscik, Reinhard, Kirsch, & Kuehner, 2013). It should be noted that in daily life, 
however, not only does rumination have an impact on affect, but affect also influences 
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rumination. Previous research has shown that negative affect can predict subsequent 
rumination (Hoorelbeke et al., 2016; Moberly & Watkins, 2008).  
The nature of the interplay between rumination and affect in daily life may be 
an important factor in predicting depressive symptoms. In a recent experience sampling 
study, Pasyugina, Koval, De Leersnyder, Mesquita, and Kuppens (2015) examined the 
predictive value of the average level of momentary rumination and its influence on 
momentary negative affect to future depression. For this purpose, participants’ levels of 
momentary rumination were assessed between moment t and t-1, whereas momentary 
affect was assessed at moment t. They found that changes in depression ratings over a 
week were predicted by the average level of momentary rumination. In contrast, the 
influence of momentary rumination on negative affect did not predict changes in 
depression. These results indicate that a close examination of the relation between 
affect and rumination may be crucial in understanding predictive effects on depressive 
symptoms.  
Dynamic systems, state space and entropy 
The complex relationship between two variables interacting in a certain context 
(a system) can be investigated in many ways, but a particularly interesting perspective is 
offered by Dynamic System Theory (DST; Hollenstein, 2013; Lewis & Granic, 2000; 
Thelen & Smith, 1998). In fact, the DST suggests that a whole system, containing 
elements (e.g., rumination and affect in the current study) that covary over time, shows 
specific characteristics that are not detectable at the level of its components (Thelen, 
1995). In other words, investigating the structure of the whole system, that represents 
how the whole system changes over time, may reveal features that may be overlooked 
when only the content is considered. For example, previous research has shown that 
the structure of dynamic emotional states in parent-child interaction plays an important 
role in predicting psychopathology above and beyond the content of these emotional 
interactions (for a review, see Hollenstein, Lichtwarck-Aschoff, & Potworowski, 2013). 
Therefore, in our current study, we sought to further investigate the influence of 
rumination and affect on depression by exploring the structure of their daily dynamics.  
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From the DST perspective, in order to adequately investigate a system, it is 
necessary to first represent all the possible states of the system (also known as state 
space; Heath, 2012; Hollenstein, 2013; Lamey, Hollenstein, Lewis, & Granic, 2004) and 
then display the trajectory of states that the system takes over time. By doing so, 
different types of information can be attained, such as the content (e.g., the mean level 
of each variable) as well as the structure (e.g., variability) of the system. Among various 
structure indices, entropy is one of the most frequently used metrics to investigate the 
structural variability of the system, as it captures the amount of information generated 
as the system changes (Mitchell, 2009; Shannon & Weaver, 1949; Young, 2003). 
Importantly, previous study suggests that entropy forms the most representative index 
when compared to similar measures for system variability (Sravish, Tronick, Hollenstein, 
& Beeghly, 2013). In this context, a system that has a less stable structure produces 
higher amounts of new information (i.e., multiple states are visited over time), which 
would be reflected by higher levels of entropy (Mainzer, 2007).  
Recently, Koster et al. (2015) explored whether there was different dynamics 
between remitted depressive patients and healthy controls. They found that visit 
entropy, a specific type of entropy which depicts the variability of the transitions 
between different states in the dynamic pattern between momentary affect and 
rumination, predicted depressive symptoms at six months follow-up only in remitted 
depressed patients. Interestingly, entropy remained a significant predictor of future 
depressive symptomatology after considering the contribution of depressive symptoms 
at baseline. These findings indicate that the structure of the dynamic pattern between 
momentary rumination and affect, operationalized by visit entropy, may have a 
particular predictive effect on depressive symptomatology. However, the healthy 
controls in this study (Huffziger et al., 2013; Koster et al., 2015) were selected strictly 
(i.e., never depressed individuals) as a comparative group to remitted depressive group, 
which thus had a relatively low depression scores at baseline (BDI-II: M = 3.41; SD = 
3.93; range: 0-14). It remains unclear whether the dynamics of rumination and affect, in 
a more general population, influence future depressive symptoms. Therefore, in our 
study, we used visit entropy as the index that provides information about the structure 
of the dynamics between momentary rumination and momentary affect in an 
unselected sample. 
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Furthermore, it has been assumed that a dynamic system is multi-levelled, with 
components at different levels interacting with each other (Hollenstein et al., 2013; 
Wichers, 2014). For example, components at lower levels can build or form a new 
component at a higher level after a certain amount of time. This new higher level 
component can then influence or constrain the change of the lower-level components. 
Consistent with this view, it would be worth examining whether the dynamics of 
components at lower levels in the dynamic system, that is momentary rumination and 
affect, can predict rumination at a higher level (i.e., trait rumination).  
The present study 
In the present study, we tested the predictive potential of the dynamic structure 
of rumination and affect in daily life for depressive symptoms and trait rumination at six 
weeks follow-up. Specifically, we measured trait rumination and depressive 
symptomatology at baseline and at six weeks follow-up, and tracked momentary 
changes of ruminative thinking and affect in daily life using experience sampling 
methodology during one week following the baseline assessment. According to 
previous study (Koster et al., 2015), we investigated the structure of momentary 
rumination and affect by means of a state space grid (Hollenstein, 2013). Our first 
hypothesis, based on previous research (Koster et al., 2015; Wichers, 2014), was that 
entropy would prospectively predict changes in depressive symptoms. Second, to 
examine whether the momentary changes of ruminative thinking and affect could give 
rise to changes in trait measurement (Hollenstein et al., 2013), we hypothesized that 
the structure of the system (i.e., entropy) of rumination and affect in daily life could 
predict changes in the follow-up trait rumination measurement.  
METHOD 
Participants 
Sixty-nine undergraduate students from Ghent University enrolled at baseline. 
In order to avoid additional costs of participation to the experience sampling study, all 
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participants were required to possess a smartphone with a monthly data plan. The 
study was approved by the local ethics committee of Ghent University. 
Measures 
Symptom and trait measurements. Depressive symptoms were measured with 
the 21-item Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II-NL; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; Van der 
Does, 2002). Participants were asked to rate each item on a 4-point scale from 0 to 3 
with regard to the occurrence and severity of depressive symptoms over the past two 
weeks (BDI-II at time 1: α = .79; at time 2: α = .84). Trait rumination was measured with 
the 22-item Ruminative Response Scale (RRS-NL; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; 
Raes, Hermans, & Eelen, 2003; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). 
Participants were asked to rate on a 4-point scale how they typically respond when they 
are feeling depressed (RRS at time 1: α = .90; at time 2: α = .91). 
Daily assessment. Participants were asked to report their momentary affect and 
rumination with eight assessments per day within seven days. We used a stratified 
random sampling approach, whereby each day between 10:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. was 
divided into eight equal intervals and a signal was sent at a random time point in each 
interval. At every assessment point, participants received a text message via 
SurveySignal containing a link which directed them to Limesurvey for the online 
measurements of momentary rumination and affect. For momentary rumination, 
participants were asked to indicate their ruminative self-focus the moment just before 
receiving the signal on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 7 (very much). In line with previous 
studies (Moberly & Watkins, 2008; Hoorelbeke et al., 2016; Ruscio et al., 2015; Takano 
& Tannon, 2011), we used the average score of two items to assess their momentary 
ruminative self-focus (“Focused on feelings” and “Focused on problems”). Momentary 
affect experienced just before receiving the signal was assessed by rating two bipolar 
items (discontent-content, unwell-well) on a scale from 0 to 6 (Huffziger et al., 2013). 
The average score of these two items was used as the indicator of momentary affect. 
Here, higher scores reflect a more positive momentary affect state. The items were 
randomly presented between and within the momentary measurement of rumination 
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and affect. All text messages were delivered using SurveySignal software (Hofmann & 
Patel, 2015) and paid by researchers using SurveySignal credits.  
State space grid analysis. The dynamic structure of momentary rumination and 
affect was plotted in a state space grid and analyzed with GridWare 1.15a (Hollenstein, 
2013; Lamey et al., 2004). In line with previous study (Koster et al., 2015), 0.5 was used 
as the unit of change which results in 15 units for the rumination scale and 13 units for 
the affect scale (see Fig. 1). For maximum retention of the original information, we 
added 1 unit as unknown state in each scale (i.e., state 15 in rumination scale and state 
13 in affect scale) for missing data (cf. Hollenstein, 2013). The momentary state of 
rumination is presented on the x-axis, ranging from 0 (no rumination) to 14 (very much 
rumination) whereas momentary affect is presented on the y-axis, ranging from 0 
(negative affect) to 12 (positive affect). Each point in the state space grid represents the 
current state of rumination and affect at that time point. Combining all the points in the 
state space grid reveals how ruminative thinking and affect changed over time.  
To measure the structural variability of the transitions between different states, 
we used Visit Entropy as our main index (Hollenstein, 2013). One ‘visit’ here refers to 
one or more consecutive points that are grouped into a single state, from the first point 
entering this state until the last point that leaves this state. According to Hollenstein 
(2013), entropy of the whole system was calculated by,  
Entropy = ∑ (P𝑖 ∗ ln (
1
P𝑖
))𝑛𝑖=1                                 (1) 
where n denotes the number of possible states and P denotes the probability of 
the visit of a single state over all the states, which was calculated by 
P= 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐴  𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠
                                           (2)  
where A denotes a certain joint state. Based on the equations, higher levels of 
entropy indicate a more unpredictable transition among different states of a system.  
Procedure 
After signing informed consent, participants completed the BDI-II and RRS as 
baseline measures of depressive symptomatology and trait rumination. Next, 
participants were registered in SurveySignal and given the daily measurement 
CHAPTER 6 
 
 
142 
instructions. The daily measurement started one day after the registration and 
contained eight assessments a day over a period of seven days. Signals were sent 
between 10 a.m. and 10 p.m., during which participants had to rate their momentary 
affect and rumination. At six weeks follow-up, depressive symptoms and trait 
rumination were reassessed using the BDI-II and RRS, after which participants received 
a debriefing and were reimbursed for their participation.  
 
 
 
Fig.1. State space of momentary rumination and affect illustrating two participants in 
the current study. Panel A displays lower visit entropy than Panel B. Missing data was 
depicted as scores of 15 on momentary rumination and of 13 on momentary affect. 
RESULTS 
Group characteristics 
Sixty-nine participants completed the baseline assessment of depressive 
symptomatology and trait rumination. One participant did not attend the follow-up 
assessment. Four participants were excluded due to poor compliance. One outlier was 
excluded because its standardized residual was larger than 3.0 in regression analyses. 
The remaining 63 participants (age: M = 18.48, SD = 1.27; 51 female) were highly 
compliant with the daily measurement procedure (response rate: M = 91.16%; SD = 
DAILY DYNAMICS IN RUMINATION AND AFFECT 
 
 
143 
7.54%; range = 68%-100%). Descriptive information concerning age, gender and 
measurements of depressive symptomatology and trait rumination can be found in 
Table 1. Our sample showed sufficient variation in depressive symptoms and trait 
rumination. 
 
Table1. Demographic characteristics (N = 63). 
 
 Mean SD Range 
Age 18.48 1.27 17-22 
Gender 
(female:male) 
51:12   
BDI-II T1 10.29 5.78 0-27 
RRS T1 41.11 10.90 23-68 
BDI-II T2 9.49 5.90 1-28 
RRS T2 38.17 10.55 23-68 
Note: BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory-II; RRS, Ruminative Response Scale; T1, baseline 
measurement; T2, six weeks follow-up. 
Zero-order correlations 
The mean level of momentary rumination was 1.90 (SD = 1.04; range = 0.22-
4.81) and the mean level of momentary affect was 4.11 (SD = 0.54; range = 2.94-5.77). 
First, we examined the relationship between momentary affect and rumination. The 
result showed that the mean level of momentary affect was negatively correlated with 
momentary rumination (r = -.31, p = .02), indicating that individuals reporting less 
positive affect tend to ruminate more in daily life. We then checked the relationship 
between measures for momentary affect and rumination, and trait measures at 
baseline. Momentary affect was significantly associated with trait rumination (r = -.33, p 
< .01). There was also a tendency for momentary affect to be negatively correlated with 
BDI-II score at baseline (r = -.21, p = .09). Surprisingly, no significant relationship was 
found between momentary rumination and other trait measures (all r < .15, p > .23; see 
Table 2 for details).  
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Table2.  Correlations between BDI-II scores, RRS scores, momentary measurements and 
entropy (N = 63). 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. BDI_II T1 - .51*** .45*** .50*** .06 -.21† .11 
2. BDI_II T2  - .29* .50*** .15 -.11 .23† 
3. RRS T1   - .64*** .09 -.33** .24† 
4. RRS T2    - .13 -.15 .35*** 
5. Momentary rumination     - -.31* .68*** 
6. Momentary affect      - -.28* 
7. Entropy       - 
Note: †p< .1; *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory-II; RRS, 
Ruminative Response Scale; T1, baseline measurement; T2, six weeks follow-up. 
Structure of the dynamic pattern of momentary rumination and affect 
The mean level of entropy was 3.02 (SD = 0.41; range = 1.70-3.65). Entropy was 
significantly correlated with momentary rumination (r = .68, p < .001) and momentary 
affect (r = -.28, p < .05). Furthermore, participants reporting higher levels of trait 
rumination at baseline, showed a tendency to subsequently demonstrate more entropy 
during the daily assessments (r = .24, p = .054), whereas baseline depressive 
symptomatology was not related to entropy (r = .11, p = .40). 
Predicting depressive symptoms and trait rumination at six weeks follow-up 
We used Hierarchical Regression Analysis (HRA) to examine whether the 
structure of the dynamic pattern of rumination and affect in daily life (i.e. entropy) can 
predict depressive symptoms and trait rumination separately, after controlling for the 
contributions of trait rumination and depressive symptoms at baseline. Due to the 
violation of the homoscedasticity assumption, we adopted heteroscedasticity-
consistent inference (HC-inference; Hayes & Cai, 2007). In addition, given that BDI-II 
and RRS at time 1 as predictors in HRA are correlated with each other, collinearity 
issues may arise when using standardized regression coefficients. As a result, we used 
relative weight analysis (Johnson, 2000; Johnson & LeBreton, 2004; Tonidandel & 
LeBreton, 2015) to provide additional variance partitioning information, which has been 
proposed to be more accurate when predictor variables correlate with one another. 
Therefore, the contribution of each predictor presented below accounted for the 
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variance of the outcome variable in two different ways: (1) Proportion of contribution 
obtained from the HRA shows the unique contribution of each predictor above and 
beyond other predictors, whereas (2) proportion of contribution obtained from relative 
weight analysis shows the specific contribution of each predictor including its direct 
effect and its effect in combination with other predictors. 
In the HRA predicting depressive symptoms at time 2, we entered BDI-II and RRS 
at time 1 as predictors in the first step and entropy as predictor in the second step. The 
results are shown in Table 3. The result of the HC-inference revealed that baseline 
depressive symptomatology formed a significant predictor for depressive symptoms at 
time 2 (p < .001), accounting for 22% of the variance. However, trait rumination at time 
1 did not significantly predict depressive symptoms at time 2 (p = .83). In contrast, after 
controlling for both depressive symptomatology and trait rumination at time 1, entropy 
formed a marginally significant predictor (∆R2 = .03, p = .07). These findings suggest that 
there was a tendency for entropy to explain 3% of depressive symptoms at time 2 
beyond and above baseline depressive symptoms and trait rumination. The relative 
importance weight of entropy confirmed that it can explain 3% of the variance of 
depressive symptoms at time 2 (ɛ = .03). 
Likewise, for trait rumination at six weeks follow-up, we entered baseline trait 
rumination and depressive symptomatology as predictors in the first step, and entropy 
as predictor in the second step. The result (see Table 4) showed that trait rumination at 
time 1 significantly predicted trait rumination at time 2 (p < .001) and accounted for 
28% of the variance of trait rumination at time 2. There was a tendency for baseline 
depressive symptomatology to predict trait rumination at time 2 (p = .06). Importantly, 
entropy explained an additional 4.1% of variance in trait rumination scores at six weeks 
follow-up (p < .05) after controlling for baseline depressive symptomatology and trait 
rumination. The results of relative importance analysis indicated that the direct and 
combined effects of entropy in total accounted for 8% of the trait rumination at time 2. 
Notably, whereas the above presented findings suggest the predictive potential 
of the dynamic structure of momentary rumination and affect for depressive 
symptomatology, the content on its own (i.e., mean levels of momentary rumination 
and affect) did not significantly predict depressive symptoms at time 2. That is, when 
entered together in a regression model to predict depressive symptomatology at time 
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2, the predictive effects of mean levels of momentary rumination and affect did not 
reach significance (all ps > .21; see Table 3 for details). Momentary rumination could 
explain 2% of variance of depressive symptoms at time 2 whereas momentary affect 
could only account for 0.1% of the variance. Similar results were obtained when 
predicting trait rumination at time 2 (see Table 4 for details): neither momentary 
rumination nor momentary affect were found to significantly predict trait rumination at 
six weeks follow-up (all ps > .18). Both of them could only account for 1% of the 
variance of trait rumination at time 2. Hence, the results of the content of the dynamic 
patterns suggest a specific contribution of structural dynamics in predicting depressive 
symptoms and trait rumination at time 2. 
 
Table3. Hierarchical regression analysis predicting BDI-II after six weeks. 
 
Steps Predictors ∆R2 Β ε 
Structure     
Step 1 .26***   
 BDI-II T1  .47*** .22 [.007; .431] 
 RRS T1  .07 .04 [.007; .175] 
Step 2  .03†   
 BDI-II T1  .48*** .22 [.069; .422] 
 RRS T1  .03 .04 [.008; .156] 
 Entropy  .17† .03 [.002; .119] 
Content     
Step 1 .26***   
 BDI-II T1  .47*** .22 [.007; .431] 
 RRS T1  .07 .04 [.007; .175] 
Step 2  .02   
 BDI-II T1  .48*** .22 [.070; .419] 
 RRS T1  .08 .04 [.006; .160] 
 Momentary Rumination  .14 .02 [.001; .123] 
 Momentary Affect  .06 .001 [.001; .053] 
Note: †p< .1; *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. RRS, Ruminative Response Scale; BDI-II, Beck 
Depression Inventory-II; T1, baseline measurement; ε, relative importance weight.  
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Table4. Hierarchical regression analysis predicting RRS after six weeks. 
 
Steps Predictors ∆R2 Β ε 
Structure     
Step 1 .46***   
 RRS T1  .52*** .31 [.140; .506] 
 BDI-II T1  .26† .15 [.037; .327] 
Step 2  .04*   
 RRS T1  .46** .28 [.119; .471] 
 BDI-II T1  .26† .14 [.036; .308] 
 Entropy  .21* .08 [.019; .175] 
Content     
Step 1 .46***   
 RRS T1  .52*** .31 [.140; .506] 
 BDI-II T1  .26† .15 [.037; .327] 
Step 2  .02   
 RRS T1  .54*** .30 [.128; .502] 
 BDI-II T1  .27† .15 [.036; .299] 
 Momentary Rumination  .11 .01 [.001; .091] 
 Momentary Affect  .12 .01 [.005; .059] 
Note: †p< .1; *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. RRS, Ruminative Response Scale; BDI-II, Beck 
Depression Inventory-II; T1, baseline measurement; ε, relative importance weight.  
 
DISCUSSION 
The present study aimed to investigate the predictive contribution of the 
dynamic structure (i.e., entropy) of rumination and affect in daily life to depressive 
symptoms and trait rumination in an unselected sample. We found that entropy 
marginally significantly predicted depressive symptomatology and significantly 
predicted changes in trait rumination at six weeks follow-up while taking into account 
baseline depressive symptoms and trait rumination. 
The current results showed a tendency that entropy predicted changes in 
depressive symptoms at six weeks follow-up. In line with previous study (Koster et al., 
2015), these findings suggest that more disorganized patterns of thought and affect 
predict more symptoms later on. Although there was only a tendency for this predictive 
effect of entropy on depressive symptoms, it should be noted that the presented 
predictive effects were attained after controlling for the contribution of both depressive 
symptoms and trait rumination at baseline. Similarly, we also found that entropy 
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predicted the changes in trait rumination at six weeks follow-up. The latter finding is 
consistent with previous study (Koster et al., 2015) showing that entropy marginally 
significantly predicted depressive rumination2 in both remitted depressed and healthy 
control participants after six months.  
Interestingly, in our study, we found that only entropy but not the content 
variables (i.e., mean level of momentary rumination and affect) showed a predictive 
effect on depressive symptoms after six weeks. In fact, visit entropy in the state space 
grid can be considered as one of the most content-independent measures of variability 
(Hollenstein, 2013). These results provide additional support for previous findings that 
the structure of emotional states contributes distinctively to the prediction of 
psychopathology (for a review, see Hollenstein et al., 2013). Although the content 
variables in the current study were not predictive of psychopathology, it is important to 
notice that the content variables could still provide meaningful information (Kuppens, 
Oravecz, & Tuerlinckx, 2010; Pasyugina et al., 2015). The findings concerning the 
predictive value of entropy of our study simply emphasize that the structure itself may 
have its specific contribution to the prediction of depressive symptoms and trait 
rumination.  
The observation that higher entropy is predictive for higher future levels of 
depressive symptoms and trait rumination raises questions regarding the potential 
(mal)adaptive nature of variability within a system. It has been proposed that the 
concept and the effect of variability should be considered within context. Concerning 
the relation between variability and mental health, a non-linear relationship has been 
proposed (Guastello, 2015), which suggests that adaptive systems may display 
variability in mid-range values. In contrast, too low levels of variability would represent 
a rigid system whereas too high levels of variability may represent a disordered system, 
both of which are assumed to be maladaptive (in terms of flexible adaptation to daily 
                                                 
2
 Here, we only provided the results for total trait rumination scores without taking into account 
the scores in the brooding and reflection subscales. In contrast, in the previous study no total 
rumination scores were available given that only the brooding and reflection subscales were 
assessed (Koster et al., 2015). However, it is important to note that in our current study, when 
we include brooding or reflection as DVs in the HRA analysis, no significant results were 
obtained. This might be due to the fact that the total rumination score allows more variability 
than the scores in the subscales. 
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life stressors). Indeed, in a meta-analysis it has been shown that too much 
unpredictability (operationalized as higher levels of self-complexity) has a moderate 
depressogenic effect (Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002). 
Our findings have potential implications for understanding the development and 
prevention of depression. First, previous research indicates that the impact of 
rumination on negative affect does not predict change in depressive symptoms 
(Pasyugina et al., 2015). However, DST proposes that the whole system presents 
specific characteristics that cannot be observed within sub-components. In the current 
study the predictive effect of entropy on trait rumination and depressive symptoms 
suggests that the dynamic pattern of momentary rumination and affect can contribute 
to the development of depression. Second, according to the DST, increased variability 
may represent an early warning signal of system transition (Hayes et al., 2015). The fact 
that higher levels of entropy were associated with higher levels of trait rumination may 
indicate that the systems of those who are vulnerable to depression are more unstable 
and have potentials to change. It may imply a critical period for carrying out 
interventions that may prevent these dynamic patterns from changing into more rigid 
depressive patterns (Tschacher, Scheier, & Grawe, 1995). 
There are some limitations to our study. First, the follow-up measurements 
were conducted after six weeks which is still relatively short for monitoring change in 
depressive symptomatology, especially if one wants to explore the predictive value of 
entropy for occurrence of depressive episodes (e.g., entropy as an affective risk 
marker). Assessing depressive symptoms over a longer period may provide additional 
information about the prospective influence of the dynamic pattern. Second, there are 
a wealth of constructs that assess different aspects of the dynamic pattern. Future 
studies should consider other dynamic attributes as well in order to gain a more 
comprehensive view of the dynamic pattern between rumination and affect and its 
predictive effect on depressive symptoms. Third, momentary rumination was not 
significantly correlated with trait rumination in our study, whereas some studies that 
explored the association between momentary rumination and trait rumination have 
shown medium positive correlations between both constructs (Moberly & Watkins, 
2008; Pasyugina et al., 2015). This result might be due to the specific setting in the 
current study in which the order of the momentary measurements was randomized not 
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only within the two items of rumination itself, but also between assessments of 
rumination and affect. As such, the measure of rumination was not always followed by 
the measure of affect which may bias the evaluation of rumination based on the value 
of affect. Similar findings were reported by Huffziger et al. (2013), where momentary 
rumination was not significantly associated with brooding at baseline in the remitted 
depressed group and with reflection at baseline in the healthy control group.    
CONCLUSION 
Our experience sampling study investigated whether the structure of the 
dynamic pattern of (i.e., entropy) rumination and affect in daily life predicts future 
depressive symptoms and trait rumination. We found that there was a tendency for 
entropy to predict depressive symptoms at six weeks follow-up after controlling for 
baseline depressive symptomatology and trait rumination. Entropy also was a 
significant predictor for trait rumination at six weeks follow-up. Overall, our findings 
provide evidence that the structure of the dynamic pattern of momentary rumination 
and affect has its specific contribution to the development of depression and trait 
rumination. 
  
DAILY DYNAMICS IN RUMINATION AND AFFECT 
 
 
151 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This research was supported by a China Scholarship Council (CSC) grant 
(201306770031) awarded to Lin Fang. Igor Marchetti is a postdoctoral research fellow 
of the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO). Kristof Hoorelbeke is funded by Ghent 
University (Special Research Fund, BOFDOC2015002801). 
  
CHAPTER 6 
 
 
152 
REFERENCES 
Beck, A.T., Steer, R.A., & Brown, G.K. (1996). Manual for the Beck Depression Inventory-
II. San Antonio, TX: Psychological Corporation. 
Brans, K., Koval, P., Verduyn, P., Lim, Y. L., & Kuppens, P. (2013). The regulation of 
negative and positive affect in daily life. Emotion, 13, 926-939. 
Ciesla, J., & Roberts, J.E. (2007). Rumination, negative cognition, and their interactive 
effects on depressed mood. Emotion, 7, 555-565. 
Guastello, S.J. (2015). The complexity of the psychological self and the principle of 
optimum variability. Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life Science, 19, 511-
527. 
Hayes, A.F., & Cai, L. (2007). Using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard error 
estimators in OLS regression: An introduction and software implementation. 
Behavior Research Methods, 39, 709-722. 
Hayes, A.M., Yasinski, C., Barnes, J.B., & Bockting, C.L.H. (2015). Network destabilization 
and transition in depression: New methods for studying the dynamics of 
therapeutic change. Clinical Psychology Review, 41, 27-39. 
Heath, R.A. (2000). Nonlinear dynamics: techniques and applications in psychology. 
Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Hofmann, W., & Patel P.V. (2015). SurveySignal: A convenient solution for experience 
sampling research using participants’ own smartphones. Social Science 
Computer Review, 33, 235-253. 
Hollenstein, T. (2013). State space grids: Depicting dynamics across development. New 
York, NY: Springer. 
Hollenstein, T., Lichtwarck-Aschoff, A., & Potworowski, G. (2013). A model of 
socioemotional flexibility at three time scales. Emotion Review, 5, 397-405. 
DAILY DYNAMICS IN RUMINATION AND AFFECT 
 
 
153 
Hoorelbeke, K., Koster, E.H.W., Demeyer, I., Loeys, T., & Vanderhasselt, M.A. (2016). 
Effects of cognitive control training on the dynamics of (mal)adaptive emotion 
regulation in daily life. Emotion, 16, 945-956.  
Huffziger, S., Ebner-Priemer, U., Zamoscik, V., Reinhard, I., Kirsch, P., & Kuehner, C. 
(2013). Effects of mood and rumination on cortisol levels in daily life: An 
ambulatory assessment study in remitted depressed patients and healthy 
controls. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 38, 2258-2267. 
Johnson, J.W. (2000). A heuristic method for estimating the relative weight of predictor 
variables in multiple regression. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 35, 1-19. 
Johnson, J.W., & LeBreton, J.M. (2004). History and use of relative importance indices in 
organizational research. Organizational Research Methods, 7, 283-299. 
Kasch, K.L., Klein, D.N., & Lara, M.E. (2001). A construct validation study of the 
Response Styles Questionnaire Rumination Scale in participants with a recent-
onset major depressive episode. Psychological Assessment, 13, 375-383. 
Kircanski, K., Thompson, R.J., Sorenson, J.E., Sherdell, L., & Gotlib, I.H. (2015). 
Rumination and worry in daily life: Examining the naturalistic validity of 
theoretical constructs. Clinical Psychological Science, 3, 926-939.  
Koster, E.H.W., Fang, L., Marchetti, I., Ebner-Priemer, U., Kirsch, P., Huffziger, S., & 
Kuehner, C. (2015). Examining the relation between mood and rumination in 
remitted depressed individuals: A dynamic systems analysis. Clinical 
Psychological Science, 3, 619-627. 
Kuppens, P., Oravecz, Z., & Tuerlinckx, F. (2010). Feelings change: accounting for 
individual differences in the temporal dynamics of affect. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 99, 1042-1060. 
Lamey, A., Hollenstein, T., Lewis, M.D., & Granic, I. (2004). GridWare (Version 1.1) 
[Computer software]. Retrieved from http://statespacegrids.org 
CHAPTER 6 
 
 
154 
Lewis, M.D., & Granic, I. (2000). Emotion development and self-organization: Dynamic 
systems approaches to emotional development. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Mainzer, K. (2007). Thinking in complexity (5th ed.). Berlin: Springer: Complexity. 
Mitchell, M. (2009). Complexity: A guided tour. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Moberly, N.J., & Watkins, E.R. (2008). Ruminative self-focus and negative affect: An 
experience sampling study. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 117, 314-323. 
Mor, N., & Winquist, J. (2002). Self-focuses attention and negative affect: A meta-
analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 128, 638-662.  
Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1991). Responses to depression and their effects on the duration 
of depressive episodes. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 100, 569-582. 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Morrow, J. (1991). A prospective study of depression and 
posttraumatic stress symptoms after a natural disaster: The 1989 Loma Prieta 
earthquake. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 115-121. 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., Wisco, B.E., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2008). Rethinking rumination. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3, 400-424. 
Pasyugina, I., Koval, P., De Leersnyder, J., Mesquita, B., & Kuppens, P. (2015). 
Distinguishing between level and impact of rumination as predictors of 
depressive symptoms: An experience sampling study. Cognition and Emotion, 
29, 736-746. 
Raes, F., Hermans, D., & Eelen, P. (2003). De Nederlandstalige versie van de Ruminative 
Response Scale en de Rumination on Sadness Scale (The Dutch version of the 
Rumination Response Scale and the Rumination on Sadness Scale). 
Gedragstherapie, 36, 97-104. 
Rafaeli-Mor, E., & Steinberg, J. (2002). Self-complexity and well-being: A review and 
research synthesis. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6, 31-58. 
DAILY DYNAMICS IN RUMINATION AND AFFECT 
 
 
155 
Ruscio, A.M., Gentes, E.L., Jones, J.D., Hallion, L.S., Coleman, E.S., & Swendsen, J. (2015). 
Rumination predicts heightened responding to stressful life events in major 
depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 124, 17-26. 
Shannon, C.E., & Weaver, W. (1949). The mathematical theory of communication. 
Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
Sravish, A.V., Tronick, E., Hollenstein, T., & Beeghly, M. (2013). Dyadic flexibility during 
the face-to-face still-face paradigm: A dynamic systems analysis of its temporal 
organization. Infant Behavior and Development, 36, 432-437. 
Takano, K., & Tanno, Y. (2011). Diurnal variation in rumination. Emotion, 11, 1046-1058. 
Thelen, E. (1995). Motor development: a new synthesis. American Psychologist, 50, 79-
95. 
Thelen, E., & Smith, L.B. (1998). Dynamic systems theories. In W. Damon (Ed.), 
Handbook of child psychology: Vol.1. Theoretical models of human development 
(5th ed., pp. 563-634). New York: Wiley. 
Tonidandel, S., & LeBreton, J.M. (2015). RWA Web: a free, comprehensive, web-based, 
and user-friendly tool for relative weight analyses. Journal of Business and 
Psychology, 30, 207-216. 
Treynor, W., Gonzalez, R., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2003). Rumination reconsidered: A 
psychometric analysis. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27, 247-259. 
Tschacher, W., Scheier, C., & Grawe, K. (1995). Order and pattern formation in 
psychotherapy. Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life Science, 2, 195-215. 
Van der Does, A.J.W. (2002). Handleiding bij de Nederlandse versie van de Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI-II-NL) (2nd ed.). In The Dutch version of the Beck 
Depression Inventory –II. Lisse, NL: Swets & Zeitlinger. 
CHAPTER 6 
 
 
156 
Watkins, E.R. (2008). Constructive and unconstructive thought. Psychological Bulletin, 
134, 163-206. 
Wichers, M. (2014). The dynamic nature of depression: a new micro-level perspective of 
mental disorder that meets current challenges. Psychological Medicine, 44, 
1349-1360. 
Young, L.S. (2003). Entropy in dynamical systems. In Greven, A., Keller, G., &Warnecke, 
G. (Eds.), Entropy (pp. 313-328). New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
 
 
157 
 
 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
Remember the time when we broke up with someone or when our beloved pet 
died? We were overwhelmed with sadness. We may think again and again about those 
difficult moments as well as how bad our feelings were. After a while, some people may 
be able to stop such negative thinking, but for others, it seems very difficult to get rid of 
those sad thoughts. This raises the question of what factors make some people tend to 
ruminate more often than others, and how people who ruminate get trapped in the 
vicious cycle of rumination. To address these issues, several theoretical frameworks 
have been proposed, such as the cognitive inhibition hypothesis (Joormann, 2010), and 
the account of the impaired disengagement hypothesis (Koster, De Lissnyder, 
Derakhshan, & De Raedt, 2011), both of which characterize individuals in high trait 
rumination as having impaired cognitive control for negative information. Consistent 
with these theoretical frameworks, a large number of studies have shown that high 
levels of rumination are associated with impaired cognitive control (i.e., inhibition or 
attentional disengagement) for negative stimuli. However, cognitive control difficulties 
have also been found in some previous studies where non-negative stimuli were 
presented (Joormann, 2006; Joormann & Tran, 2009; LeMoult, Arditte, D’Avanzato, & 
Joormann, 2013). A recent cognitive model- the attentional scope model of rumination- 
has been developed, trying to provide explanations for these mixed findings in a more 
complex view of the cognitive control mechanisms of rumination (Whitmer & Gotlib, 
2013).  
With regard to the first issue, the attentional scope model of rumination states 
that individual differences in the attentional scope are important cognitive factors that 
make some individuals ruminate more than others (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). They 
argued that when individuals with a narrow attentional scope are in a negative mood, 
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the negative-mood congruence bias would make their restrained attention scope only 
focus on negative information. In contrast, when they are in a neutral mood, there is no 
negative attentional bias. Consequently, the constrained way of allocating attentional 
resources can affect their processing of both negative and other valences of 
information.  With these hypotheses, this model can potentially interpret previous 
contradicting findings that rumination is associated with processing difficulties not only 
in negative stimuli but also in positive or neutral stimuli. However, until now, few 
empirical studies have directly tested the assumptions of this model (e.g., Grol, Hertel, 
Koster, & De Raedt, 2015). Therefore, the aim of the first research line of this doctoral 
project (Chapter 2, 3 and 4) was to explore the relation between attentional scope and 
rumination based on the hypotheses made by the attentional scope model of 
rumination. Specifically, we focused on whether the association of attentional scope 
and rumination could be found when processing all types of information, and whether 
changing attentional scope could causally affect rumination.  
Noteworthy, even if people ruminate, it may not always be followed with 
negative consequences. Some researchers have argued that ruminative thinking is not 
necessarily a maladaptive emotion regulation strategy, but it is the persistent or 
habitual use of rumination that is associated with impaired problem solving, increasing 
negative emotions and development of depression (Koster et al., 2011; Watkins & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2014). Indeed, rumination has also proved to have adaptive effects 
under certain conditions (Watkins, 2004; 2008). To investigate how individuals who 
ruminate develop maladaptive rumination, it is important to examine how ruminative 
thinking changes in daily life. According to the attentional scope model of rumination, 
individuals who tend to ruminate quite often have a more narrow attentional scope so 
that they devote more attentional resources into what they are currently attending, 
which induces deeper encoding of the information which is in the centre of their 
attention (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). This may lead to a better performance (and 
probably a positive mood) when in the situation that requires focused attention, 
whereas in a situation that asks for distributing attentional resources in a more 
extended way, processing information with a narrow attentional scope may result in a 
relatively poor performance (and perhaps a negative mood). Thus, the daily dynamics of 
ruminative thinking and affect in high ruminators, who in general ruminate more across 
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contexts, are supposed to be more complex than in low ruminators. This putatively 
unstable dynamic pattern may be associated with maladaptive trait rumination and 
future depressive symptoms. The second research line aimed to address this issue with 
experience sampling studies (Chapter 5 and 6), exploring the daily dynamics of 
momentary ruminative thinking and affect. The association between daily dynamics and 
maladaptive dispositions was then investigated by examining the predictive effect of 
the daily dynamics of ruminative thinking and affect on the follow-up measurements of 
trait rumination and depressive symptoms.  
The main findings and contributions of this doctoral project are summarized 
below. 
 THE RELATION BETWEEN ATTENTIONAL SCOPE AND RUMINATION 
To systematically investigate the propositions of the attentional scope model of 
rumination, a series of studies have been conducted. In Chapter 2, we tested the 
prediction that individuals with high levels of rumination may have a more narrow 
scope of attention. This would affect their processing of not only negative information 
but also neutral information when they are not in a negative mood (Whitmer & Gotlib, 
2013). High and low ruminators were recruited after pre-screening based on their RRS 
scores. A well-validated moving window paradigm was employed to measure 
attentional scope, during which participants’ eye movements were recorded (McConkie 
& Rayner, 1975). Participants were asked to read the sentences as usual and try to 
understand their meaning. In the small, medium and large window size conditions, 
participants could only see the characters within an invisible window, which moves with 
individuals’ gaze fixation, whereas the text outside the window was covered with blank. 
They also performed in a no-window condition as a natural reading reference, where all 
characters of the sentence were presented on the screen. The rationale of this 
paradigm is that when the window size is narrower than individuals’ attentional scope, 
then they would process the sentence with more difficulties than when they read in a 
natural condition. Correspondingly, when the window size is as large as, or larger than, 
individuals’ attentional scope, they would read the sentence as if they were in the 
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natural reading condition. The positive and negative mood on baseline were assessed 
to control for mood influence on attentional scope, and neutral self- and other-related 
sentences were used as reading material. The results of this study revealed that 
individuals in the high trait rumination group read faster, reflecting by shorter total 
time of reading, larger reading rate, and using less number of fixations than individuals 
in the low trait rumination group across self- and other-related sentences in the small 
window size condition, which was the most difficult reading condition relative to the 
natural reading condition (no-window condition). Therefore, these results suggested 
that high ruminators exhibit a more narrow attentional scope when processing neutral 
information. These findings are compatible with the hypothesis of the attentional scope 
model of rumination that narrow attentional scope can affect the information 
processing of neutral information when high ruminators are in neutral mood. 
However, because only neutral sentences were selected as the reading material 
in this study, we cannot generalize these findings into other types of valence. Hence, a 
second study was conducted (Chapter 3) to examine whether the relation between 
attentional scope and rumination could be observed in relation to different valences of 
information. For this purpose, negative, neutral and positive sentences were included 
as reading material in the same moving window paradigm. Different division of areas of 
interest were also made to provide precise details with regard to the processing of 
emotional and non-emotional words of each sentence. The results of a sample with 
sufficient variation in trait rumination demonstrated that individuals with high levels of 
rumination exhibit a narrower attentional scope than individuals with low levels of 
rumination when reading all the presented valences of sentence after controlling for 
baseline mood. Taken together, our findings of Chapter 2 and 3 provided evidence for 
the main predictions of the attentional scope model of rumination concerning the 
relation between attentional scope and rumination, that when individuals are not in a 
negative mood, high ruminators show a constrained attentional scope when processing 
both neutral and emotional information. Interestingly, in the second study (Chapter 3), 
the faster total reading time of high ruminators was no longer observed when 
processing negative information in the small window size condition. This may indicate 
that, even though attention is more focused in general, across all valences of 
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information, high ruminators may still treat negative information differently from non-
negative information. 
In the first two studies, we reported an observed association between 
attentional scope and rumination, but due to the cross-sectional nature of the design, 
the causal direction of this link is still not clear. Therefore, we ran a training study in 
which attentional scope was manipulated, in order to investigate the causal effects of 
attentional scope on rumination (Chapter 4). Previous studies have shown that training 
attentional scope with only one task in a single-session did not work successfully in 
modulating attentional scope (Fang et al., in press). To strengthen training effect, we 
adopted a multiple-session training (5 days) with a combination of a modified version of 
Global-Local task (Navon, 1977) and a visuospatial training task (Fang et al., in press). 
The transfer effects of training on attentional scope were assessed with a Global-Local 
assessment task and with a visuospatial attentional breadth assessment task (Bosmans, 
Braet, Koster, & De Raedt, 2009; Grol et al., 2015). Moreover, the transfer effects of 
training on rumination were tested when participants were confronted with a realistic 
stressful situation under lab conditions. Surprisingly, only a narrowing effect was 
observed in the Global-Local assessment task, whereas there was no other evidence 
that training yielded the intended effect neither on the Global-Local assessment task 
nor on the visuospatial attentional breadth assessment task. As a result, we cannot 
make any firm conclusions about the causal link between attentional breadth and 
rumination. 
PREDICTIVE EFFECT OF DYNAMICS OF RUMINATIVE THINKING AND AFFECT ON TRAIT 
RUMINATION AND DEPRESSION 
The studies presented in previous chapters (Chapter 2, 3, and 4) sought to 
address the question concerning what cognitive factors make some individuals 
ruminate more often than others by exploring the relation between attentional scope 
and rumination. However, how daily ruminative thinking is associated with maladaptive 
trait rumination and future depressive symptoms is still unclear. To uncover the 
dynamics of daily ruminative thinking and mood, we conducted a secondary analysis 
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(Chapter 5) on an experience sampling study, in which remitted depressed patients and 
never-depressed individuals were asked to evaluate their momentary rumination and 
mood ten times a day during two consecutive days (Huffziger et al., 2013). We put 
these two momentary measurements into a Dynamic System theory (DST) framework, 
which states that a dynamic system is a system with different components that change 
over time (Lewis & Granic, 2000; Thelen & Smith, 1998). In terms of the DST, the 
changing momentary rumination and mood can be considered as two components of a 
dynamic system. We used entropy, a measure of the amount of information generated 
as a system changes (Mitchell, 2009; Shannon & Weaver, 1949; Young, 2003), as the 
main index in depicting the dynamics of the whole system. Additionally, their 
depressive symptoms and trait rumination were assessed at baseline and at six months 
follow-up. We found that entropy predicted depressive symptoms at six months follow-
up only in remitted depressive patients. More precisely, a higher level of entropy, which 
represents a highly disorganized dynamic pattern of ruminative thinking and mood, was 
associated with more depressive symptoms at follow-up in remitted depressive 
patients. In addition, there was a tendency that entropy predicted the brooding 
subtype of rumination at follow-up in both groups.  
Intriguingly, since the mean levels of entropy were not significantly different 
between two groups, it is possible to speculate that the functional organizations of the 
two systems are intrinsically different. While more variable fluctuations in remitted 
depressed individuals represent a marker of future depressive symptoms, the same 
level of variability does not signal any future maladjustment in healthy individuals. In 
line with this interpretation, it has been suggested different populations (and different 
systems) could have different optimal levels of entropy (Cunningham, Dunfield, 
Stillman, 2013). This, in turn, potentially implies the existence of group-specific 
thresholds in marking the transition between constructive and unconstructive 
variability (flexibility vs. instability; Hollenstein, Lichtwarck-Aschoff, & Potworowski, 
2013). 
It should be noted that the healthy controls in previous study (Chapter 5) were 
selected strictly as a comparative group (i.e., never depressed individuals) to remitted 
depressive group so that they had relatively low levels of depressive symptoms at 
baseline. It remains unknown whether and how the dynamics of ruminative thinking 
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and mood in daily life predicts future trait rumination and depressive symptoms in a 
more general population. Therefore, a more intensive experience sampling study was 
conducted (Chapter 6), in which participants in an unselected sample with sufficient 
variation in depressive symptoms and trait rumination were asked to rate their 
momentary ruminative thinking and affect eight times a day within seven days. Their 
trait rumination and depressive symptoms were measured at baseline and at six weeks 
follow-up. Entropy was found to significantly predict trait rumination and to marginally 
significantly predict depressive symptoms at follow-up after controlling for the baseline 
depressive symptoms and trait rumination. In accordance with our previous study 
(Chapter 5), higher levels of entropy were associated with higher levels of trait 
rumination and depressive symptoms after six weeks. Crucially, entropy could explain 
more variance of future depressive symptoms and trait rumination than mean level of 
momentary measurements. These findings are in line with previous studies revealing 
that the structure of a dynamic system (e.g., entropy) has its specific contribution to the 
prediction of psychopathology (Hollenstein et al., 2013). 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 
Attentional scope model of rumination 
Our findings are in accordance with the hypothesis from the attentional scope 
model stating that high ruminators exhibit a more narrow attentional scope when 
processing different types of information, when they are not in a negative mood 
(Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). These findings are also consistent with previous studies that 
showed different performances between high and low trait ruminators in the 
processing of not only negative but also non-negative materials (Joormann, 2006; 
Joormann & Tran, 2009; LeMoult et al., 2013). The attentional scope model of 
rumination points out that when individuals are in a neutral mood, there are no 
emotion-related attentional biases modulating the processing of specific type of 
information so that the narrow attentional scope can be used in processing of all 
information independent of their valence. Of note, though participants in the studies 
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reported did not provide information about their current mood state, participants 
showing rumination-related poor performance on both negative and non-negative 
stimuli, were all non-depressed individuals. Thus, they in general show less persistent 
negative mood than clinical depressive patients, and may then be less influenced by 
negative-emotion congruent attentional bias (e.g., Joormann & Tran, 2009). In both of 
our eye movement studies, the narrowing effect on performance still exist after 
controlling for baseline mood states. Our findings provide more direct evidence that the 
association between attentional scope and rumination is not driven by mood. In 
contrast, the valence-specific impairment related to rumination was mainly observed in 
dysphoric (Joormann, 2004) and clinically depressed patients (Goeleven, De Raedt, 
Baert, & Koster, 2006). Noteworthy, there were studies using non-depressed samples 
that showed valence-specific impairment with high ruminators (Southworth, Grafton, 
MacLeod, & Watkins, 2017). Nevertheless, some of them can still be interpreted by the 
attentional scope model of rumination. For example, Vålenas and colleagues (2017) 
reported that rumination was associated with impaired disengagement of attention 
from negative words in undergraduates who were preparing mid-term exams. In light of 
the assumptions of the attentional scope model of rumination, this stressful period 
might cause a negative attentional bias that had already constrained the narrow 
attentional scope in negative-related stimuli. 
Moreover, even though high ruminators have been proposed to exhibit 
narrower attentional scope in the processing all types of stimuli, there is still the 
possibility that they attended differently to different information with specific self-
references and/or valences. Our research also took the feature of information’s self-
reference and valence into account. Since rumination is characterized as self-related 
repetitive thoughts (Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Takano, Sakamoto, & Tanno, 2013; 
Watkins, 2004; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2012) and has been related to increased activation of 
the neural network involved in self-referential processing (Johnstone, van Reekum, 
Urry, Kalin, & Davidson, 2007; Ray et al., 2005), self- and other-related sentences were 
used in the first eye movement study (Chapter 2). The findings showed that high levels 
of trait rumination were associated with a narrow attentional scope across self- and 
other-related sentences. This adds to the assumptions of the attentional scope model 
of rumination with regard to the types of information it encompassed, which mainly 
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refer to the valence of information. Contrary to our findings, Grol et al. (2015) reported 
that individuals with higher levels of trait rumination who underwent a state 
rumination induction showed a more narrow attentional scope for self-related 
information relative to other-related information. The incompatible findings may be in 
part due to the fact that self-involvement has been activated in the rumination 
induction, in which self-related scenario were provided to all participants (Grol et al., 
2015), while in our study there was no explicit instruction facilitating self-involvement. 
In order to test possible differences in the processing of different valences, in 
our second eye movement study (Chapter 3), we included neutral, positive and negative 
sentences which were all self-related. The results in the differential total reading time 
between negative sentences and non-negative sentences indicated that even though 
high ruminators have a narrow attentional scope when processing all types of 
information in neutral mood, they may still show different responses toward negative 
information. Previous studies have shown that high levels of trait rumination are 
associated with attentional bias towards negative information relative to positive 
or/and neutral stimuli (De Lissnyder, Koster, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2010; Donaldson, 
Lam, & Mathews, 2007). The attentional scope model of rumination argues that when 
individuals are in negative mood, negative attentional bias makes them only focus on 
negative self-related events. Alternatively, when there is lack of negative attentional 
bias, a narrow attention scope should be found also when dealing with non-negative 
information. Our findings support the latter prediction but also suggest that high 
ruminators may use more time to process negative information. However, the 
underlying mechanism of these observations is not clear yet and further research is 
warranted to clarify this question.  
The laboratory experiments in this project have suggested an association 
between attentional scope and trait rumination. However, it is still unclear how this 
narrowing effect can be demonstrated in a more ecological assessment, and whether it 
can be used to explain how people who ruminate more often develop the maladaptive 
habit of rumination in daily life. For this purpose, we explored the dynamic patterns of 
ruminative thinking and affect in two experience sampling studies in remitted 
depressed sample (Chapter 5) and a more general unselected sample (Chapter 6). In 
light of the attentional scope model of rumination, the narrow attentional scope of high 
CHAPTER 7 
 
166 
ruminators can be observed when processing different types of information. This may 
imply that they ruminate not just under negative situation but also under other 
circumstances (e.g., in non-negative conditions). For example, ruminative thinking 
about positive mood and information has been reported in a high positive mood state 
(Feldman, Joormann, & Johnson, 2008; Raes, Smets, Nelis, & Schoofs, 2012). In 
addition, the consequences of ruminative thinking are not always maladaptive. As such, 
the dynamics patterns of ruminative thinking and affect in daily life are supposed to be 
more complexed for high trait ruminators when they are not in a depressive episode. 
Indeed, both of our two ESM studies revealed a tendency that higher levels of 
rumination were associated with higher levels of entropy.  
Furthermore, considering how daily ruminative thinking develops to 
maladaptive trait rumination as well as increases depressive symptoms, our findings 
showed that higher levels of entropy were associated with higher levels of trait 
rumination and depressive symptoms at the follow-up assessments. Previous research 
has suggested that emotion regulation strategy that is not suitable for the current 
situation has detrimental impact on well-being (Haines et al., 2016; Troy, Shallcross, & 
Mauss, 2013). Accordingly, our findings that higher levels of entropy predicted higher 
future depressive symptoms may in part be due to the fact that individuals with higher 
levels of entropy ruminate without considering whether it fits the demands of the 
context. However, we cannot make sure whether this is the case, because we did not 
measure the details of the context connected with each measurement of ruminative 
thinking in our ESM studies. Additionally, although our findings that higher levels of 
entropy predicted higher future trait rumination can possibly be explained by the 
attentional scope model of rumination, since we did not assess individuals’ attentional 
scope before daily measurement, the proposed link between attentional scope and 
entropy still needs more direct evidence. Taken together, the findings in the experience 
sampling studies of this dissertation provide insight into extending the hypotheses of 
the attentional scope model of rumination into daily life experience. Future studies 
should try to specify the precise patterns involved in the daily dynamics of ruminative 
thinking and affect by including the attentional information of individuals and daily 
context. 
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Attentional scope training 
If individuals get stuck in the vicious cycle of rumination, is it possible for 
psychotherapeutic interventions to specifically tackle the problem of their ruminative 
thinking? Previous research has shown that cognitive-behaviour therapy that directly 
target rumination has promising treatment effects in ameliorating maladaptive 
ruminative thinking, and further enhancing the treatment in depression (Watkins, 2009; 
2016; Watkins et al., 2007). Our research also contributes a new perspective to the 
repertoire of training that specific focus on rumination. The findings of the lab studies 
and real life experience sampling studies in this dissertation suggest that not only the 
content of self-focused thought but also thinking in a restrained manner is associated 
with depressive rumination and depressive symptoms. However, it should be 
emphasized that a narrow attentional scope can be either detrimental by making 
individuals vulnerable to rumination or beneficial by helping people focus on the task at 
hand and avoiding distractive interference (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). Specifically, on 
the one hand, trait ruminators performed better than low ruminators on tasks that 
need people to maintain their attentional focus in task-relevant information 
(Altamirano, Miyake, & Whitmer, 2010; Zetsche & Joormann, 2011), whereas broad 
attentional scope decreased the quality of encoded information (Vanlessen, Rossi, De 
Raedt, & Pourtois, 2013). On the other hand, broad attentional breadth has been 
related to positive mood (Derryberry & Tucker, 1994; Rowe, Hirsh & Anderson, 2007), 
improved self-regulation (Hanif et al., 2012), enhanced resilience to stress (Fredrickson, 
2004), and increased cognitive flexibility (Olivers & Nieuwenhuis, 2005; Zmigrod, 
Zmigrod, & Hommel, 2015). In contrast, narrowed attentional breadth has been related 
to negative emotions (Fenske & Eastwood, 2003; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008), 
attention capture by negative stimuli (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2012), increased anxiety 
(Derryberry & Tucker, 1994), and high levels of rumination (Grol et al., 2015). Further, 
what we have uncovered in this dissertation is that high trait ruminators tend to 
allocate attentional resources in a constrained way even when they are not in a 
negative mood. Evidence from a growing number of studies has shown that high levels 
of rumination are associated with impaired set-shifting (Yang, Cao, Shields, Teng, & Liu, 
2016). Combined, it indicates that high ruminators are unlikely to change ruminative 
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thinking based on certain contexts since their attention is overly focused on their 
problems. This feature may be related to context-insensitivity which is observed in 
individuals with high depression scores (Haines et al., 2016). Accordingly, attentional 
scope training should switch from the goal of trying to change a narrow attentional 
scope into a broad one to the goal of enhancing the ability of using different attentional 
allocation strategies in accordance with contextual requirements.   
Prevention and treatment of maladaptive rumination and depression 
The findings of the two ESM studies showed that higher levels of entropy 
predicted higher levels of future depressive symptoms and trait rumination. It may 
seem counter-intuitive, since high variability is readily to be connected with positive 
qualities, such as flexible to change and creativity. However, it has been argued that 
whether the implication of high or low variability is adaptive or maladaptive depends on 
specific situation (Hollenstein et al., 2013). In fact, the concept and the effect of 
variability should be considered within a specific context. Recently, a non-linear 
relationship has been proposed regarding the relation between variability and mental 
health (Guastello, 2015; Lichtwarck-Aschoff, Kunnen, & van Geert, 2009; Lunkenheimer, 
Olsons, Hollenstein, Sameroff, & Winter, 2011). It states that adaptive systems may 
display variability in mid-range values. In contrast, too low levels of variability would 
represent a rigid system, whereas too high levels of variability may represent a 
disordered system, both of which are assumed to be maladaptive (in terms of flexible 
adaptation to daily life stressors). Indeed, in a meta-analysis, it has been shown that too 
much unpredictability (operationalized as higher levels of self-complexity) has a 
moderate depressogenic effect (Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002). According to the 
dynamic system theory, a system with high levels of entropy tends to change into a 
more stable system, which then leads to relatively lower levels of entropy. As a result, a 
system with high levels of entropy is assumed to be vulnerable to disturbance (Carver & 
Scheier, 1998). On the one hand, if the disturbance is related to stress and negative 
mood, then increased variability may represent an early warning signal of system 
transition to a stable depression system (Hayes, Yasinski, Barnes, & Bockting, 2015). On 
the other hand, if the disturbance is a psychotherapeutic intervention, then the 
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unstable system may imply a critical period for carrying out interventions that could 
prevent these dynamic patterns from changing into more rigid depressive patterns 
(Tschacher, Scheier, & Grawe, 1995). Our findings that higher levels of entropy were 
associated with higher levels of trait rumination may indicate that the systems of those 
who are vulnerable to depression are more unstable and have a higher potential to 
change.  
LIMITATION AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
There are several limitations of this PhD research that require consideration. 
First, most of the samples we used in this dissertation were unselected general 
population, except in Chapter 2 where we pre-selected high and low trait ruminators, 
and in Chapter 5 where the sample contained remitted depressive patients. Therefore, 
findings of these studies may not be generalized to depressive patients. For instance, 
individuals that are experiencing a current depressive episode are characterized by 
suffering prolonged and increased negative affect. The sustained negative-emotion 
congruent bias would then make them only focus about their negative feeling and its 
consequences. The findings that high levels of rumination were associated with 
valence-specific impairment in clinical depressed or dysphorics may support this 
assumption (Chen, Feng, Wang, Su, & Zhang, 2016; Goeleven et al., 2006). Besides, 
attentional breadth training may have better effects in individuals with high levels of 
depressive rumination, considering that healthy, non-clinical participants in general 
may present good cognitive functioning which causes little space for them to improve. 
Concerning the daily dynamics of ruminative thinking and affect for depressive trait 
ruminators, their dynamic patterns may be more rigid, possibly containing a strong 
attractor state characterized by high levels of momentary rumination and high levels of 
negative affect. One interesting direction for future studies would be to explore the 
relation between attentional scope and rumination, and dynamics of momentary 
ruminative thinking and affect in depressive ruminators.  
Second, in this dissertation, attentional scope was always measured at the 
perceptual level. In Chapter 2 and 3, a moving window task was used to assess the 
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attentional scope during reading. In Chapter 4, the transfer effects of training on 
attentional scope were assessed with the Global-Local assessment task (Navon, 1977), 
and the visuospatial attentional breadth assessment task (Bosmans et al., 2009; Grol et 
al., 2015). Given that control of internal mental representations is associated with 
rumination (De Lissnyder et al., 2012), ruminative thinking can be considered as mainly 
involving internal attention. In contrast, perceptual attention is identified as external 
attention (Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011). Particularly, visuospatial attention 
exerts its influence in modulating information that refers to representation of 
localization (Knudsen, 2007). Therefore, one might speculate that measures of 
attentional scope at the perceptual level cannot fully uncover the attentional 
distribution involved in rumination. Likewise, training attentional scope at perceptual 
level may limit the effectiveness of training on rumination. 
However, we would argue that there are a number of similarities between 
external attention and internal attention (Chun et al., 2011). For example, it is well-
established that both of them have restricted capacities. Consequently, individuals have 
to decide how to distribute their limited attentional resources when performing both 
external and internal attention tasks. Moreover, a region at superior parietal cortex has 
been found to be a common region that involved in switching spatial attention, task set 
and memory representations (Esterman, Chiu, Tamber-Rosenau, & Yantis, 2009). In 
addition, it has been shown that working memory contents can reciprocally interact 
with perceptual attention (Dell’Acqua, Sessa, Jolicoeur, & Robitaille, 2006; Lepsien, 
Griffin, Devlin, & Nobre, 2005). These findings may imply that assessing and training 
attentional scope at the perceptual level can still provide meaningful insights into the 
attentional allocation related to rumination. Still, future studies should use attentional 
scope manipulation and assessment that specifically target internal attention allocation 
and that operate at perceptual level. 
Third, in Chapter 4 we intended to manipulate attentional scope in an intensive 
multiple-session training to examine its effect on rumination, but we failed to find 
evidence that attentional scope has been modulated as expected. Thus, the causal 
relationship between rumination and attentional scope is still unknown. Nevertheless, 
previous studies have indirectly indicated that rumination can be reduced through 
expanding attentional scope. For example, physical exercise, which was reported to 
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induce a tendency related with broadened attentional scope (Barnes, Coombes, 
Armstrong, Higgins, & Janelle, 2010) has been reported to be associated with decreased 
ruminative thinking at three and nine weeks follow-up (Craft, 2005). Future studies 
should continue to investigate whether manipulating attentional scope has a causal 
impact on rumination.  
One thing may be worth considering when selecting a better way to manipulate 
attentional scope. Though accumulated evidence has suggested that positive mood can 
expand attentional scope (Hüttermann & Memmert, 2015; Rowe et al., 2007; Vanlessen 
et al., 2016), it is inappropriate to enlarge attentional scope by inducing positive mood. 
Because positive mood is strongly related to rumination and also positive mood may 
elicit other factors rather than pure attentional scope, such as impaired inhibitory 
control (Rowe et al., 2007). These may compound the need for detecting the effect of 
attentional scope which mainly refers to attentional resources allocation to task 
relevant stimuli and inhibition of unattended distractive information. Besides, the effect 
of positive mood has been shown to disappear fast (Vanlessen et al., 2013). More 
stringent manipulation is needed in order to provide validated and stable change of 
attentional scope. 
The limitation of our ESM studies is that we only carried out daily momentary 
measurement once without implementing any manipulation or induction (e.g., stressful 
induction). Thus, we cannot provide information about how people at risk of 
depression, such as high ruminators, develop a depressive episode after being 
confronted with stressful events. In terms of the Dynamic Systems Theory, the 
transition from a highly disorganized dynamic pattern to a rigid stable depressive 
system remains unknown. Also, not much has been investigated about how 
psychotherapy turns a rigid depressive system into a more flexible well-functioned 
system. Future research could consider using naturalistic stressful situations as external 
detrimental influences or, alternatively, using cognitive training as external beneficial 
influence. By comparing dynamic patterns of ruminative thinking and affect before and 
after these interventions, we can explore the transition at a system level, and also the 
resilient ability of a system that reflects its speed of recovery after perturbation.  
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
Attentional scope is one of the most important cognitive factors that are 
associated with the repetitive nature of rumination. The attentional scope model of 
rumination sought to explain the primary source of individual differences that makes 
some individuals ruminate more than others when encountering sad situations. This 
doctoral project set out to test different proposals of this model and our work has 
provided supportive evidence for its main predictions. We have demonstrated that 
individuals high in trait rumination exhibit a more narrow attentional scope in the 
processing of both neutral and emotional information when they are not in a negative 
mood. Moreover, our findings extended the application of this model to daily life 
context. The unstable and depressogenic dynamic patterns of ruminative thinking and 
affect in high trait ruminators reported in our experience sampling studies may reflect 
their usage of a constrained thinking style in inappropriate situations. However, due to 
the limited success of attentional breadth manipulations in our multiple-session 
training, we cannot draw any conclusion regarding the causal direction between 
attentional scope and rumination. Also, it remains unclear how exactly the daily 
dynamics of high ruminators transform after perturbation either caused by stressful 
events or by psychotherapy. Future studies are needed to investigate the potential 
effect of attentional scope on rumination, providing evidence not only from stringent 
laboratory experiments but also from a more ecological assessment of momentary 
rumination and affect in the ever-changing environments. This may help us gain a more 
comprehensive understanding of how attentional scope interacts with rumination, and 
as such provide insights into the development of a better treatment and prevention 
plan for individuals high in trait rumination, who are related to increased risk for 
depression.  
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*Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)?  
- [X] main researcher    
- [X] responsible ZAP    
- [ ] all members of the research group    
- [ ] all members of UGent    
- [ ] other (specify): ...    
       
4. Reproduction    
==============================================================  
*Have the results been reproduced?:    
[ ] YES / [X] NO    
If YES, by whom (add if multiple): / 
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Ruminatie is van bijzonder belang voor onderzoekers gericht op kwetsbaarheid 
voor depressie. Volgens de responsestyle theory theorie wordt ruminatie opgevat als 
een vorm van reageren op negatieve stemming die zich op een voortdurende en 
repetitieve wijze richt op de gevolgen, oorzaken en betekenis van iemands gevoelens 
en problemen (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). 
Tientallen jaren van onderzoek hebben aangetoond dat ruminatie een van de 
belangrijkste risicofactoren is voor het ontstaan en de instandhouding van depressieve 
symptomen (Mor & Winquist, 2002; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Twee belangrijke 
kwesties hebben veel aandacht gekregen in de afgelopen twee decennia. Ten eerste, 
welk type mensen de neiging hebben om vaker te rumineren dan anderen, en ten 
tweede, hoe mensen die rumineren vast komen te zitten in de vicieuze cirkel van dit 
rumineren. Verschillende theoretische kaders zijn voorgesteld en een grote 
hoeveelheid onderzoek is verricht met betrekking tot deze twee vragen (Joormann, 
2010; Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakhshan, & De Raedt, 2011).  
Whitmer en Gotlib (2013) hebben onlangs een attentional scope model van 
ruminatie ontwikkeld, in een poging om de aandachtsmechanismen bij ruminatie te 
begrijpen op een meer complete manier. Dit model stelt dat mensen met hoge 
ruminatiescores een vernauwde focus hebben van aandacht. Hoewel dit model een 
alternatieve verklaring biedt voor een groot aantal van de eerdere bevindingen in 
perceptie, werkgeheugen en het lange termijn geheugen, is er tot nu toe weinig 
onderzoek verricht dat dit model rechtstreeks toetst (Grol, Hertel, Koster, & De Raedt, 
2015). Daarom is in een reeks van studies in dit proefschrift getracht om systematisch 
de belangrijkste hypotheses van dit model te onderzoeken. 
Het belangrijkste doel van dit doctoraatsproject is om de onderliggende 
mechanismen van ruminatie en de impact ervan op de ontwikkeling van depressie te 
onderzoeken. In de eerste onderzoekslijn (hoofdstuk 2, 3 en 4) onderzoeken we 
rechtstreeks de voorspellingen van het attentional scope model van ruminatie dat 
individuele verschillen in aandachtsfocus invloed kan hebben op de neiging tot 
rumineren. In de tweede onderzoekslijn (hoofdstuk 5 en 6) onderzochten we de 
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dynamiek van de mechanismen van ruminatie in het dagelijks leven door de 
dynamische patronen in kortstondig ruminatief denken en affect te analyseren, die ons 
kunnen helpen om te begrijpen hoe rumineren zich ontwikkelt tot een maladaptieve 
gewoonte in het dagelijks leven. Hieronder vindt u de details van elk hoofdstuk 
samengevat. 
In hoofdstuk 2 testten we de voorspelling dat mensen met een hoog niveau van 
ruminatie een meer beperkte aandachtsfocus hebben. Dit zou niet enkel invloed 
hebben op de verwerking van negatieve informatie, maar ook op de verwerking van 
neutrale informatie als ze niet in een negatieve stemming zijn (Whitmer & Gotlib, 
2013). Hoge en lage rumineerders werden geselecteerd na pre-screening op basis van 
hun ruminatie scores. Een goed gevalideerd moving window paradigma werd gebruikt 
om de aandachtsbreedte te meten, waarbij de oogbewegingen van de deelnemers 
geregistreerd werden (McConkie & Rayner, 1975). De deelnemers werden gevraagd 
zinnen te lezen en hun betekenis te verwerken. De positieve en negatieve stemming op 
baseline werden gemeten om te controleren voor de invloed van stemming op het 
aandachtsbreedte. Neutrale zelf- en andere gerelateerde zinnen werden als 
leesmateriaal gepresenteerd. De resultaten van deze studie toonden aan dat mensen in 
de groep met hoge scores op ruminatie als trek sneller lazen, wat bleek uit kortere 
totale tijd van het lezen, grotere leessnelheid, en minder aantal fixaties dan die in de 
groep met lage scores op de trek ruminatie in alle zelf- en andere gerelateerde zinnen 
in de conditie met een bepekt aandachtsvenster, die de moeilijkste leesconditie ten 
opzichte van het natuurlijk lezen was. De bevindingen suggereerden dat hoge 
rumineerders een smallere aandachtsfocus vertonen bij het verwerken van neutrale 
informatie na controle voor de positieve en negatieve stemming. 
Omdat evenwel alleen neutrale zinnen als leesmateriaal werden geselecteerd in 
dit onderzoek, kunnen we deze bevindingen niet generaliseren voor alle soorten 
informatie. Daarom werd een tweede studie (hoofdstuk 3) uitgevoerd die de relatie 
tussen aandachtsbreedte en ruminatie bij verschillende valenties van informatie 
onderzocht. Hiervoor werden negatieve, neutrale en positieve zinnen opgenomen als 
leesmateriaal in hetzelfde moving window paradigma. Verschillende interessegebieden 
werden geselecteerd om nauwkeurig bijzonderheden omtrent de behandeling van 
emotionele en niet-emotionele woorden in elke zin te achterhalen. De resultaten van 
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een niet-geselecteerde sample met voldoende variatie in trek ruminatie toonde aan dat 
hoge rumineerders een smallere aandachtsfocus hebben bij het verwerken van zowel 
neutrale en emotionele informatie na correctie voor baseline gemoedstoestand. 
Interessant is dat in de tweede studie (hoofdstuk 3) de snellere totale leestijd van hoge 
rumineerders niet langer werd waargenomen bij het verwerken van negatieve 
informatie in de conditie met een kleine venstergrootte. Dit kan erop wijzen dat, 
hoewel gebruik makend van een gerichte aandacht in de verwerking van allerlei 
informatie, hoge rumineerders negatieve informatie nog steeds anders verwerken dan 
niet-negatieve informatie. 
Om de causale relatie tussen ruminatie en aandachtsbreedte te testen, voerden 
we een training studie uit waarin het aandachtsbereik werd gemanipuleerd en het 
effect ervan op ruminatie werd onderzocht (hoofdstuk 4). We gebruikten een multiple-
sessie training (5 dagen) in combinatie met een aangepaste versie van de Global-Local 
taak (Navon, 1977) en een visueel-ruimtelijke training taak (Fang et al., In press). De 
overdracht effecten van de training op aandachtsbereik werden onderzocht met een 
Global-Local evaluatietaak en een visueel-ruimtelijke aandachtsbereik evaluatietaak 
(Bosmans, Braet, Koster, & De Raedt, 2009; Grol et al, 2015.). Daarnaast werden de 
overdracht effecten van training op ruminatie getest wanneer de deelnemers 
geconfronteerd werden met een stressvolle situatie in het lab. Helaas werd slechts een 
vernauwingseffect waargenomen in de Global-Local assessment taak, terwijl er geen 
ander bewijs werd gevonden dat de training de de gewenste effecten teweeg bracht in 
de Global-Local evaluatietaak, noch in de visueel-ruimtelijke aandachtsbereik 
evaluatietaak. Als gevolg daarvan kunnen we geen sterke conclusies maken over het 
oorzakelijk verband tussen aandachtsbreedte en ruminatie. 
Om de dynamiek van het dagelijkse ruminatief denken en stemming te 
ontdekken, voerden we een secundaire analyse (hoofdstuk 5) op een experience 
sampling studie, waarin depressieve patiënten en nooit-depressieve personen werden 
gevraagd om hun kortstondige ruminatie en stemming tien keer per dag gedurende 
twee opeenvolgende dagen te meten (Huffziger et al., 2013). Hun depressieve 
symptomen en trek ruminatie werden beoordeeld op baseline en op zes maanden 
follow-up. We gebruikten entropie, een maat voor de hoeveelheid voorspelbaarheid 
van informatie in een systeem (Shannon & Weaver, 1949), als de belangrijkste index 
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voor het weergeven van de dynamiek van het gehele systeem. De resultaten toonden 
aan dat een hogere entropie, wat een hoog gedesorganiseerd dynamisch patroon van 
ruminatief denken en stemming vertegenwoordigd, geassocieerd was met meer 
depressieve symptomen bij de follow-up van depressieve patiënten in remissie. 
Bovendien werd gevonden dat entropie ruminatie voorspelde bij follow-up in beide 
groepen. 
We dienen op te merken dat de gezonde controlesubjecten in de vorige studie 
(hoofdstuk 5) streng werden geselecteerd als een vergelijkingsgroep voor de 
depressieve groep in remissie zodat ze relatief geringe depressieve symptomen 
vertoonden bij aanvang. Het is niet bekend hoe de dynamiek van ruminatief denken en 
stemming in het dagelijks leven geassocieerd is met toekomstige trek ruminatie en 
depressieve symptomen in de meer algemene populatie. Daarom werd een 
intensievere experience sampling studie uitgevoerd (hoofdstuk 6), waarin de 
deelnemers van een niet-geselecteerde sample met voldoende variatie in depressieve 
symptomen en trek ruminatie werden gevraagd om hun kortstondige ruminatief 
denken en affect acht keer per dag gedurende zeven dagen te beoordelen. Hun trek 
ruminatie en depressieve symptomen werden gemeten bij aanvang en bij zes weken 
follow-up. Entropie bleek trek ruminatie en depressieve symptomen te voorspellen bij 
de follow-up na correctie voor de baseline depressieve symptomen en trek ruminatie. 
In overeenstemming met onze vorige studie (hoofdstuk 5), waren hoge niveaus van 
entropie geassocieerd met een hoge mate van trek ruminatie en depressieve 
symptomen na zes weken. Cruciaal is dat entropie meer variantie van toekomstige 
depressieve symptomen en trek ruminatie kan verklaren dan het gemiddelde niveau 
van ruminatie tijdens de experience sampling metingen. Deze bevindingen zijn in 
overeenstemming met eerdere studies waaruit blijkt dat de structuur van een systeem 
zijn specifieke bijdrage heeft voor de voorspelling van psychopathologie (Hollenstein, 
Lichtwarck-Aschoff, & Potworowski, 2013). 
Samengevat, aandachtsbreedte is één van de belangrijkste cognitieve factoren 
die samenhangen met de repetitieve aard van ruminatie. Het aandachtsbreedte model 
van ruminatie tracht de primaire bron van individuele verschillen te verklaren die 
ervoor zorgen dat sommige mensen meer rumineren dan anderen bij het ondervinden 
negatieve situaties. Het doel van dit project was om de verschillende predicties van dit 
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model te testen en het heeft verder bewijs voor de belangrijkste predicties geleverd. 
We hebben aangetoond dat individuen met hoge ruminatie trek een smallere focus van 
aandacht vertonen bij de verwerking van zowel neutrale en emotionele informatie 
wanneer ze niet in negatieve stemming zijn. Bovendien hebben onze bevindingen de 
toepassing van dit model uitgebreid naar de context van het dagelijkse leven. De 
instabiele en depressogene dynamische patronen van ruminatief denken en affect in de 
hoge trek rumineerders in onze experience sampling studie kunnen hun gebruik van 
een beperkte focus in aversieve of stresserende situaties weerspiegelen. Vanwege het 
beperkte succes van aandachtsbreedte manipulaties in onze multiple sessions training 
kunnen we geen conclusie over de causale richting tussen aandachtsbereik en 
ruminatie trekken. Ook blijft het onduidelijk hoe de dagelijkse dynamiek van hoge 
rumineerders exact veranderen na verstoringen, hetzij als gevolg van stressvolle 
gebeurtenissen of door psychotherapie. Toekomstige studies zijn nodig om het 
potentiële effect van aandachtsbreedte op ruminatie te onderzoeken, niet enkel via 
resultaten uit strenge laboratoriumexperimenten, maar ook via een meer ecologische 
evaluatie van kortstondige ruminatie en affect in steeds veranderende omgevingen. Dit 
kan ons helpen om een meer omvattend begrip te krijgen van hoe aandachtsbreedte 
interageert met ruminatie, en als zodanig inzicht bieden in de ontwikkeling van een 
betere behandeling en een preventieplan voor individuen hoog in trek ruminatie, 
gerelateerd aan een verhoogd risico op depressie. 
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